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ABSTRACT 
THE FINANCIAL SECTOR AND INCLUSIVE DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: 
ESSAYS ON ACCESS TO FINANCE FOR SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED 
ENTERPRISES IN SOUTH SUDAN AND KENYA 
 
MAY 2014 
 
JAMES ALIC GARANG, B.S., UNIVERSITY OF UTAH 
 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professors James Boyce and Leonce Ndikumana 
 
 
 
This dissertation, consisting of three essays, uses data from field surveys of banks and 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) conducted in South Sudan and Kenya from July 
2011 through September 2012. The first essay examines the role of financial sector 
development in expanding access to finance by SMEs in Kenya. We find that while the 
financial system in general, and the Central Bank of Kenya in particular, have made 
headway in expanding financial inclusion in Kenya, small firms continue to face more 
constraints in access to finance compared to larger firms. The policy emphasis on 
financial inclusion, coupled with the widespread innovations in information and 
communications technology, such as M-Pesa and agency banking, are furthering the 
expansion of the access frontier in Kenya. The second essay assesses access to finance by 
SMEs in South Sudan, based on a survey conducted in three of the country’s ten states. 
Using a Probit model estimation, we find that not only does size of the firm matter, but 
also that distance from Juba is inversely related to access to finance by SMEs. The final 
essay draws lessons from the Kenyan experience, in light of the findings on access to 
 vii 
 
finance in South Sudan, to formulate proposals for innovative financial services for 
SMEs and with regard to the regulatory framework for financial sector development in 
South Sudan. The aim throughout the dissertation is to explore how the financial sector 
can serve to advance the goal of inclusive economic development. Policy 
recommendations emphasize strengthening the regulatory framework, land rights 
administration, channeling oil resource revenues to fuel broad-based economic 
development, and pursuing financial inclusion as an objective in its own right and not just 
a byproduct of economic development.  
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CHAPTER 1 
SETTING THE STAGE 
1.1 Introduction 
Recent years have seen a policy shift to “finance for all” (Marshall, 2004; Helms, 2006; 
World Bank, 2008; Chibba, 2009), including finance for Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprise (SMEs), in particular (Ardic, Mylenko, & Saltane, 2012). Billed as dynamic 
job creators (Buckley, 1996; Duarte, 2004; Ganbold, 2008; SBA, 2009; Ardic, Mylenko, 
& Saltane, 2012), SMEs make up majority of firms in developing countries. Yet SMEs 
tend to face significant constraints in accessing credit and other financial services, owing 
to geographical distance from financial centers, affordability, lack of collateral, poor or 
nonexistent credit history and other non-price barriers (Beck & Honohan, 2007; Ardic, 
Mylenko, & Saltane, 2012;Demirguc-Kunt & Klapper, 2013).  
However, individual governments, development financial institutions and other 
stakeholders are realizing today that financial inclusion can bring many important 
benefits (Chakravarty & Pal, 2013). Expanding the access frontier can have economy-
wide consequences, especially by making SMEs as a powerful means to poverty 
reduction  and fostering the Financial Inclusion-Poverty Reduction-Millennium 
Development Goals nexus(FI-PR-MDG nexus) (Chibba, 2009). An inclusive financial 
sector can generate positive externalities to the governments, contributing to job creation, 
and macroeconomic stability. From the standpoint of the banking sector, financial 
inclusion brings about a broader client base and dependable source of funding. It also 
reduces some risks in money laundering activities by bringing much of 
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unregulated/underground economy into the regulated sector, thereby achieving financial 
stability and integrity.1 Finally, from the perspective of households and SMEs, financial 
inclusion provides opportunities to borrow and save, offers efficient means of making 
payments, and facilitate investment in housing, education, insurance, and firm growth 
(Aduda & Kalunda, 2012; Hurtado, Torres, & Hayem, 2013).  
1.2 Background of the Research Problem, Hypotheses and Justification of the 
Study 
1.2.1 Background of the Research Problem 
Throughout the world, and in Africa in particular, the quest for financial inclusion and 
inclusive economic development is now more than ever paramount (Aduda & Kalunda, 
2012: Calice, 2013; Hayem, Hurtado, & Torres, 2013). Expressing this policy agenda, the 
African Development Bank (AfDB) publication Financial Inclusion in Africa (2013) 
states thus: “A clear paradigm shift has resulted in a more inclusive and sustainable 
growth. For its part, the African Development Bank has launched its Ten-Year Strategy 
2013-2022, the main thrust of which is inclusive and green growth” (Foreword, p. 9). 
Despite high-level policy support, SMEs tend to face significant problems in all 
economies (Ardic, Mylenko, & Saltane, 2012; Demirguc-Kunt & Klapper, 2013). 
Nowhere are these problems more acute than in post-conflict and fragile states, where 
weak institutions, poor infrastructure, political instability, lack of enforcement 
                                                          
1 Even though the largest amount of money laundering activities (MLA) is orchestrated 
by individuals and agencies that are financially included and the MLA linked to lack of 
financial service is minimal, financial inclusion brings to the open for policymakers to 
see what was already underground. 
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mechanisms, and underdeveloped financial systems prevail (Sile, 2013). At the same 
time, the desire to maintain harmony and provide peace dividends is compelling in these 
settings, bringing greater urgency to the role of SMEs in creating jobs.  
This study sets out to analyze credit market access by SMEs in the post-conflict setting of 
South Sudan and to this end, draw lessons from neighboring Kenya. The aim throughout 
the dissertation is to identify ingredients of successful financial sector development and 
regulatory frameworks (see Chapter 5). The overarching goal is to formulate financing 
strategies for South Sudan that will enhance SME job creation and poverty reduction. 
1.2.2 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
     The study explores and seeks answers to the following questions: 
1. What are the major obstacles to SME growth in South Sudan? 
2. To what extent do SMEs in South Sudan have access to finance, and on what 
terms? 
3. In what ways are banks expanding the access frontier in Kenya, and how have 
technology and mobile banking advanced the goal of financial inclusion? 
4. How have financial innovations in Kenya affected horizontal inequality, by 
accident or by design, among the regions? 
5. What can South Sudan learn from Kenya’s experience in financial sector 
development? 
The ensuing chapters seek to test the following hypotheses: 
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1. Lack of Access to credit on favorable terms is a major obstacle to the formation 
and growth of SMEs; 
2. Access to finance varies with distance from Juba and gender in South Sudan; 
3. Access to finance varies with firm size and technology in Kenya; 
4. Innovative financial sector development in Kenya has reduced horizontal 
inequality by extending access to previously marginalized populations; and  
5. South Sudan can learn from best practices in banking in Kenya, and from Kenya’s 
successes and/or failures in expanding access across regions. 
1.2.3 Motivation 
 Simply put, SMEs matter because they are dynamic enterprises and job generators 
(Buckley, 1996; Duarte, 2004; Ganbold, 2008; SBA, 2009; Ardic, Mylenko & Saltane, 
2012; Khanam, Rahman & Zarook, 2013). SMEs contribute to macroeconomic outcomes, 
notably GDP growth, exports and employment.  Yet Khanam, Rahman & Zarook, 2013, 
p. 11) find that in the case of Libya, SMEs still suffer from lack of access to finance even 
though they are seen as “economic engines of many economies worldwide.”  The pecking 
order hypothesis states that firms obtain capital as follows: Firstly, they exhaust internal 
profits; secondly, they go for short-term financing; thirdly, long-term financing; and 
fourthly, they go for least preferred option, new equity investors (Khanam, Rahman & 
Zarook, 2013). Majority of SMEs do not observe this order; some do not even go beyond 
the first option after exhausting internal fund. Hence, raising equity is not an option for 
SMEs. With improved financial services, SMEs can access finance to expand their 
operations (World Bank, 2008; Cattani, 2002; Beck & Honohan, 2007). 
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 In a post-conflict country such as South Sudan, the problem is all the more acute. 
Grounds for optimism can be found, however, in recent development of financial sector 
in Africa and global commitment to inclusive finance as a means to achieve inclusive 
development (Chibba, 2009; AFI, 2010; Aduda & Kalunda, 2012; Dittus & Klein, 2011). 
The efforts by international financial institutions such as the World Bank, AfDB and 
other regional bodies to make the case for financial service inclusion has been of 
particular interest to development economists. The phrase, “making finance work for 
Africa” is now a shared goal among policymakers on the continent.  
A typical SME faces many problems, including lack of liquidity, high transaction costs, 
and weak managerial competence. However, access to finance is arguably a major 
binding constraint on their growth. Any policy that eases financing constraints should be 
welcome. Banking reforms and financial innovations that aim to reach the ‘bottom of the 
pyramid’ are one way to relax those constraints and improve access (Beck, Demirguc-
Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2004; Chakravarty & Pal, 2013). 
1.2.4 Significance 
This research connects to four contemporary issues in development economics. The first 
is the growing literature on post-conflict development which recognizes that institutions 
do not spontaneously arise out of thin air but instead must be built, with a key role for 
public policy in enabling this institution-building, and that post-conflict situations call for 
inclusivity. The recent inter-disciplinary scholarship on “horizontal inequality”, economic 
inequalities across social groups defined on the basis of ethnicity, language, region and 
religion, informs my research on access to finance for all at a fair price. Social scientists 
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from a variety of disciplines, including economist Frances Stewart (2005), political 
scientist Grudun Ostby (2008) and anthropologist Graham Brown (2009), are beginning 
to open policymakers’ eyes to the importance of “whom” as well as “what” in economic 
development. The Kenyan 2030 Vision, an economic development plan by the Kenyan 
Government to develop several different economic zones in various parts of the country, 
similarly recognizes the importance of inclusion and equitable development. My research 
extends the analysis of horizontal inequality to the area of financial sector development. 
The second issue is the debate on the role of the government in the marketplace. The 
efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970) that holds that financial markets are smoothly 
self-correcting has been challenged, most recently by the world financial crisis. 
Governments have an important role to play in regulating the financial sector and in 
efforts to expand access (see financial inclusion, the role of public sector and central 
banks in nurturing complementarities). This is a very important point; in the case of 
South Sudan, a critical challenge has been to build viable government structures, 
basically from scratch.  Can South Sudan learn from the post-independence history of 
other African countries and avoid making the same mistakes that other sister nations 
made?  Where does South Sudan want to be 50 years from now and in light of the recent 
internal conflict which started on 15 December 2013? Will it be like Mauritius, 
Botswana, and South Africa or will it be like Somalia and the like? This should be taken 
in light of the recent thinking in development economics that a country’s process of 
continuous technological change and industrial upgrading is determined by its factor 
endowment but that this differs from one level to another as it climbs development ladder 
(Lin, 2011). 
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The third issue is whether effective policy can ensure that banks maximize social returns 
as they seek to maximize their own profits. In other words, what is the appropriate 
institutional and regulatory framework to channel the resources of the banking sector to 
productive activities that support broader development objectives? This framework can 
include public-private partnerships or NGOs partnering with banks to expand access. For 
example, Equity Bank of Kenya, which is a licensed commercial bank, partners with 
other multilateral or bilateral development agencies such as China Development Aid, to 
lend to the sectors not previously served by the formal sector. Banks may serve the 
financial inclusion mission in areas deemed unreachable a decade ago by using new 
technologies such as mobile banking by phone or village vans to gain new customers. In 
other words, mobile banking presents opportunities for cooperation or partnerships 
between banks and other non-bank sectors. Furthermore, central banks are taking on 
another role, that of being actively involved in financial inclusion. A number of central 
banks in Africa, including the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) are currently engaged in 
financial inclusion endeavors with view to creating an inclusive financial system and a 
technology-driven process to deliver inclusive development (Chibba, 2012; Stephen, 
2011; Ardic, Mylenko & Saltane, 2012).  
The fourth issue pertains to the role of small businesses in economic development. In the 
U.S., no administration has dared to challenge the job-creating ability of SMEs, and 
Congress is obligated to come up with attractive policies to support small businesses.2 
                                                          
2 First many in congress believe that SMEs create jobs. Second, it is politically suicidal to 
fight this perception because one appears to be fighting for the top 1% and not the 
underdogs. 
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The Small Business Administration (SBA) in the U.S. exists for these reasons. The SBA 
has, over the years, allocated loan guarantees to qualifying businesses, and empirical 
studies indicate that the programs have worked in boosting local employment (Craig & 
Jackson, 2007; 2008). SMEs can create jobs in developing regions, too (Audretsch, 
2002). SMEs, for example, account for 80% of all new jobs in Kenya (FSD Kenya, 
2008). As we will demonstrate in chapter four, 99% of all firms in South Sudan are 
SMEs. 
Loan guarantees are relevant for South Sudan. We will argue later in Chapter 5 that some 
oil revenue should be set aside and used for targeted lending to SMEs. 
1.3  History of Political Instability and Financial Sector Underdevelopment 
1.3.1 Genesis of the Tumultuous Political Economy in South Sudan 
The prevalence of civil violence and the miseries resulting from economic under-
development on the African continent leave everybody wondering what has become of 
the Afro-optimism and euphoria which were in the air at the dawn of independence in the 
1960s. Blame is assigned to internal and external political actors. For many Africans, 
scholars and laypeople alike, the trinity of slave trade, colonialism and the colonial 
legacy of ‘big men’ politics, and ethnic polarization are the scapegoats (Kamara, 
Mlambo, & Nyende, 2009). Poor governance and corruption as offshoots of the colonial 
institutional legacy are also mentioned as part of the problem (Acemoglu, Johnson & 
Robinson, 2001). Soul-searching for political and economic solutions to the continent’s 
problems continues to proliferate. 
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For post-independence Sudan, civil conflict has been the norm rather than the exception. 
Foreign invasion, starting with the Turco-Egyptian rule (1821-1898) and Anglo-Egyptian 
Condominium rule (1899-1956), provide the background for internal turmoil (Collins, 
1976; Ali, El Badawi & El-Batahani; Young, 2003; Ylönen, 2005; Natsio & Abramovitz, 
2011; D'Agoôt, 2013). Sudan became independent on 1 January 1956. Political 
differences and divergent economic and social visions led South Sudan to wage war 
against the Khartoum Government, starting in 1955. That initial war came to an end 
through a peace accord signed in Ethiopia in 1972. The second war started in 1983 to be 
concluded only by the Comprehensive Peace Agreements (CPA) signed in Kenya on 
January 9, 2005 (JAM, 2005). Following a referendum mandated by the CPA, South 
Sudan achieved independence on 9 July 2011 (World Bank, 2011; SSDP, 2011; Bricéno-
Garmendia & Ranganath, 2011; Hale, 2012; D'Agoôt, 2013).        
However, South Sudan is discovering that independence alone is not enough to change 
relationships with bad neighbors or improve economic conditions overnight. The nation 
currently faces tremendous development challenges arising from oil mismanagement, 
structural problems, international political contradictions and the relationships with 
Khartoum (World Bank, 2011; Bricéno-Garmendia & Ranganath, 2011). Delivering on 
independence promises, dealing with the north, and managing expectations have not been 
easy. Corruption has reared its ugly head, and not much of the country’s oil wealth has 
trickled down. Even though South Sudan spent $450 million per year between 2005 and 
2011 on infrastructure, it has a huge unmet infrastructural gap (Bricéno-Garmendia & 
Ranganath, 2011). 
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While South Sudan’s economy grew by 4% annually from 2009 through 2011, it 
drastically declined in 2012 by 56% due to the oil shutdown that resulted from 
differences over transit fees for passage of the oil through neighboring Sudan (World 
Bank, 2013). This validly demonstrated how vulnerable South Sudan’s economic growth 
is to oil shocks. 
Austerity measures that the South Sudan parliament passed in July 2012, shortly after the 
completion of the survey for this dissertation, put a freeze on capital outlays and 
operation costs. The drastic cuts have affected households, the currency market, and by 
extension, credit allocation to private sector. 
Notwithstanding the government’s proclaimed intention to make South Sudan a middle-
income country by 2040 (SSDP, 2011), there is little to show for it on the ground.  
Reconstruction in South Sudan is proving difficult because oil resources have not been 
equitably utilized. In addition, vital institutions such as law and order, civil society, 
courts, and spirit of entrepreneurship were destroyed or severely degraded during the war 
(Bricéno-Garmendia & Ranganath, 2011; SSDP, 2011) and have to be rebuilt. 
Financial services are typically hard to come by in war-torn economies. For one, conflict 
takes precedence and scarce resources go toward fighting. Political instability translates 
into economic instability. In the case of South Sudan, instability has disrupted farming 
activities which translated into high degree of dependence on humanitarian aid or on a 
few individual family members when the others are maimed or killed. Low levels of 
living and low levels of productivity reinforce each other. Political and economic 
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instability are mutually reinforcing, too, as recognized in Gunnar Myrdal’s famous notion 
of circular and cumulative causation (Myrdal, 1944). 
War kills investment by leading to capital flight, misallocation of scarce resources, and 
destruction of investment assets (Collier, 1999 & 2009; Arunatilake, Jayasurika, & 
Kelegama, 2001; Kamara, Mlambo, & Nyende, 2009). War inhibits growth by damaging 
the economy through disassembling part of the labor force, blowing up bridges, 
disrupting social order, making some roads unsafe for travel, imposing undue costs on 
travelers, suppressing civil liberties, and diverting public expenditure from growth-
promoting projects (Collier, 1999 & 2009; Nojanic, 2008).  
When the war is over, these challenges persist and consolidating peace is a tough hill to 
climb. Encouraging investors to come in and gamble with their dollars is difficult and 
costly because of the risk premium associated with investment in such a setting (Kasturi 
& Toh, 2012). Local private funding for local projects is inadequate. Multilateral and 
bilateral assistance for reconstruction normally comes to the country via the public sector, 
and is often distributed through political mechanisms on a whom-you-know rather than 
what-you-know basis. Notwithstanding these difficulties, with appropriate policies, a 
seemingly failing state can turn around. Uganda has been hailed as one such success story 
(Ndikumana & Nannyonjo, 2007) and so is Rwanda today. 
Since 2005, South Sudan has opened the borders to neighboring countries. Regional 
traders poured in from Kenya and Uganda. They set up businesses, from five-star hotels 
to apparel shops to nightclubs. It is estimated that between 2009 and 2010, South Sudan 
imported goods worth around $75 million from Kenya and around $55 million from 
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Uganda. Many are lemon marketers because some of these services are substandard but 
costly. Overall market activities are thin, however, limited or missing in some places. 
Within a short time following the CPA, prices in the capital skyrocketed due to influx of 
post-conflict aid/oil revenue, leading some commentators to nickname Juba the “second 
Tokyo.”   
On the financial sector development front, foreign banks, mainly from East Africa, also 
came in search of business opportunities. A number of Kenyan commercial banks opened 
branches in South Sudan because doing business immediately after the CPA was 
perceived as lucrative. I speculate that donor money and oil-contract jobs were the main 
motives for coming of some foreign entrepreneurs. 
South Sudan, a yet-to-be member of East Africa Community (EAC)3, is land-locked, 
meaning that it depends on its relations with Kenya, Uganda and Khartoum for access to 
seaports. However, land-lockedness is not an insuperable handicap. Some countries 
overcome it, the classic example being Switzerland in Europe and Botswana in Africa. 
Sound macroeconomic policies and financial sector development can help to create an 
enabling environment for development (Akerlof & Shiller, 2009), and regional blocs are 
an opportunity for small open economies such as South Sudan to expand their influence 
on the international stages. 
                                                          
3 The application process for South Sudan to join this regional bloc is in progress. There 
is an on-going debate among the current members whether the application should be fast-
tracked or allowed to follow the normal process of making sure that all conditions are 
met; Uganda, Kenya and Rwanda are for quick admission of South Sudan into EAC 
whereas Tanzania and Burundi advocate for due diligence and checklist. We do not know 
when it will likely be decided. 
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1.3.2      Stylized Facts on the Economy in South Sudan 
Having emerged out of war, we can think of South Sudan as being at an early stage of 
development. Countries at such level are typically characterized by relative scarcity of 
capital and relative abundance of labor (Lin, 2011). Their productive activities are usually 
labor-intensive and concentrated in sectors such as subsistence agriculture, fishery, 
mining, and animal husbandry. The small firm size and incomplete markets lead to an 
economy characterized by close networks. Because of war and development neglect 
under the old Sudan, the economy of South Sudan today suffers many structural 
problems. We can summarize these by means of six stylized facts: 
First, South Sudan is a subsistence economy. Despite the huge potential for agricultural 
exports, 78% of population still depends on subsistence farming (see Table 1.1; SSCCSE, 
2010). Where there are exports to East Africa, they are handful primary agricultural 
products. 
Second, the high dependence ratio represents a heavy economic burden. Children and 
people above 65 years old are usually nonproductive and depend on country’s labor force 
for support. With an average household size of about seven members, each working adult 
has many mouths to feed. Peacetime has seen higher birth rates and this adds to the 
dependency burdens posed by widows, orphans, war disabled and other victims of the 
concluded war. Seventy-two percent of the population is below the age of 30 (5th 
Population and Housing Census, 2008). When the age dependency ratio is computed as 
those below 14 and above 55 years of age, divided by those in the age range of 14-55, the 
ratio is 88% for the country as a whole: 75% in the urban settings, and 91% in rural areas 
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(SSDP, 2011). By way of comparison, the dependency ratio for Kenya is 82%, for 
instance (World Bank, 2013; see Table 1.1). 
Third, the formal private sector is weak and characterized by “hit and run” investors. 
Because infrastructure and the regulatory and supervisory framework are weak (Bricéno-
Garmendia & Ranganath, 2011; SSDP, 2011; Demombynes, Gubbins, & Romeo, 2013), 
it is hard to attract long-term investors. Uncertainty about the outcome of the post-
referendum political issues contributed to this phenomenon. The retail sector is the major 
area of local entrepreneur occupation. There are no conglomerates or big wholesalers 
(such as Uchumi, Tuskys, or Utawala in Kenya) to speak of, as of now. In Juba and other 
urban areas, one sees the springing up of small shops, tea stalls, restaurants, fruit sellers, 
sewing machine operators, garment hawkers, fish sellers, and many other small 
enterprises that are either locally owned or foreign owned. The survey data collected for 
this dissertation confirms the abovementioned proposition. 
Fourth, the level of education is low. The country’s low level of education is a result of 
the war and its impact on the human and physical capital development. To inject capacity 
into civil service, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Initiative 
brought about 200 civil servants from Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda to train South 
Sudanese civil servants through twinning. So throughout the country, the South Sudan 
government has hired expatriates, such as teachers and technocrats from neighboring 
countries, to help with the foundation of the state. Recall that only 27 percent of the total 
population is literate in South Sudan (SSCCSE, 2010), as cited above. This figure 
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compares dismally with literacy rates of 87 and 73 percent in Kenya and Uganda, 
respectively (Central Intelligence Agency, 2013). 
Fifth, the telecommunications industry is in its infancy but growing. Based on the 
National Baseline House Survey (NBHS, 2009), 15 percent of the households own a 
phone. The ratio is 59 percent in urban areas, compared to only 8 percent in the rural 
areas. ZAIN, MTN, Gemtel, and Vivacell are pioneering the telecommunications industry 
(Bricéno-Garmenndia, & Ranganath, 2011). While the mobile industry is not regulated, 
telephony is increasingly used by small traders to transfer money across the ten states4 
and it has a potential to lower entry barriers, reduce costs and expand access (Demirguc-
Kunt & Klapper, 2013). Although it is not called M-PESA as in Kenya (where M-stands 
for mobile while Pesa is a Swahili word for money, the coinage literally implies mobile 
money) the emerging system shares some semblance. Despite the digital divide between 
rural areas and urban centers, a number of South Sudanese are using cell phones 
(provided they have network coverage) to transmit payments to places where commercial 
banks or microfinance have no footprint (see Table 1.2). This is noteworthy given the 
importance of financial inclusion in the economy as well as the promise for mobile 
                                                          
4 It works as follows: a person remitting money to a relative in the village or another 
town comes to the independent money transfer service providers. He would give them 
money and sending fees. After transaction is logged in a cashbook, he is instructed to call 
his relative and tell him to go and collect the remittance at a designated collection stall. 
But unlike M-Pesa agent network in Kenya, a South Sudanese recipient cannot just go to 
any agent providing service. He must go to a particular service provider, say, Jong Bar 
Money Transfer Service Company in Aweil, and the latter company happens to have a 
sending branch in Juba. Another cash-in/cash-out provider, say, Tiger Money Transfer 
cannot serve this individual because the two providers are not affiliated. But like in 
Kenya, the mobile financial service is a non-bank-led model (Faye & Triki, 2013). 
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phone-based data collection, the promise that mobile phones have for enabling 
researchers to collect public opinion polls (Demombynes, Gubbins, & Romeo, 2013). 
1.4 Objectives of the Study 
 The primary objectives of this study are to: 
(i) assess the role of the financial sector in financing SMEs in Kenya and South 
Sudan, and  
(ii)  draw lessons from the Kenyan experience to suggest possible strategies for 
improving access to finance by SMEs and households in the post-conflict 
Republic of South Sudan.  
1.5  Scope and Limitations of the Study 
Following the literature review in Chapter 2 the dissertation comprises three essays. The 
first essay (Chapter 3) is on Financial Sector Development and SMEs in Kenya. The 
second essay is on Lack of Access to Finance by Small and Medium-sized Enterprises as 
a Constraint to Development in South Sudan (Chapter 4). We use econometric analysis to 
distill determinants of financial access in South Sudan. The third essay is about 
Enhancing Financial Inclusion for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises in South Sudan 
(Chapter 5). In this chapter, we look at lessons that can be learned from Kenya and 
propose strategies to strength the regulatory framework and offer ways to channel oil 
resources for broad-based development. The data come from field surveys in South 
Sudan and Kenya conducted from July 2011 through September 2012.  
We investigate the determinants of access, both from the standpoint of SMEs (demand-
side) and credit providers (supply-side) so as to provide a full picture of the mechanics 
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and economics of credit provision. To the best of our knowledge, no prior research has 
analyzed Kenyan financial sector development with a view to applying it to the South 
Sudan situation. This is the first study of this kind in South Sudan, connecting it to the 
current development policy debates on the financial inclusion agenda. 
Analyzing access to finance in sub-Saharan Africa is often difficult due to the 
rudimentary nature of available data (World Bank, 2008; CGAP, 2009; Jerven, 2013). 
This study therefore faces the usual limitations relying on own-collected data. Let me 
outline three of those issues: 
 First, the selection survivor bias from the interviews could not be ruled out. Firms that 
went out of business were not available for interviews. Second, the data for South Sudan 
came from three states rather than ten. Third, I had to rely on research assistants to obtain 
data, and their biases could have influenced the inclusion or exclusion of some SME 
respondents. While my interviews in South Sudan with commercial banks covered the 
whole banking population (all eight banks) the situation was different in Kenya. For the 
latter, I wrote letters to all financial institutions, but ended up using the snowballing 
method in some cases and systematic sampling afterward. A colleague would ring up a 
colleague in a bank on my behalf, and if they were willing to talk, then I would sit down 
with them for interviews. Where I have no networks of friends in a given financial 
institution, we often were unable to conduct interviews. As a result, I ended up with a 
smaller sample of banks in Kenya than I would have liked. 
The remainder of this dissertation proceeds in chapters as follows. Chapter 2 reviews 
literature on Financial Sector Development; Chapter 3 presents the essay on Kenya, and 
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Chapters 4 presents the essay on South Sudan. Chapter 5 draws lessons for South Sudan 
from the Kenyan experience. Finally, Chapter 6 provides conclusions and policy 
implications. 
 
Table 1.1: Stylized Facts on the South Sudan Economy5 Relative to Selected East 
African Countries and sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) 
Indicator South 
Sudan 
Kenya Uganda Ethiopia SSA 
Average 
Household Consumption 
 (% of GDP) 
35 80 81 86 67 
Age dependency 
(% of Total Population) 
88 82 103 86 87 
Documents to Import 
 (Number) 
12 9 10 10 9 
Literacy Rate 
(% of total population, 15 
and over) 
27 87 73 39 60 
Mobile Cellular 
Subscriptions 
(per 100 people) 
19 72 46 24 53 
Military Expenditure 
(% of GDP) 
10.3 2.0 1.4 0.9 1.5 
Sources: World Bank, 2013, Central Intelligence Agency, 2013; and South Sudan 
National Bureau of Statistics, 2010. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 Because of the large informal sector and the fact that oil revenues flow through the 
government, the share of household consumption as a percent of GDP is very small in 
2011. But when the oil was shutdown in 2012, total GDP declines by 47% while the 
share of GDP going to household consumption rises to 93% (World Bank, 2013). This 
shows the volatility of oil and narrowness of economy base or dearth of non-oil revenue. 
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Table 1.2: Indicators of Financial Sector Development and Access to Finance in 
South Sudan, East Africa and sub-Sahara Africa, 2008-2012 
Indictor South 
Sudan 
Kenya Uganda Ethiopia SSA 
Domestic Credit Provided by 
Banking Sector  (% of GDP) 
-  52.3 16.4 -  77.8 
Money and Quasi Money 
 (M as % of GDP) 
- 51 24 35 48 
Private Credit Bureau 
Coverage (% of adults) 
0.0 4.7 4.1 0.0 6.0 
Loan in the past year 
 (% age 15 and above) 
- 67.4 52.8 -  46.8 
Demographic Branch 
penetration 
(Number of Commercial bank 
branches per 100,000 adults) 
 1 5 3 2 4 
Demographic ATM 
Penetration 
(Number of ATMs per 100, 
000 adults) 
-  9.9 4.00 0.5 4.5 
Mobile Phone Used to Pay 
Bills (% Age 15 and above) 
 13.4 3.3 - 3.0 
ATM is main mode of deposit 
 (% with an account, age 15+) 
- 4.2 10.4 - 6.6 
ATM is main mode of 
withdrawal 
 (% with an account, age 15+) 
- 69.2 41.7 - 41.8 
Account at a formal financial 
institution (% age 15+) 
- 42.3 20.5 - 24.0 
Account used for business 
purposes (% age 15+) 
- 12.5 7.5 - 5.3 
Account used to receive 
remittances (% age 15+) 
- 17.2 3.3 - 9.1 
Account used to receive wages 
(% age 15+) 
- 15.9 9.2 - 9.9 
Credit card (% age 15+) - 6.1 1.6 - 2.9 
Mobile phone used to receive 
money (% age 15+) 
- 66.7 25.2 - 14.6 
Mobile phone used to send 
money (% age 15+) 
- 60.5 20.0 - 11.2 
Source: World Bank, 2012; Global Findex, 2012 (for the USA, the credit provided to 
private sector by banking sector is 231.6%; for whole world, it is 168.9%). 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
FINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT AND ACCESS TO FINANCE BY 
SMES: A REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
 2.1 Introduction 
Inequality takes many forms with respect to credit market participants. In general, there is 
a vertical inequality in access to finance with regard to segments of the society with 
unequal incomes. The well-to-do section of society tends to face higher probabilities in 
accessing financial services, whereas the poor and often times, SMEs, tend to have 
limited financial access (Beck & Demirkuc-Kunt, 2008; Ardic, Mylenko, & Saltane, 
2012; Demirguc-Kunt & Klapper, 2013). In addition, there is the issue of horizontal 
inequality in access to finance, when people of different ethnic groups, regions and 
gender have differential access.  
In Kenya, issues of constraints and uneven access have not faded away, particularly in 
rural areas despite recent innovations in credit markets (Aduda & Kalunda, 2012). For 
example, Atieno (2001) observes that commercial banks and other formal institutions 
often fail to cater for small borrowers because of their strict lending policies and 
conditions. Citing data from a 1995 survey, she observes that 33% of borrowers in Kenya 
ranked credit constraints as among their problems and that 86% of borrowers got capital 
from informal sources.  
Countries have, from time to time, intervened in the credit markets to correct some 
market failures and market imperfections due to monopoly power, adverse selection or 
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moral hazards or externalities. Development economists increasingly see SMEs as the 
“missing link” in the puzzle of poverty reduction, and financial inclusion offers 
possibilities to advance inclusive development (Mendoza & Thelen, 2008; Chibba, 2009; 
Gencer 2011; Aduda & Kalunda, 2012).  
This chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 examines the definition and role of SMEs 
in modern economies, as well as the typical problem of access to finance. Section 2.3 
discusses measurement of financial sector development, while section 2.4 takes on the 
role of financial inclusion as a way to expand the access frontier and addresses SME 
financing issues. Section 2.5 assesses conventional and unconventional measures in the 
credit markets, and finally, section 2.6 concludes the chapter. 
2.2 SMEs and Access to Finance 
2.2.1 Definition of SMEs 
There is a wide range of definitions and measures of SMEs that differ from country to 
country (see Table 2.1). Though there is no universally agreed upon definition of SMEs 
(Singh & Tandon, 2012), three commonly used criteria are the number of employees, 
value of assets, and value of sales (Ganbold, 2008; Ardic, Mylenko, & Saltane, 2012). 
The number of employees has gained prominence because it is easy to collect.  
The European Union (EU) defines a small enterprise as one which has a headcount of 
less than 50 employees and a balance sheet and turnover each of which is not more than 
10 million Euros. A medium-size enterprise has headcount of less than 250, and a 
turnover of not more than 50 million Euros or a balance sheet of not more than 43 million 
Euros. Value of assets refers to the balance sheet of the enterprises which reflects the 
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overall wealth of the enterprise, whereas turnover or sales simply refers to annual sales 
volumes minus discounts and sales taxes in a given accounting period.  
In the USA, the Small Business Administration (SBA) Size Standard Office is charged 
with setting the size of SMEs to reflect sectoral differences and to aid policies targeting 
SMEs. A firm with less than 500 employees is considered a small business (SBA, 2009). 
The definition of SMEs is not simply based on the employees alone, however; it also 
brings in considerations that differ across sectors. For example, an enterprise specializing 
in service delivery is considered small if it has a balance sheet of $10 million or less. 
 In Kenya, a firm that employs between 5 and 50 persons is defined as small, while one 
that employs 50 to 200 is a medium-sized enterprise. Kenyan SME eligibility criteria are 
thus closer to those of the EU than U.S. At present, South Sudan does not have an official 
definition for SMEs.  For the purpose of this study, I adopt the World Bank Business 
Environment criteria6, according to which firms with one to four employees are 
considered microenterprises, five to nineteen small, 20 to 99 medium, and  100 and 
above, large. 
 
 
                                                          
6 These firm-level surveys by the World Bank are conducted every three years since 
2002. The surveys cover most regions of the world on issues related or focusing on firm 
financing, labor, payments systems and other topics that assess business environment and 
firm parlance (see World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance 
Survey, 2009).  
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2.2.2 Role of SMEs in the Modern Economies 
According to a 2004 OECD Survey, SMEs in emerging economies account for 60% of all 
companies. In China, they account for 70% of foreign trade (Tung & Aycun, 2008).  The 
SME sector accounts for 80% of employment opportunities in Kenya (FSD Kenya, 
2010). In Nigeria, SMEs account for about 95% of all jobs in manufacturing (Ganbold, 
2008). A recent survey involving 47,745 firms in 99 countries across the world shows 
that SMEs are first suppliers of employment and contribute 66% of all jobs in developing 
economies (Bilandzic, Hommes & Stein, 2013).  
SME peculiarities give them some advantages. According to Buckley (1996) SMEs are 
innovators, employment creators and bridge builders in international trade. They exhibit 
high levels of productivity and capability, quickly responding to market changes. They 
are immediate end-users of indigenous research (Amaeshi, Jackson & Yauz, 2008). They 
provide a breeding environment for entrepreneurs, and act as a bridge in flows of trade, 
investment and technology. By using more labor intensively than large firms, they 
generate more employment per unit investment. They outperform in innovations per 
capita, and they help in transferring labor-intensive technologies and small-scale 
technologies (Reynolds, 1997; Liedholm, 2002; Duarte, 2004; Ganbold, 2008; SBA, 
2009). This growth potential prompted the World Bank (2004) to devote $10 million to 
the promotion of small enterprises in Bangladesh. The Bank argues that small firms foster 
competition and innovation (Audretsch, 2002; Demirguc-Kunt, Levine, & Beck, 2005; 
Beck & Honohan, 2007).  
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The contribution of SMEs to modern economies is not without controversy. The first 
criticism directed at SMEs posits that big firms come with advantages, too: better pay for 
workers, safer working environments, and economies of scale and scope, including the 
capacity to undertake and bear fixed costs associated with R&D (Rosenzweig, 1988). For 
Alfred Chandler (1990) and other skeptics, size matters, and to participate globally, you 
have to be big. Second, the concept of SMEs is not clear cut. Definitions are arbitrary, 
and there is no common set of measures and policies (Nkurunziza, 2010). Third, some 
critics argue that the scale-based approach is not the best way to develop and frame 
economic policy making (Little et.al, 1987). 
The pro-SME camp argues that critics are mistaken to posit a static minimum efficient 
scale (MES) which if not achieved makes the firm Pareto suboptimal (Audtretsch, 2002). 
Proponents pose the question: Who does not start small before they become big? Think 
about Google, an idea hatched by two college kids; Microsoft, a brainchild of college 
dropout; the invention of flight industry by the Wright Brothers; or Vodafone company, 
an idea credited to Gerry Whent (he is both a founder and the first CEO of Vodafone 
company). Each of these companies started small, the counterargument goes; the 
weaklings of today can be the giants of tomorrow. This line of reasoning is consistent 
with Jovanoic’s model of noisy selection, where inefficient firms fail and efficient ones 
survive and grow (Audretsch, 2002).  
A second pro-SME argument is based on innovation. SMEs produce twice more 
innovations per employee than large firms (Preston, 1997). Larger firms have an 
advantage only in appropriating but not in generating new knowledge, by buying 
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property rights or enjoying spillover effects (Acs & Preston, 1997). Audretsch (2002) 
theorizes that as the gap between the wage rate and return from starting a new firm 
widens, the likelihood of an agent choosing to appropriate the value of his knowledge 
internally through starting new enterprise becomes greater. This would help to explain 
why SMEs are better at creating radical innovations, and why they record more patents 
on a per-employee basis.   
Third, SMEs are constantly churning, as some enter and others exit (Amaeshi, Jackson & 
Yauz, 2008). If one focuses on aggregate measures, this dynamism is missed. Moreover, 
SMEs come with spinoff effects (satisfying consumer demand) and spillover effects 
(acting as suppliers to larger firms) that extend beyond the SME sector. 
2.2.3 Problems of Access to Finance by SMEs 
Access to finance is defined as availability of financial services in the forms of demand 
deposits, credit, payments, or insurance (Beck & Honohan, 2007; Donovan, 2011; Aduda 
& Kalunda, 2012; Arnold & Johnson, 2012; Massa, 2013). The availability of such 
services can be constrained by physical access, affordability and eligibility. Barriers such 
as high transactions cost, distance, and minimum balance requirements can exclude 
individuals and firms. Access to finance also refers to the degree to which financial 
services are available at a fair price.  
Access to finance matters to SMEs. In particular, access to credit is associated with 
positive growth (Ardic, Mylenko, & Saltane, 2012; Ouma & Ramo, 2013). In the words 
of Charles Ou, “access to credit for small business startup, expansion, survival, and 
financial institutions plays an important role in providing capital to small firms (those 
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with fewer than 500 employees) since these firms are not in a position to access fund 
from equity capital or publicly traded markets” (SBA, p. 9). Special problems of credit 
access by SMEs arise due to several reasons. First, SMEs lack strong and transparent 
record-keeping systems. This leads to difficulty in assessing client creditworthiness and 
enforcing creditor rights (Beck, & Honohan, 2007). Second, SMEs access to finance is 
poor because of high default risk, collateral requirements, delays in loan processing, 
inflexible conditions, and high interest rates. Third, SMEs face small markets, often 
fragmented financial systems, and difficult business environments (Kauffamn, 2005; 
Sacerdoti, 2005). Fourth, SMEs can and do fail due to lack of competent management, 
poor bookkeeping, staffing, sales and marketing problems, and adverse economic 
conditions. 
For these reasons, formal banks often see lending to SMEs as unprofitable (Aryeteey, 
1994). In African countries, commercial banks have not traditionally serviced small-scale 
borrowers, and instead depended on lending to the state and larger private sector 
enterprises. So, institutionally, banks have had little capacity (or incentive to build 
capacity) to administer small-scale loans. Such loans are costly to manage (transactions 
costs) and lack of information on borrowers can present a further problem (Kablan, 2010; 
Sacerdoti, 2005; Boyko & Gottesman, 2011). 
SMEs sometimes have turned to microcredit units, which themselves are constrained and 
face limited expansion possibilities. Despite their revolutionary contributions to credit 
availability, microfinance institutions (MFIs) typically lend on short terms and do not 
provide long-term financing that SMEs need for expansion. MFIs also usually lend in 
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small amounts which can be inadequate to satisfy SME needs. Constrained by lack of 
savings mobilization, MFIs depend heavily on donor resources (World Bank, 2008). In 
addition, MFIs operate under different mission statements, often rely on NGO support 
that is not sustainable, and in some cases may crowd out commercially viable projects 
(Basu, Blavy & Yulek, 2004). For example, focus on microfinance for poverty reduction 
can shift attention to subsidies and charity, which can hurt the quality of services. The 
poor lack of access to education, markets, technology, and other factors that expand 
production frontiers and these may not be overcome by microfinance alone. 
Improved access to formal finance can improve economic growth and social services 
(IMF, 2008; Gencer, 2011; Aduda & Kalunda, 2012), consistent with the view that 
growth can be good for both poor and rich (Dollar & Kraay, 2002). This does not mean 
there are no distributional issues, nor is it an endorsement of trickle-down-Thatcher-
Reaganomics. But when there are improved macroeconomic and institutional frameworks 
and lower interest rates, formal bank lending to SMEs can bring substantial benefits 
above and beyond those of lending by MFIs. Banks and MFIs can play complementary 
roles, as well. For example, formal banks sometimes learn lessons from deposit 
mobilization initiatives by MFIs such as the Indian Self-help Group initiative (Basu, 
Blavy & Yulek, 2004). 
In Kenya, a series of enabling financial-sector innovations have been tried, including 
changes in regulation and supervision. Some measures indicative of policies to improve 
access include: (1) investing in information infrastructures, and building credit registries, 
(2) encouraging openness, competition, and increased transparency through periodic 
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publication/surveys,(3) formalization and enforcement of lender responsibility (this 
means central bank regulators are required to ensure that firms comply with regulations, 
as well as have proper recourse to court to recoup assets from defaulting parties), (4) 
public-private partnerships through club membership, guaranteeing solvency, and 
awards, and (5) overcoming physical access barriers through the technology-based 
agency model and mobile branches.  One bank in Kenya that has taken mobile banks to 
new heights is the Equity Bank. As of 2006, Equity has about 100 mobile vans providing 
financial services in rural areas in Kenya with a scheduled frequency (Beck & Honohan, 
2007). It also provides financial literacy training, same-day emergency loans, and 
encourages women entrepreneurs to seek assistance.  
Markets alone are not the solution, because markets can and do fail due to collective 
action problems, power concentration, greed, and lack of foresight. Policy regulation, 
supervision and some nuanced governmental controls are needed for macroeconomic 
stability which means that government interventionist policies are here to stay to address 
externality and coordination issues (Akerlof & Schiller, 2009; Lin, 2011). Because 
financial markets, like other real markets, do fail, there is a burden on the financial 
regulators and central banks not just to focus singly on price stability but also provide 
prudent regulation to minimize undue system-wide financial risks.  
Ayyagari,  Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2006) find that while “inefficient 
functioning financial markets, inadequate security, and enforcement of property rights, 
poor provision of infrastructure, inefficient regulation and taxation and broader 
governance features such as corruption and macroeconomic instability are discussed 
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without any comparative evidence on their ordering” (p.1), not all obstacles are equally 
constraining to firm growth. Rather they find that access to finance, crime and political 
instability have direct impacts on firm growth, and that other obstacles affect firm growth 
indirectly. On a further robustness test, they conclude that access to finance is “the most 
robust of the three” (p.1). Similarly, Kumar, Rajan, and Zingales (1999) find that average 
size of the firm is larger in countries with better financial markets, suggesting that 
financial constraint does in fact limit a firm size. Protecting property rights can enhance 
external financing for small firms more than that of larger firms (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt & 
Maksimovic, 2008). This implies that delivering political stability, and reducing crime 
rate, as well as financial sector reforms, can help to foster growth in the SME sector 
(Ayyagari, Beck & Demirguc-Kunt, 2007).  
2.3 Financial Inclusion 
Access to finance is widely seen as the major binding constraint on growth (World Bank, 
2008; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & Laeven, 2006; Demirguc-Kunt & Klapper, 2012; 
Andrianaivo & Kpodar, 2012; Singh & Tandon, 2013). Recent efforts by international 
financial institutions (Department for International Development [DFID], AfDB, 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency [MIGA], European Investment Bank [EIB], 
Asian Development bank [ADB], Commonwealth Development Corporation [CDC], 
Netherlands Development Finance Company [FMO], and Belgian Investment Company 
for Developing Countries[ BIO])7 and a number of governments to support financial 
                                                          
7 Example of these include support to women-SME term loan for women and growth-
oriented women entrepreneurs in Kenya, gender empowerment program in Nigeria, 
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service inclusion reflect the growing interest of development economists in the potential 
role of banking in facilitating not only economic growth but also equitable growth (see 
Ardic, Mylenko, & Saltane, 2012; AFI, 2013; Calice, 2013; Hayem, Torres, & Hurtado, 
2013; Massa, 2013; World Bank financial contributions to SMEs). After all, we know 
that “An economy cannot thrive on a fraction of its citizens while excluding others” 
(Aduda & Kalunda, 2012). 
To illustrate the growing interest in financial inclusion agenda, a number of workshops, 
conferences and symposia held around the world speak volumes. Examples abound: the 
Maya Declaration and G-20 Financial Inclusion Action Plan (AFI, 2013), the United 
Nations Conference on Financial Inclusion in Africa, held in Dakar, June 2006; World 
Bank Access to Finance, Washington D.C, March 2007; Making Finance Work for the 
Poor, April 2007 (jointly organized by DFID, USAID and WB); DFID’s Financial 
Inclusion Conference, June 2007; Global Conference on Next Generation and Access to 
Finance: Gaining Scale and Reducing Cost with Technology and Credit Scoring, 
Washington D.C, September 2007 under IFC, CCAGP and VISA International (Chibba, 
2009).  
Already, according to the 2010 Financial Access Database, 74 out of 140 surveyed 
countries report data on SME financing (Ardic, Mylenko, & Saltane, 2012). Kenya is 
among these and is one of the 59 countries where central banks report SME financing 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Uganda women entrepreneurs, and women entrepreneurs program in Tanzania, among 
others (see Massa, 2013). 
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through regular reporting. Eighteen countries of the sample in Africa are collecting core 
data for gauging success in financial inclusion. 
Particular financial inclusion workshops or conferences in Africa include: Ready for 
Takeoff: A High Level Conference on Kenya’s Economic Successes, Prospects, and 
Challenges, Nairobi, September 2013; the 2012 Global Policy Forum (GPF) held in Cape 
Town, South Africa, under the overall theme of Making Financial Inclusion Real, and the 
first GPF AFI conference in Nairobi, September 2009. 
The phrase, “making finance work for Africa” thus has become a widely shared goal 
among policymakers (Beck & Honohan, 2007, p. 146-148). As of today, there is a 
growing recognition among central banks, governments, mobile provider operators and 
microfinance institutions that financial inclusion is essential for several reasons, 
including employment opportunities and poverty reduction (Singh & Tandon, 2013). 
Today a number of developing countries elsewhere around the world also have made 
financial inclusion one of their policy objectives (Singh & Tandon, 2013). For instance, 
Brazil, India, and the Philippines, have embraced the goal of financial inclusion. What is 
encouraging in this drive is that central banks are in the driver seat. Many countries are 
adopting mobile money applications as a way to further the financial inclusion objective. 
For Kenya and the Philippines, in particular, the service provider “intimately” interacts 
with the regulators, resulting in a conducive environment for mobile financial services to 
take-off without premature or stymying regulation (Stephen, 2011; AFI, 2010). Financial 
inclusion is no longer seen as a passive by-product of development but rather as an 
objective in its own right to be pursued. 
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In addition to their role of financial services, mobile phones are also increasingly being 
used to collect data which can then be used to further improve financial services and 
other services such as implementing surveys, monitoring conditional cash transfers, 
interview enumerators via phones and monitoring of health programs among others 
(Demombynes, Gubbins & Romeo, 2013). This holds a great prospect because mobile 
phone subscriptions grew in Africa from 87 million in 2005 to 433 million in 2011 
(Demombynes, Gubbins & Romeo, 2013, p. 2). 
Financial inclusion, which AfDB (2013) defines as “all initiatives that make formal 
financial services available, accessible, affordable to all segments of the population” 
covers both demand and supply-side factors. On the supply side, a number of 
fundamental pillars are in the forefront to drive financial inclusion: mobile financial 
services, ATMs, NGOs, MFIs, and the public sector (Figure 2.1).  
The first key pillar of financial inclusion is the role of non-financial private sector in 
tapping the technology-based deployments (mobile applications or adoption of mobile 
financial services such as M-Pesa in Kenya) through e-banking and telecommunication 
(Chibba, 2009; see Figure 2.1). According to Donovan (2012, p. 61), “Mobile financial 
services are among the most promising mobile applications in the developing world.” 
This is due to the fact that mobile applications are easily adopted across diverse sectors 
such as healthcare, commerce, larger manufacturers, agriculture and credit markets as 
there are presently close to110 mobile money systems adopted in the developing world 
and the most developed and well known among them is the M-Pesa (Donovan, 2011; 
Chibba, 2009).  As Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show, the deployment of mobile financial services 
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is growing and by this measure, Sub-Sahara is in the lead. This offers range of innovative 
services including (1) payments through peer-to-peer transfer, (2) finance via offering 
insurance products, such as Salama Kilimo in Kenya, and second generation mobile 
financial services in South Africa, and finally, (3) banking such as checking account 
access miles away from bank premises (Faye & Triki, 2013; Table 2.2). Unlike the 
previous attempts, which were either credit or savings-led, the M-Pesa drive suggests a 
third approach called the “payment rail.” In other words, proponents believe that there are 
forces inherent in mobile money—ubiquity of data transmission, mobile money as new 
industry and as infrastructure supporting new businesses and other industries, the infusion 
of capital abroad and from informal sector, as well as efficiency gains from digital 
currency— that will effectively drive growth (Gencer, 2011). Mobile banking offers 
cheaper, safer and faster methods to transfer funds (Table 2.3). At the same time, mobile 
money can have a positive impact on the GDP through (1) reducing the untaxable “gray 
economy” and reduction of fraud, (2) productivity gains through efficient 
communications, underscoring that connectivity is productivity and (3) increased 
investments, hence producing more jobs (Figure 2.4). For example, by March 2010, due 
to M-Pesa, Safaricom is believed to have created over 36,000 new agents and 
telecommunications jobs in Nairobi, Africa’s New Silicon Valley (Gencer, 2011). 
The second pillar of financial inclusion is financial literacy, defined “as the ability to 
make informed judgments and to take effective decisions regarding the use and the 
management of money” (Chibba, 2009, p. 222). It matters for expanding access 
(Demirguc-Kunt & Klapper, 2013). Today, a number of banks  such as Faulu Kenya 
(Cohen & Nelson, 2011) in Kenya are engaged in the promotion of financial literacy as 
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they rollout many of their financial services through client workshops/face-to-face 
training, campaigns on money management principles through radios, TV or print media. 
Understanding the psychology of financial exclusion due to illiteracy, low income, 
distance, and self-exclusion, is also another component of this pillar (Aduda & Kalunda, 
2012)8. 
The third pillar of financial inclusion is the role of microfinance institutions (MFIs). They 
have long and successful records in promoting financial inclusion. Some of the MFIs (for 
example, Faulu) in Kenya are converting to deposit-taking to engage further with the 
public. While MFIs alone are not enough, they complement other financial inclusion 
toolkits.  
The fourth pillar of financial inclusion is public sector support. This is a country-specific 
politico-economic dimension that ensures appropriate legislation as well as supervision 
and implementation (Chibba, 2009; Aduda & Kalunda, 2012). M-Pesa did not succeed in 
a vacuum but rather thanks to the concerted efforts of the Kenyan government and 
concerned stakeholders to cooperate in implementing appropriate regulations and 
accountability mechanisms (AFI, 2010). Others argue that Kenya’s adoption rate was 
boosted by the presence of a “perfect storm” in political, demographic and business 
factors (Gencer, 2011).   
                                                          
8 Aduda and Kalunda (2012) classify types of financial exclusions as physical access 
exclusion, access exclusion, condition exclusion, price exclusion, marketing and self-
exclusion. Other researchers classify them differently; namely balance levels 
requirements, insufficient documentation, and interest rate barriers among others.  
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To the extent these pillars are transformative; they can be strengthened through five 
models: financial sector consensus, private sector development, public sector leadership, 
civil society and the catalytic model (Chibba, 2009):  
2.4 Measuring Financial Sector Development and Financial Inclusion 
Some consensus is emerging over the question whether there is a direct link between 
financial sector development and economic growth through finance (Goldsmith, 1969; 
McKinnon, 1973; Benhaib & Spiegel, 2000; Classens & Laeven, 2003; Love, 2003; 
Beck, Levine & Loayza, 2000a, 2000b).  Love (2003) argues that financial development 
impacts growth by reducing financing constraints (legal constraints, enforcement of 
property rights, creditor rights and accounting standards), hence removing distortions that 
would have made investment more inefficient. In testing this relationship, Benhabib and 
Spiegel (2000) conclude that financial sector development correlates with total factor 
productivity growth and investment and that many of results are sensitive to country 
fixed-effects, implying differences in broader characteristics and level of financial sector 
development. 
Using data on 80 countries from 1960 to 1989, Levine and King (1993) find some 
associations between level of financial sector development on one hand and real GDP 
growth, rate of physical accumulation and efficiency in which all factors are properly 
utilized in the economy, on the other hand. This finding corresponds with Schumpeter 
who held the view that financial system has a potential to promote economic growth. 
Levine and King(1993) claim that “In 1911 Joseph Schumpeter argued that the services 
provided by financial intermediaries—Mobilizing savings, evaluating projects, managing 
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risks, monitoring managers, and facilitating transactions—are essential for technological 
innovation and economic development” (p. 717). 
This view has not always been uniformly accepted within the economics discipline. Some 
economists contend that finance is unimportant for growth. Robinson (1952) believes that 
financial development only follows economic growth and more recently, Lucas (1988) 
calls the relationship between financial sector development and economic development as 
something “overstressed” (Levine & King, 1993, p. 717).  Beck, Levine and Loayza 
(2000a) argue that “Economic theories mirror these divisions” with some going back to 
19th century. For example, Hamilton (1781) contended that “Banks were the happiest 
engines that ever were invented” so as to spur economic growth while on the other hand, 
others offered different claims, for instance Adams (1819), argued that  banks had 
negative effect on the “ morality, tranquility, and even wealth” of given states or 
countries.  In that regard, one group favors the role of financial intermediaries to 
economic growth (Hamilton, 1781; Bagehot, 1873; Schumpeter, 1943) and while another 
group minimizes its role (sees Adams, 1819; Robinson, 1952; Lucas, 1988). 
However, recent studies have come to find stronger relationships between growth and 
financial sector development. On their part, Gregoro and Guidotti (1995) examine link 
between the long-run economic growth and financial sector development, proxied by 
ratio between bank credit to private sector and GDP. They find a positive relationship 
between the two in a large cross-country sample and vary across countries with negative 
impact for Latin America when they used panel data. They also conclude that the channel 
from financial sector to growth is through efficiency, not volume of investment. Other 
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models they cited include “endogenous growth literature (Bencivenga & Smith, 1991; 
Greenwood & Jovanoic, 1990) which focuses of marginal product of capital which 
remains positive in their investigation. 
Identifying sources of growth such as private savings rates, physical capital 
accumulation, and total factor productivity, Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) find that 
financial intermediaries impact growth through its positive effect on total productivity 
growth.  
Financial sector development, therefore, is now widely recognized as contributing to 
economic growth and poverty reduction (Aduda & Kalunda, 2012; Jung, 1986). 
According to Levine (1997, p. 703), “there is even evidence that the level of financial 
development is a good predictor of future economic development.”  Johnson and Nino-
Zarazua (2011, p. 475) remark, “The role of financial sector as a leading contributor to 
growth has been substantially accepted and recently the focus has turned to its 
contribution to poverty reduction.”  There are two views in this debate. The first view, 
referred to as “demand-following” asserts that economic growth leads to expansion of 
financial system and on the second view, referred to as “supply-leading”, argues for the 
expansion of financial services before demand for financial services or “The financial 
sector precedes and induces real growth” (Jung, 1986, p. 333). 
There is no one-size-fits-all measure of financial development. Nevertheless, 
conventional indicators of financial development include: 
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(i) Private credit from financial intermediaries to the private sector divided by GDP. 
Studies show that private credit is a good predictor of economic growth (Beck, 
Demirkuc-Kunt & Levine 2005; Sacerdoti, 2005; Ardic, Mylenko, & Saltane, 
2012; see Chapter 1.1, Table 1.2). 
(ii) The ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP (M2/GDP), which is an indicator of 
“financial deepening.” This measure has received criticisms because it overlooks 
openness, extent of public borrowing from domestic financial system, the 
development of nonbank financial intermediation, and the competitiveness of the 
banking sector (Kablan, 2010).  
(iii)  The ratio of the total loans outstanding to GDP, another measure of financial 
depth. Greater depth is associated with greater access, since access itself is hard 
to measure (CGAP, 2009). This measure is also criticized because domestic 
private credit is conflated with government borrowing which may crowd-out 
private sector borrowers. 
Financial development is associated not only with increased access to finance but also 
with higher quality of services. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Peria (2007) put together a list 
of indicators to measure banking sector penetration and outreach that also address quality 
attributes:  
1. Geographic branch penetration: number of bank branches per 1000 km sq; 
2. Demographic branch penetration: number of branches per 100,000 people; 
3. Geographic ATM penetration: number of bank ATMs per 1000 km square; 
4. Demographic ATM penetration: number of bank ATMs per 100,000 people; 
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5. Loan accounts per capita: number of loans per 100, 000 people; 
6. Loan-income ratio: average size of loans to GDP per capita; 
7. Deposit accounts per capita: number of deposits per 1000 people; 
8. Deposit-income ratio: average size of deposits per 1000 people. 
The financial inclusion agenda is concerned today about expanding the services through 
improvement in each of the above criteria (see Chapter 1, Table 1.2; Table 2.4). 
2.5 Interventions in Credit Markets 
Credit markets in Africa tend to exhibit the following characteristics: 
(1) Inability to satisfy existing credit demand, especially among SMEs and in rural 
areas. 
(2) Imperfect information, costly screening and monitoring, and poor contract 
enforcement, all of which contribute to moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems; according to Atieno (2009), credit markets tend to be segmented and 
incomplete, hence making it harder for SMEs to secure credit.  
(3) Dualistic markets—informal and formal markets existing side- by-side. 
 Small business enterprises often rely on their own savings or turn to friends and families 
to finance expansion (see survey analysis in Chapters 3 and 4). Sometimes they go to 
moneylenders who charge exorbitant rates. The result is a dualistic monetary system, in 
which banks lend to big businesses and leave small borrowers out in the cold, where they 
may be at the mercy of loan sharks. Nevertheless, informal finance in some cases 
succeeds where formal finance fails.  
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Aryeetey (1997) contends that informal financial markets serve niches that formal banks 
cannot reach in Africa. The unorganized monetary system mobilizes household savings 
and provides financing to small businesses. In order to overcome weaknesses in legal 
structures and poor contract enforcement, informal markets use social sanctions, 
collateral substitutes, reputation and group dynamics and personal relationships. For 
example, informal finance has been important in Ghana for decades, whether the 
government has pursued liberal or repressive financial policies (Aryeteey, 1997). 
Even though informal finance serves niches that formal banks do not reach, it has its 
limitations. SMEs often demand larger loans than informal finance can provide. 
Moreover, some informal lending sources, such as moneylenders (who do not mobilize 
deposits but raise capital from their own earnings, and economic activities such as 
farming and trading), charge exorbitantly high interest rates.  
At the same time, SMEs often have difficulty accessing formal-sector finance.  In Kenya, 
despite the more than doubling of banking assets between 1990 and 1995, few 
commercial banks were lending to SMEs in the late 1990s (Atieno, 2001). Exceptions 
include Barclays Bank which lent to women in groups and as individuals, and set up loan 
guarantee funds. Also, Kenya Commercial Bank has offered government guarantee loans 
to deserving SMEs.    
Atieno (2001) found that Kenya’s Central Bank rules lowering entry requirements 
(minimum capital requirements) led to growth of non-bank financial institutions (NFIs) 
from 23 in 1981 to 54 in 1988, and that the number declined to 24 in 1997 following the 
conversion of many NBFIs into commercial banks. I suspect that this growth of NBFIs 
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exerted some competitive pressure on licensed banks and might have helped to expand 
access to small borrowers. NBFIs include currency exchange bureaus, insurance firms, 
cashier check issuers, and check cashing locations. NBFIs occupy an intermediate 
position on the continuum between the formal and informal finance. Microfinance 
institutions, Savings and Credit Cooperative Organizations (SACCOs) and Rotating 
Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) also fall on this continuum. In Kenya, 
SACCOs, MFIs, and ROSCAs are categorized as “other alternative financial services” 
(Central Bank Act, 2008). Let us now turn to general conventional and non-conventional 
means of interventions in the credit markets. 
2.5.1 Conventional Means of Interventions in Credit Market 
In good times, a country’s central bank has at its disposal a number of conventional 
monetary policy tools. Interest rate policies, open market operations and changes in 
reserve requirements are applied to control credit supply. While the degree of 
intervention is different, advanced as well as developing countries use these conventional 
monetary policies. 
Monetary theory holds that in a competitive credit market without externalities, the first 
fundamental welfare theorem states that forces of supply and demand interact to produce 
market clearing interest rates which are Pareto optimal. Any other interest rate would be 
disequilibrating. But because the standard model of competitive market is rare to find in 
developing countries due to market failures, governments have intervened in credit 
markets. These interventions have taken varied forms, both in the past and present. 
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First, governments in developing countries were frequently used to intervene through 
selective credit schemes. But these schemes came under heavy criticisms for bearing 
below-market interest rates and therefore becoming commercially unviable. In the face of 
such criticisms, they have been largely abandoned on the ground they tend to lead to 
financial repression (see McKinnon, 1973). Structural adjustment programs grew out, in 
part, of this understanding of the need to correct the government inefficiencies in the 
credit markets. 
Second, governments in developing countries used to intervene in the rural credit 
markets, including through nationalization as in India in 1969 and  Mexico in 1982 
(Besley, 1994). Compelling banks to set up branches in rural areas to lend to agriculture 
is another such scheme.  
Today, a number of conventional market based-solutions are being sought in which 
developing country governments are intervening in credit markets through other means. 
One such intervention is through pure regulation, which has been and continues to be 
used to affect daily operations of bank, including capital ratios and other soundness 
measures. There is also increased cooperation between the public and private sector in 
rolling out some financial services, such as M-Pesa or agency models in Kenya. In 
addition, not only are central banks issuing prudential guidelines to commercial 
institutions, they are also using moral suasion to encourage implementation of the 
financial inclusion agenda. 
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2.5.2 Non-conventional Means of Interventions in Credit Markets 
There are two kinds of interventions in this category, one dealing with stock markets and 
the other dealing with banks to affect credit markets.  In developing countries, 
unconventional means of interventions include:  
First, investing in informational credit databases, such as credit references. This can have 
far reaching implications in access to credit. Commercial banks, central banks and 
concerned governments such as the Government of Kenya (GoK) are pushing hard for 
this investment because of the benefits it provides to the lenders, borrowers and the credit 
market in general.  
Second, there has been an interest in governments to subsidize early innovators, for 
example, by giving them tax breaks. The growth of M-Pesa is a good example of such 
early subsidization, in that the Kenyan Government did not heavily regulate the financial 
service provider in the early stage (AFI, 2010). This model in which innovation precedes 
regulation gave the M-Pesa platform a breathing space. Another example is the Grameen 
Bank in Bangladesh. The latter pioneered the innovative group lending model which has 
been embraced by the MFI industry because of its implication in reducing information 
asymmetries between lenders and borrowers. Mashigo (2008) finds, for example, that 
group lending improves access to credit by group members in Soshanguve informal 
settlement in South Africa. 
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Third, small loan guarantees, such as the ones offered by SBA in the US are hypothesized 
to provide net positive social welfare gains9. Craig, Jackson and Thomson (2007, p. 7) 
find that there is a “significant correlation between the average annual level of 
employment in a local market and the level of SBA guaranteed lending in the local 
markets.”  However, there are few studies in this area, which means that there is no 
definitive answer as to whether guaranteed subsidies help small businesses or remain 
ineffective though they are politically popular. This model is not peculiar to the western 
governments. A number of developing country commercial banks are partnering with 
development institutions to pool resources and lend them to SMEs. 
In the developed economies, when policy interest rates reach the zero bound level, central 
banks have the option of using monetary stimulus via “quantitative easing,” which is 
another unconventional forms of intervention (Imus, Srinivasan & Vladimir, 2009; Santo 
& Suchanek, 2013). Indeed, following the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 that hit the 
advanced economies, governments took a number of unconventional measures to 
intervene in the credit market (Tong & Wei, 2010). These unconventional measures 
included debt guarantee purchases of toxic assets and bank recapitalization. These 
interventions, according to Tong and Wei (2010), helped alleviate the credit constraints 
for the non-financial firms. These non-standard measures have been transitory and 
tailored to the needs of each economy (Trichet, 2013). In the words of Santor and 
                                                          
9 For over half a century, SBA has been providing loan guarantees as mechanisms to 
mitigate credit rationing. Consistently over the years, the federal loan guarantees grew 
from $12.6 billion to $18 billion in 2006 and $25 billion in 2008 (see Craig, Jackson & 
Thomson, 2007). 
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Suchanek (2013, p. 11), “Unconventional monetary policies have thus become part of the 
toolkit of central banks, permitting them to provide considerable policy stimulus should 
circumstances require more action.” 
While these unconventional measures have also helped real economies, such measures 
have also created real potential costs and challenges for the central banks in the 
mechanics of expanded balance sheets and how to exit (Bernanke, 2012; Santo & 
Suchanek, 2013). Exiting too soon may undermine recovery, but exiting too slow may 
lead to excess liquidity and building up of inflationary measures. Many have thus called 
for clear communications and guidance. 
Another problem is that a given central bank’s credibility (especially the U.S. Fed) may 
be at stake if it is seen to continue propping up government spending through large fiscal 
deficits. There is also a concern about “low for long”, a situation in which interest can 
stay low for an extended period (Carney, 2012). This may have distributional and 
spillover effects in other asset prices (Santor & Suchanek, 2013), and the commitment to 
keep interest rate close to zero for extended time permits the operation of “zombie 
banks,” which remain operating due to continued government support despite negative 
net worth (Imus, Srinivasan and Vladimir, 2009). 
At the end of the day though, developed and developing countries face different policy 
settings and different challenges in applying unconventional measures. Advanced 
countries have efficient financial infrastructures which make it easy to transmit monetary 
policy injections across the entire economy. Second, developing countries are more 
dependent on cash-based transactions than advanced countries. Cash-based economy 
 46 
 
(soft currency) comes with a baggage of disadvantage ranging from insecurity carrying 
cash to losing value if there is hyperinflation. Having soft currency as opposed to hard 
(strong) currency complicated interventions because in developing countries, much of the 
economy is underground. That advanced countries have hard currency position does not 
undercut their policy intervention; developing countries face the issue of soft currency, 
which is constantly fluctuating due to political instability or lack of confidence in a given 
national currency. In other words, the economic fundamentals are very weak in 
developing countries than in developed countries which make monetary policy less 
effective in the former. 
Intervention in credit market is not a common experience in South Sudan because the 
country, including its Central Bank just emerged on the scene recently. The Bank is 
presently managed by 9-member board of directors which is the “highest policy and 
decision making body” (GoSS, 2011). The board composes of a governor, and two 
deputy governors who are generally appointed by the president as well as six-
nonexecutive members who are not Bank employees, proposed and appointed by 
Governor and the president, respectively. A governor who happens to be chairman of the 
board and two deputies are appointed for five years and the other board members for 
seven years each. An exception is made for first such two deputies and other members of 
board who are slated to serve staggered terms to provide continuity. 
Many of conventional and as well as unconventional means of intervening in the credit 
markets are still foreign to South Sudan, which has only a bank-based weak financial 
system. The only two major areas where the Bank has played a role in the economy are to 
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act as a banker and agent of the government (receiving its oil revenue and representing 
the government in some international obligations falling within its competency). Except 
through occasional fixed exchange rate policy, many of these policy tools are out of its 
reach or have not delved into yet. For example, commercial banks are not lending, so 
interest policy has not been an effective policy. On reserve requirements, many banks are 
having enough liquidity sitting idly and only found a borrower in the name of the 
government during austerity measures of 2012. Commercial banks were issued treasury 
bills and lent money to ministry of finance.  
There is no policy of providing credit guarantees to businesses or private sectors nor is 
the Bank engages in quantitative easing policies as is the case in the West. In short, there 
are no applications of both the unconventional and conventional means of intervention in 
credit market today in South Sudan. First, the banking sector is limited in their lending 
activities and is much concerned with exchange transactions, involving personal 
remittances and bank transfers. Second, lack of skilled management in the Bank and 
commercial institutions as well as lack of strong regulatory framework is constraining 
any meaningful interventions. The recent devaluation of the currency on 11 November 
2013 proves disastrous because of these limiting factors or weak regulatory system. 
2.6 Conclusion 
From 1956 through 2005, South Sudan has been a region which has put political 
liberation above everything else. And between 2005 through 2011, the Southern Sudan (a 
region then) was once again preoccupied with holding credible referendum and seceding. 
While the secession came on 9 July 2011, the country came to the world scene as the 
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youngest nation and among the least developed economies, with no experience in 
virtually everything. Hence, its central bank is two years old and all its institutions are 
beset by weak regulatory framework. Oil fueled consumption in the expense of other 
pursuits such as access to credit and financial inclusion in general.  
Aware of the current affairs of the banking sector in South Sudan, role of the CBSS and 
the ills facing its economy, this chapter aims to shade some light on the role of SMEs in 
modern economies and offer suggestions for enhancement of financial inclusion. 
This chapter, therefore, defines SMEs and discusses why they are important in modern 
economies as a vehicle to create jobs and reduce poverty. We argue that development 
circles have come to a better understanding in advocating financial inclusion not only 
through MFIs but also through technology-based applications such as ATMs, mobile 
finance services such as M-Pesa, and innovative leadership in the public-private sector 
nexus. 
Central banks in the developing world are currently the prime movers taking on the 
unconventional objectives of pushing for financial inclusion and greater interoperability 
(the capacity for operations or to operate together, for instance, inter-operation between 
M-Pesa platform and that of M-Kesho) in financial services. This is witnessed by the 
growing number of financial inclusion workshops, symposia and conferences, as well as 
interventions in credit markets to further these goals.  
This dissertation’s exploration of the Kenyan experience in expanding financial access to 
SMEs, and of the challenges of doing this in the post-conflict environment of South 
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Sudan, builds upon these developments in an effort to formulate a strategy for promoting 
financial inclusion in a setting where credit markets are singularly underdeveloped. 
 
 
Table 2.1 Definition of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in EU, U. S and Kenya 
Country 
/Region 
Enterprise  Headcount Turnover  Balance Sheet  
EU Small < 50 ≤ € 10   million ≤ € 10  million 
Medium < 250 ≤ € 50 million  ≤ € 43 million 
USA Small 
Business 
< 500  $ 7 million 
(service) 
$ 7 million 
(service) 
Kenya Small Between 5 
and 50  
N/A N/A 
Medium Up to 200  Ksh. 2 million Ksh. 2 million 
Source: U.S. Small Business Administration, and EU Recommendations (2003/361/EC) 
 
 
Table 2.2: Different Types of Mobile Financial Services across the World 
Type Kind of Services 
Mobile Finance 
 
- Credit 
- Insurance 
- Savings 
Mobile Banking - Transactional 
- Informational 
Mobile Payment - Person-to-person 
- Government-to-person 
- Business-to-business 
Source: Adopted from Donovan, 2011 
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Table 2.3: Cost of a 200 USD Money Transfer (Person-to-person; P2P) 
Mobile Payment Cash to Cash 
Provider Cost 
(USD) 
Provider Cost 
(USD) 
Celpaid (Cote d’Ivoire) 8 WARI(Senegal) 20 
Airtel (Burkina Faso) 6 CMS(Senegal) 2 
Inova (Burkina Faso) 6 ACEP(Senagl) 2 
Societe Generale (Senegal) 10 Eco-bank 
(Burkina Faso) 
8 
M-Pesa (Kenya) 1   
Orange Money (Senegal) 9   
Source: AfDB Publication, 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.4: Use of Financial Services across Africa (% of Adult population) 
 Formal Formal Other Informal Excluded 
Kenya 21.5 15 29.5 34 
Tanzania 15 2 7 75 
Uganda 18 0 29 52 
Zambia 14 12 11 62 
Botswana 44 5 5 48 
South Africa 54 6 9 31 
Namibia 53 3 1 42 
Source: Beck et al., (2010) 
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Figure 2.1: Pillars of Financial Inclusion 
Source: Author (2013) 
 
Figure 2.2: Global Mobile Deployments, 2001-2011 
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Figure 2.3: Number of Mobile Money Deployments by Region, March 2011 
 
Source: Donovan, 2011 
Note: E&CA = Europe and Central Asia; MENA = Middle East and North Africa; SA = 
South Asia; LAC = Latin America and Caribbean; EA&P = East Asia and Pacific; SSA = 
sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
  
11 
3 5 
13 
16 
20 
56 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
N
um
be
r o
f m
ob
ile
 m
on
ey
 a
pp
lic
at
io
ns
 
 53 
 
Figure 2.4: Financial Inclusion Contribution to a Country’s GDP  
 
Source: Gencer (2011); Modified by Author (2013) 
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CHAPTER 3 
FINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT AND SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED 
ENTERPRISES IN KENYA 
3.1 Introduction 
Received wisdom links access to credit with economic growth through efficient resource 
allocation and enablement of exchange of goods and services (Levine, 1997; Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 2005; Johnson & Arnold, 2012; IMF, 2008; Ouma & 
Ramo, 2013).  In development circles, emphasis is increasingly placed on financial 
inclusion, based on the understanding that lack of basic financial services, such as credit, 
savings mechanisms and insurance policies contributes to unrelenting income inequality, 
poverty and lethargic economic growth (Dev, 2006; Kendall, Mylenko & Ponce, 2010; 
Nkurunziza, 2010; Singh & Tandon, 2012; Cracknell, 2012; Koker & Jentzsch, 2012; 
Lassila, 2012; d’Alcantara & Gautier, 2013; Bauchet & Murdoch, 2013). Demand-side 
factors10, such as lack of employment, fluctuating incomes, and illiteracy as well as 
supply-side factors such as geographic distance, excessive cost of financial services, lack 
of identification documents or high minimum balances, often lead to financial exclusion 
of significant segments of the population in low-income countries (Atieno, 2009; Johnson 
& Nino-Zarazua, 2011; d’Alcantara & Gautier, 2013; Aterido, Beck & Iacovone, 2013). 
In the words of Singh and Tandon (2012, p. 49), “financial exclusion leads to social 
exclusion, poverty as well as all the other associated economic and social problems.”  For 
                                                          
10 Theoretically, we have come to understand constraints to access to finance in the lens 
of New Institutional Economics which shines a spotlight on asymmetric information and 
transaction costs that may arise from geographical distance, cost of services, and identity 
card requirements, among others; (see Johnson and Nino-Zarazua, 2009). 
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this reason it can be argued that financial services should be considered as “merit goods”, 
defined as goods that should universally be provided to individual not so much on 
willingness and ability to pay but on needs-based criteria (d’Alcantara & Gautier, 2013, 
p. 131). Merit goods may arise due to preference –distortion problem, distributional 
problem and public good problem (Head, 1966). Examples of merit goods in our society 
today include public education, subsidized housing and head-start programs because they 
embody positive externalities. 
This recognition has led international financial institutions, governments and private 
sector agencies to advocate policies geared toward creating broad-based financial sectors 
as one of the tools to achieve inclusive economic development (United Nations, 2006; 
World Bank, 2008; IMF, 2008, AfDB, 2013). In addition, financial inclusion is pursued 
for the goals of financial integrity, such as anti-money laundering (Koker & Jentzsch, 
2012), based on the argument that bringing everyone into the formal financial system 
stifles illegal activities (see Kenya’s Prevention of Terrorism Act 2012).  
Access to finance by Small and Medium Sized enterprises (SMEs) is an important 
element of financial inclusion agenda. In Kenya, Equity Bank has demonstrated that 
banking with the bottom of the economic pyramid11 can be safe and profitable 
(Cracknell, 2012). Banks should, therefore, look at financial inclusion both as a business 
opportunity and social responsibility (Dev, 2006). This awakening to the possibilities of 
“banking the unbanked” is gaining foothold in Kenya, a country where the financial 
                                                          
11 According to Prahalad (2004), about 4 billion people fall in this category, many of 
whom live on less than $5 a day. 
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sector has been reasonably stable since the early 2000s. Based on my fieldwork and 
review of the literature, financial stability in Kenya has been attributed to several factors, 
including enforcement of capital requirements, strong regulation, a deposit protection 
fund, strong audits which bring credibility to the banking sector, declining non-
performing loans due to credit referencing and window shopping, regulation of 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) to mitigate systemic risks, and finally the fact that the 
Kenyan economy is growing and integrating with the rest of the world (CBK, 2012). 
The Central Bank of Kenya’s policy is to continue to improve financial inclusion through 
agency banking, MFI regulation and provision of sound prudential guidelines. In order to 
further these goals, the government, the central bank  and the banking sector have 
embraced technology—ATMs and mobile financial services— to deliver financial 
services to all, especially those at the bottom of the economic pyramid. Postal services 
are used to provide these financial services as is the case in Brazil and India. Kenya’s 
mobile phone penetration grew from 15,000 users in 1999 to 24 million in 2011 (CBK 
Report, 2012).  Fewer than 3% of households in Kenya had a cell phone in 1990 whereas 
by 2011, 93% of all households had mobile phones (Demombynes and Thegeya, 2012).  
According to the latest national survey, about 48% of all adults own a mobile phone in 
Kenya (FinAccess National Survey, 2009). According to Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper 
(2012), 12% in Sub-Sahara Africa without a formal bank account now use mobile phone 
financial service transactions. 
The Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) describes itself as  a “champion of financial inclusion 
innovations through agency banking and mobile financial services,” and the Bank has 
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hosted country delegations on “agency banking, consumer protection, financial 
education, credit information sharing, mobile financial services and microfinance and 
automation of bank supervision functions” (CBK, 2012, p.62). CBK is one of 95 
members of the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI), a network of financial 
policymakers, founded by Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation in 2008 with the expressed 
goal of encouraging countries to adopt inclusive financial policies so as to help move 
people out of poverty. AFI does this by encouraging interaction among its members and 
knowledge exchange on financial inclusion policies, a paradigm referred to as peer-to-
peer learning model. These initiatives are bearing fruit. First, the use of formal bank 
credit in Kenya in the entire population increased from 31% in 2006 to 38% in 2009 and 
Second, most money transfers are now done through M-Pesa (National FinAccess 
Survey, 2009). The ATM usage also increased from 7.8% of the adult population in 2006 
to 13.4% in 2009. Despite all these efforts, the number of unbanked is still high in Kenya 
(IMF, 2008) and SMEs still face significant barriers to growth (Rosemary, 2009). More 
people still rely on informal financial services, networks between firms and the M-Pesa is 
primarily banking the already banked population. Also, Kenya has seven regulatory 
bodies in the financial market and there is more room for interaction to improve 
efficiency (Cracknell, 2012). 
While close to one billion adults worldwide have no bank accounts, most are assumed to 
have mobile phones (Jack & Suri, 2011)12 . The potential of mobile telephone for 
                                                          
12 We are by no means suggesting that the so-called digital divide or digital chasm, for 
lack of better words, is completely narrowed. Despite these best efforts, the divide still 
exists both across and within countries. Howard and Mazaheri (2009, p. 1159) find that 
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revolutionizing access to financial services is illustrated by the successful story of M-
Pesa in Kenya’s financial landscape (Demombynes & Thegeya, 2012; Aker & Mbiti, 
2010; Jack, Suri & Townsend, 2010; Mbiti & Weil, 2011; Jack & Suri, 2011; Cracknell, 
2012; d’Alcantara & Gautier, 2013). Launched in 2007 by Safaricom and Vodafone M-
Pesa (where M stands for mobile and Pesa is a Swahili word for money) is the most 
developed mobile phone payment system in the world. Currently operated by mobile 
phone network Safaricom, it “allows users to deposit money onto their mobile handsets, 
transfer e-money to another user with a simple text message, and withdraw cash at one of 
thousands of outlets throughout the country” (Mbiti & Weil, 2013, p. 369). It holds 
promises for financial inclusion, employment opportunities and poverty reduction 
(Kamothi, 2009; Kendall, Mylenko, & Ponce, 2010; Aker & Mbiti, 2010). For small 
firms and individuals, M-Pesa has generated innovative uses ranging from sending pocket 
money and school fees to students, to paying loans, transport fees, and other bills (Jack, 
Ray & Suri, 2013).  
M-Pesa is succeeding in Kenya because of mobile penetration, low transaction costs and 
a concerted drive to increase access to financial services (Jack & Suri, 2011). Though it is 
not a bank, Safaricom hopes that M-Pesa would substitute for bank accounts and reach 
millions unbanked people (Jack, Suri, & Townsend, 2010). Citing Kimenyi and Ndugu 
(2009), Demombynes and Thegeya (2012) state that four factors contributed to the rapid 
growth in “mobile money” in Kenya, namely (1) a conducive legal and tax environment, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
“while 7 out of 10 people in the United States have reported ever using the internet by 
2008, only 7 out of every 100 people reported doing so in India, and only 7 out of every 
1,000 people in Mali reported doing so.” 
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(2) private-public policy dialogue, (3) strategic and prudent macroeconomic policies, and 
(4) a guarantee of the existence of a competitive market, discouraging dominance by 
initial entrants (p. 4). 
Although the adoption of mobile phone is highest among those who are young, educated, 
urban and wealthy, the technology is no longer restricted primarily to the elites (Aker & 
Mbiti, 2010)13. Mobile technology is a vital channel of financial inclusion (Koker & 
Jentzsch, 2012). While the percentage of Kenyans using formal credit sources 
(commercial banks, post banks or insurance) rose from 18.9% in 2006 to 22.6% in 2009, 
the percentage using semi-informal sources such as M-Pesa (mobile-phone based transfer 
service), MFIs, and Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs; considered as the largest 
movement in Africa), rose from 26.8% in 2006 to 40.5% in 2009 (FinAccess National 
Survey, 2009). These figures speak to the fact that Kenya’s financial inclusion crusade is 
gaining ground. Access to finance in Kenya is higher than the neighboring countries in 
East Africa (Beck et al., 2010).  
Kenya has always seen development of SMEs as a priority to achieving industrialization, 
employment creation, and poverty reduction (Atieno, 2009). SMEs accounted for 75% of 
the nation’s workforce and 22% of the nation’s GDP in 2008 (Atieno, 2009; Mbiti & 
Mainga, 2006; Ouma & Ramo, 2013). The Kenyan government shows that it values the 
contributions of SME to the national economy by taking a number of initiatives including 
the 1996 Sessional paper Number 2 on Industrial Transformation to the Year 2020 that 
                                                          
13 Mobile phone coverage in Africa grew from 10% in 1990 to 60% in 2008 (Aker & 
Mbiti, 2010). 
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emphasizes SME financing; Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment 
creation 2003-2007 which identifies SMEs as one area of facilitating economic growth 
and recovery; the 2005 Sessional Paper Number 2 on the Development of Micro and 
Small Enterprises for Employment and Wealth Creation for Poverty Reduction (Mbithi & 
Mainga, 2006), and in 2006, GoK drafted the Micro and Small Enterprises Bill as a step 
toward SME legalization in the country (Ouma & Ramo, 2013). 
This study uses firm-level data to analyze access to finance for SMEs in Kenya and what 
banking sector is doing to expand the access frontier. To the best of my knowledge, this 
is the first study focusing on the question of access to finance by SMEs and channels of 
financial inclusion in Kenya. Other studies on this issue have not analyzed specifically 
Kenya (for example, Demirguc-Kunt, & Klapper, 2012; Aterido, Beck & Iacovone, 
2013). The study draws on surveys and interviews with SMEs and financial sector 
players, asking the latter what they are doing to expand financial access, the former what 
is holding them back. 
The data come from a 7-month field survey conducted in Kenya between March 2012 
and September 2012, mainly in the greater Nairobi region. Three cities— Nairobi, Tala 
and Machakos— were covered when administering the questionnaire to 341 SMEs and 
interviewing relevant SME respondents.  On the banking sector side, 12 out of the 44 
financial institutions participated in interviews.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides the context for Kenya’s financial 
sector development. Section 3.3 gives an overview of the current composition of the 
financial sector, respectively. Section 3.4 gives examples of what the banking sector is 
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doing to expand the access frontier. Section 3.5 analyzes the survey results of the banking 
sector and SMEs in Kenya. Section 3.6 presents an econometric analysis of SME access 
to credit. Section 3.7 draws lessons from the econometric results, and Section 3.8 
concludes. 
3.2 Background of Financial Sector Development in Kenya 
Kenya attained independence from Great Britain in 1963 with Jomo Kenyatta as its first 
president. While there were some leanings toward African socialism in the early 1960s, 
Kenya has gravitated toward a market- based economy (Ndung’u, Mitullah & Waema, 
2012). The banking sector, despite several failures over the years, has come to play an 
important role in the economy. While price stability, economic growth and sound 
macroeconomic policies have been central to Kenyan economy,  successful adoption of 
mobile technology such as M-Pesa have made the Kenyan economy as of late, earning a 
champion of financial inclusion (CBK 2012). 
Relative to her neighbors in the region, Kenya has a well-developed financial sector 
(Beck et al., 2010; Cracknell, 2012). The ratio of total financial assets to GDP is equal to 
80%, 30% and 26% in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, respectively (IMF, 2008).  
Furthermore, while 18.5% and 18.1% of population in Kenya and Uganda use formal 
financial services, 62.2% in Uganda as opposed to 38.3% in Kenya are formally excluded 
from financial services (Johnson & Nino-Zarazua, 2011). In both countries, government 
employees are more likely to use formal services due to the fact that they are likely to 
have back accounts to receive salaries (see Table 1.2). 
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The roots of financial sector development or financial stability go back to the country’s 
banking reform act of 1989, which drew inspiration and theoretical basis from the extant 
scholarship of the day. Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) had argued 
that high-growth economies tend to have well-developed financial systems, and that 
growth tends to be weak in countries where there is financial repression. The McKinnon-
Shaw hypothesis was embraced by the IMF, leading to the prescription and application of 
structural adjustment programs that included financial liberalization—removal of 
mandatory credit ceilings and directed credit allocation—as one key pillar. Liberalization, 
the theory predicted, would lead the interest rate spread to decline, and lower interest 
rates to borrowers would spur investment. This expansion of credit, all else equal, would 
thereby lead to expansion of growth. Despite disappointing outcomes, financial reforms 
in Africa did produce market-determined interest rate, a shift away from credit controls, 
reductions in market distortions, and strengthening of regulation and supervision 
(Ndikumana, 2009). 
Growth did not take off as expected, but today Kenya does enjoy an improved level of 
financial development thanks to landmark reforms, including the 1989 Banking Act, the 
Capital Market Authority Act of 1989, the Treasury Bill Act of 1990, and interest rate 
liberalization in 1991. Some positive effects of financial liberalization were also seen in 
other parts of Africa. According to Aryeetey (1997), effects in Ghana have been the 
emergence of nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs), finance houses, discount houses, 
venture capital, and the stock exchange. And some of these finance houses, say in 
Nigeria, had success in reaching SMEs through loans, equipment leasing, and hire-
purchases agreements (Aryeetey, 1997). 
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Following the reforms, CBK strengthened supervision, inspection and takeovers of ailing 
banks. It also introduced a Deposit Protection Fund covering deposits up to Ksh 100,000. 
Laeven (2003) finds that small firm financing constraints decreased following financial 
liberalization in the 13 sample countries while loss of preferential treatment led to large 
firms’ financing constraints increasing.14  
After the failure of several financial institutions in 1985-86, the Kenyan government took 
steps to improve central bank ability to regulate and supervise NBFIs, and building 
societies, and to impose stringent requirements on new institutions. Differential 
regulations on commercial banks and NBFIs were removed. The Banking Act of 1989 
aimed to enhance the central bank’s role through inspection, establishment of reports, 
auditing, provisioning requirements, capital adequacy requirements, exposure units, and 
assessments against compliance. Later amendments aimed to strengthen the balance sheet 
of NBFIs to protect small depositors, and to foster financial prudence, discipline, and 
better management of banking institutions (Kabubo & Ngugi, 1998). NBFIs were 
eventually required to convert fully to commercial banks. The restructuring was intended 
to promote competition, reduce government ownership and control, harmonize relations 
among financial institutions, and upgrade services with ATMs and promissory notes.  
Despite these achievements, structural adjustment, the mantra of neoliberal policy, is 
widely regarded as failure in Sub-Sahara Africa. In the words of Aryeetey (1994), 
                                                          
14 The list includes Argentina ,Brazil ,Chile ,India ,Indonesia ,Malaysia ,Mexico ,Pakistan 
,Peru ,Philippines ,Rep. Korea ,Taiwan ,and Thailand. 
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“financial reform has at best had limited developmental effects in the region.”15 In 
particular, financial reform did not adequately address the financial dualism (existence of 
organized and unorganized money markets; see Chapter 2, Section 2.5 for further 
analysis) or steps taken to ensure that semi-formal and informal producers have access to 
formal credit to expand operations. Moreover, liberalization was not properly phased. 
The financial sector often was liberalized before prudential supervisions and regulations 
were put in place. There was also an absence of institutions to reduce information 
asymmetries (accounting, credit information agencies), which suggests that institutional 
strengthening is critical to successful liberalization (Aleem, & Kesakende, 2001).  
In Kenya, commercial banks and the CBK learned some helpful lessons from the 
reforms. NBFIs did help in mobilization of resources following liberalization, as shown 
through their increased liquidities between 1992 and 1995 (Kabubo &Ngugi, 1998). 
Though outcomes of the SAP were not immediately positive, the financial reforms tended 
to bring some benefits in the long-run (Chandra & Khanijo, 2009). 
3.3 The Current Composition of the Kenyan Financial Sector 
Kenya’s financial sector comprise of the banking sector, non-bank financial sector, 
savings and credit cooperatives, securities market intermediaries, and insurance 
companies. The Central Bank of Kenya, like most central banks on the continent, is the 
                                                          
15 According to Deng (1998), however, SAPs might have produced growth which was 
saved in traditional ways in terms of cows or other means that are not captured in 
conventional measurement. 
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main regulator of the financial sector in the country. It was created through an act of 
parliament and is an outgrowth of East African Currency Board created in 1966.  
The composition of the financial sector has been dynamic. At independence in 1963, 
Kenya had 10 commercial banks. Of these, the top three— National and Grindlays Bank, 
Barclays Bank and Standard Bank—accounted for about 80% of all bank deposits. In the 
1970s, other banks came to being; they include Cooperative Bank of Kenya, National 
Bank of Kenya, and Kenya Commercial Bank. Thanks to the reforms of 1989, the 
Nairobi Stock exchange is now the fifth largest in Africa, after those of South Africa, and 
Nigeria. That is, by market capitalization, the ranking runs thus: South Africa, Egypt, 
Morocco, Nigeria and Kenya. By 1996, Kenya had 51 commercial banks, 23 non-bank 
financial institutions, 5 building societies, 39 insurance companies, 3 reinsurance 
companies, 10 development financial institutions, a capital market authority, 20 securities 
and equities brokerage firms, a stock exchange, 12 investment advisory firms, 57 hire 
purchase companies, several pensions funds, 13 foreign exchange bureaus, and 2,670 
savings and credit cooperative societies (Kabubo & Ngugi, 1998). 
Today, the Kenyan financial sector comprises 43 commercial banks, one mortgage 
finance company, eight deposit taking microfinance institutions, two credit reference 
bureaus, five foreign bank representative offices, 112 foreign exchange bureaus (CBK, 
2012), and the Association of Microfinance Institutions (AMFI) with 56 members 
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(Cracknell, 2012). Also, based on individual asset classification16, six banks were 
classified as large, fifteen medium and twenty two small. 
The banking sector has a footprint in eight former provinces (the country is now run 
through county government) in terms of ATMs, agents and bank branch networks to 
deliver bank services. In 2012, the banking sector added 111branches to bring total to 
1,272. Because of high concentration in urban areas, 53 new branches were created in 
Nairobi. The network will grow because Kenya had established county governments to 
deliver services to 47 counties throughout the country. We thus argue that as county 
governments take effect, the branch network is expected to rise. Additionally, a number 
of ATMs increased from 2205 in December 2011 to 2381 in December 2012 (CBK, 
2012). Furthermore, as of 31st December 2012, Kenyan banks had eleven subsidiaries 
operating in other East Africa countries with 282 branches and before-tax profits of Ksh. 
5.1 billion (47% of all the profits come from South Sudan subsidiaries). 
3.4 Expanding the Financial Access Frontier in Kenya 
Kenya’s financial sector is fortunate to be operating in an environment which is enhanced 
not only by information and communications technology (ICT) but also by favorable 
governmental policy. Scholars increasingly acknowledge the role of governments in 
creating a supportive policy environment for financial development (Beck, & Honohan, 
2007; Beck, Maimbo, Faye & Triki, 2011). In the past two decades, the Kenyan 
government and the CBK have made concerted efforts to develop the financial sector 
                                                          
16 Commercial banks whose assets fall below five billion Kenya shillings are considered 
small, a value between 5-15 medium and those above fifteen billion shillings large.  
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with a view to expanding access. Though these efforts have not always been successful, 
there are several lessons learned.  
First, credit referencing bureaus now facilitate the sharing of information by institutions. 
Since 2010, all commercial banks and Deposit Taking-Microfinance institutions (DTMs) 
have been submitting both negative and positive credit information to a central unit based 
at the CBK and this information sharing between the banks helps banks in appraising 
credit worthiness (CBK, 2012). Nonperforming loans decreased by 1.4% in 2012 from 
Ksh 58.3 billion in 2011 to Ksh.57.5 billion due to enhanced credit appraisals. Individual 
banks are building strong data infrastructure, too. 
Second, CBK is in the process of adopting Basel II principles in an attempt to conform to 
international financial standards. Almost all countries in Africa except, South Africa and 
Morocco, base their micro-prudential regulatory framework on Basel I (Calice, 2010). 
The Basel II Accord on banking regulation, reached in 2004, has three main pillars. Pillar 
I includes credit regulatory capital requirements, pillar II is intended to bridge economic 
and capital requirements, while pillar III is on market discipline. Pillar III17 asks lenders 
to disclose details on risk- rating processes, risk distributions and risk -management 
activities and recommends different risk mitigating techniques. Conforming to 
international standards matters because standardization has attracted some foreign banks 
to Kenya. Their role in lending to SMEs is mixed, since the presence of foreign-owned 
                                                          
17 Basel III concerns the needs to raising better capital quality, hence complying with 
more capital, more liquidity and lower risks, and has overall positive effect on the 
banking system (Abu Ghazaleh, N. Al-Hares, O, & El-Galfy, A., 2013). 
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banks can have two opposing effects. The first is a “cream-skimming” phenomenon 
whereby foreign banks are less likely to lend to small firms that lack adequate collateral 
and accounting information (ACS and Preston, 1997). The second, however, is a positive 
network effect as foreign banks transfer technology, import better regulation and 
supervision, reap economies of scale, and increase competition such that smaller banks 
find financing to SMEs a viable business strategy. 
Market-based modern financial systems are also helping SMEs to do well in South 
Africa, Mauritius, and North Africa, as well as in Kenya. SMEs are now participating in 
regional blocs as exporters, and the growing market liberalization and use of new 
communication technologies are creating new opportunities for SME internationalization 
(Buckley, 1997; Audretsch, 2002; Fernandez, & Nieto, 2006; Ndung’u, Mitullah & 
Waema, 2012). 
ICT is increasingly used to reach financial sector customers (Donner, & Tellez, 2008; 
Matambalya, & Wolf, 2001; Ondiege, 2010). Today, across the developing world, there 
are more people with mobile phones than bank accounts. Mobile phone banking (“m-
banking”) has vastly expanded access to financial services. In 2005, Vodafone teamed up 
with Safaricom to develop M-Pesa, a payment service that enables users to make 
payments on loans, transfer cash to relatives, and avoid carrying large amounts of cash 
for security reasons (Beck, & Honohan, 2007). Convenience, support, cost and 
satisfaction account for why small firms favor mobile money transfer. Some SMEs use 
M-Pesa to pay staff allowances and replenishments. When a truck breaks down en route 
from Uganda to Kenya, for example, the truck driver calls the head office in Nairobi and 
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money is sent to him to cover the spare parts and repair. Parents can pay school fees 
through their M-Pesa accounts; tenants pay electricity and water bills through M-Pesa 
accounts.  
M-Pesa was launched in 2007 with 900,000 subscribers; that number rose to 12 million 
customers in 2010. In 2007, there were 450 agents for M-pesa against 600 ATMs and 350 
Western Union agents across Kenya.  By 2010, the number of M-Pesa agents had reached 
19,500. In Addition to M-Pesa, there are other two mobile services, M-Kesho by 
Safaricom and ZAP by Zain. Innovative mobile technology minimizes information 
asymmetry and transaction costs (Matambalya & Wolf, 2001; Donner &Tellez, 2008). 
Because ICT use is non-rival in nature, its increased usage generates network 
externalities. 
Through individual and collaborative efforts, banks and other alternative forms of 
financial service providers in Kenya have begun making specific products for SMEs. In 
2010, for example, Barclays Bank, AccessKenya Institute of Certified Accountants of 
Kenya, Express Phone, and DHL joined forces to set up an SME account to provide 
cross-product services. Another example is the partnership between Western Union, UK 
Government and Kenyan Government to avail M-Pesa International Money Transfer 
service between Kenya and UK. By reducing the cost of sending money from UK to 
Kenya, this service boosts remittances to the country. 
With increased competition some banks are seeking competitive advantage in financing 
SMEs (Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2004). Every financial institution is now marketing 
aggressively to the SME sector. Kenya Women Finance Trust (KWFT), for instance, is 
 70 
 
developing customized SME products for women entrepreneurs across the country, in the 
belief that women tend to be time-poor and often face discrimination from banks which 
prefer dealing with husbands.  There can be very strong gender biases in access to credit 
and many of the operators of very small SMEs are women. So, from a survey of 190 
women entrepreneurs who happened to be KWFT borrowers in Kisumu District in 
Kenya, Ouma and Ramo (2013) find that access to microcredit by women-owned SMEs 
is positively related to net profit, sales and a size of the firm. 
Venture capital can be a good start-up source for SME financing when an entrepreneur 
cannot secure funding from banks. Lately a number of equity funds have begun to 
participate in financing SMEs. In Kenya, they include Mirror, Fanisi, Kiboko, and Africa 
Technology Media and Telecoms (ATMT) Funds. Two reasons are cited for this new 
interest among equity funds in financing SMEs. First, there are plenty of SMEs in Kenya, 
which means there are enough customers to go round. Second, government interventions 
are promoting SMEs. 
3.5 Analysis of the Survey Results 
3.5.1 Data and Methodology   
The data used in this essay come from the fieldwork that the author undertook in Kenya 
between March and September 2012. Data was collected in greater Nairobi region— 
Nairobi town, Tala and Machakos— with SMEs and commercial institutions as the main 
respondents. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with those who accepted data 
requests. Some respondents who needed ample time were given questionnaire to fill out 
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at their own pace. The author would collect responses at a later date. As was the case in 
South Sudan, five research assistants helped with the data collection in Kenya.  
With respect to the sampling method, each street was identified and every other firm was 
approached, that is, we alternated between inclusion and exclusion of the firms for 
interviews or administering of questionnaire. Every street stands equal chance for 
selection into sample. 
On the financial sector side, the data request letters were sent to commercial banks, 
central bank, and microfinance institutions. In this case, the entire population was a 
candidate for inclusion. The central bank, ten commercial banks, Safaricom, and a 
number of microfinance institutions chose to supply data upon request. Other banks such 
as Barclay and National declined, citing reasons from privacy to proprietary 
confidentiality. Throughout (three-components-research strategy), the analysis is 
supplemented with existing data from the Central Bank of Kenya, Kenya National 
Bureau of Statistics, World Development Indicators, and IMF databases.18  
3.5.2 The Banking Sector Survey 
This section gives a brief description of the characteristics of the selected banks. While 
the data request letters were sent to all 44 financial institutions in Kenya, I was only 
granted interviews with twelve commercial banks (two other banks promised but reneged 
on sending the data later). This is unlike in South Sudan where I managed to interview 
and administer the survey questionnaire to all eight commercial banks. 
                                                          
18 The three components-research strategy include a review of the existing literature, a 
qualitative/descriptive evaluation and econometric analysis of the survey data. 
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The commercial banks in Kenya are larger than banks in South Sudan in all respects. For 
example, while Equity employs only about 125 in South Sudan (see Table 4.1), its total 
employment in Kenya is 5,565 (Table 3.1). From bank total employment to loans as 
percent of deposits, evidence emerges that the banking system in Kenya is more 
developed than that of sister neighbor, South Sudan. 
Table 3.2 speaks to the fact that banking sector is not static. Banks were asked to give 
records of changes in accounts between July 2011 and March 2012. For customer bank 
accounts, Chase Bank, for instance, states that it had about 500,000 individual accounts 
in July 2011 and that this figure jumped to 1,500,000 by March 2012. The trends shown 
in this table are indicative of the fact that the financial sector is expanding access frontier 
through the account ownership. 
Of the nine banks that provided data, all except Bank of India have lent to SMEs (Table 
3.3). Only eight banks were able to describe their top SMEs and they happened to be in 
different sectors throughout the economy (Table 3.4). But when we asked banks to rate 
what factors they consider while appraising SME loans, commercial banks placed on top 
the character of the owner, collateral requirement and capacity of the firm (Table 3.5).  
Table 3.6 indicates that banks have come to appreciate the role of technology in 
expanding financial access, and are also seeing the benefits of partnering with 
development agents to pool resources and lend out to SMEs or those at the bottom of the 
socio-economic pyramid. 
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Table 3.7 is telling: commercial banks are seeing a declining trend in non-performing 
loans. During the interviews, some respondents credited the policy environment and 
central bank leadership for enhancing the business climate, noting prudential guidelines 
and other bank circulars. By way of example, I & M Bank reported that it has less than 
1% of its loan portfolio as nonperforming between 2010 and 2012. Though Consolidated 
Bank started with the largest non-performing loans in 2005, the figures decreased from 
98% in 2005 to 10% in 2012. This is a huge turnaround. For Equity Bank, the one bank 
that has provided a breakdown of its non-performing loans, it was not the case that SMEs 
are responsible for the bulk of the problem. Take for example, in 2009, SMEs had 8.11% 
of their loans non-performing and for larger businesses for the same year, the amount 
non-performing is 11.66%. The same story is true for 2012; SME nonperforming loan is 
1.68% whereas large businesses had 2.55% of their loan non-performing. 
No matter how far the CBK has come, commercial banks still have issues that need 
attending to if they are to augment financial deepening (Table 3.8). Banks such as Chase 
Bank want to see some regulations apply aggressively to MFIs and SACCOs so as to 
have a level playing field. Others want the CBK to maintain stable interest rate, price 
stability, and speedier review of guidelines or reduce the CBK rate. In order to lend to 
SMEs, banks would like to see more strategic partners, literacy workshops to help small 
businesses, records keeping, and timely loan repayment, avoidance of “bank hopping”, 
proper management, enabling infrastructure and transparency during loan appraisal. 
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As shown in Table 3.9, some banks have lent more loans to SMEs than others. Equity 
Bank lends to 6,312 SME firms, compared to 3,900 and 60 for I&M and Development 
Bank, respectively.  
3.5.3 Agency Banking 
The CBK published agency banking guidelines in 2010 to enable banks to operate 
through third party agents (Cracknell, 2012).  In brief, agency banking is a correspondent 
banking agreement whereby bank services are sold by nonbank financial corporations on 
behalf of the bank. Such arrangement has greater potential to reach wider markets, 
especially in rural areas, where formal banks have issues to do with power shortage, bad 
attitude toward rural folk, poor infrastructure and other technological impediments (Dev, 
2006).  
Table 3.10 shows the fact that since the adoption of the agency model in Kenya, 
provision of financial services has expanded beyond the bank corridors. Agents who 
provide these services on behalf of the banks or commercial institutions or Safaricom 
have grown exponentially since 2007. As the above table shows, the number of agents 
countrywide grew from 1,582 in 2007 to 50,471in 2011, an increase of 137.7% per 
annum (See Table 3.10)19. In tandem with a banking growth, the value of transactions in 
Kenya shillings grew from 16.3 billion in 2007 to 1.2 trillion in 2012. Ten commercial 
                                                          
19 In addition to collecting the data on agents from the Central Bank, I asked the 
commercial banks to provide their own data on agency distribution (Table 3.18). Of the 
ten interviewed banks, four disclosed such information. Equity Bank led with 6,123 
agents followed by KCB with 2,573.  The other two banks, Consolidated and Chase had 
30 and 380 agents in 2012, respectively. 
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banks had grown to 12,067 agents by 30 June 2012 (CBK, 2012) from 7,999 on 30 
September 2011(Table 3.11). 
In addition, deposit-taking microfinance institutions have also shown interest in agency 
banking. As of January 2012, one DTM had acquired a license to operate agency 
network, but by June 2012, five DTMs had 259 marketing offices operating (CBK, 
2012). While ten banks and five DTMs have contracted agents by December 2012, 
Equity Bank and Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB) are leading the drive to financial 
inclusion through agency banking (see Table 3.12) as well as Safaricom M-Pesa.  
For illustrative purposes, let me provide a little background on Equity Bank and 
Safaricom, a leading mobile phone operator in Kenya which launched M-Pesa, a product 
that does not require bank accounts to operate. Safaricom innovation is forward-looking 
as it recently launched in 2012 M-Shauri, which allows its subscribers to save money and 
access short-term credit from Commercial Bank of Africa in Kenya. 
3.5.3.1 Equity Bank Pioneering Mobile and Agency Banking 
Equity Bank was founded as the Equity Building Society in 1984. It started in the 
Murang’a District as informal family business providing mortgages to low-income 
households. By 1993, non-performing loans (NPL) made up 54% of its loan portfolio. 
CBK warned Equity Bank to reform or risk closure. This led to restructuring of the board 
composition and leadership. Onto the management board came its current CEO and 
Managing Director, James Mwangi, a man with considerable banking experience. He 
transformed the bank through smart restructuring, introducing pro-small business and 
pro-low-income customer services. Today, Equity Bank boasts many achievements: bank 
 76 
 
branch penetration, ATM penetration, listing of its stock on NSE, and the opening of 
branches in Uganda, South Sudan, and Rwanda, among others.  
Although KCB began mobile banking in 1976 to further rural financial intermediation by 
making limited loans to farmers and businesspersons (David, 1981), Equity Bank is today 
the leader in that regard. Equity Bank has the largest customer base with 7.1million 
customers across the region by 2011 and has hopes to reach more millions through 
launching of M-Kesho (Cracknell, 2012).  M-Kesho,  a product developed by Equity in 
conjunction with Safaricom offers the Safaricom subscribers micro-savings, micro-
insurance and micro-credit after being a bank member for six months. M-Kesho uses the 
existing infrastructure of M-Pesa. Customers do not have to walk to the agents in order to 
transfer money; they can do it right on their phones. 
 Equity Bank has an interest in serving the SME sector and it has pursued this by seeking 
partnerships with foreign partners. It obtained loan from China Development Bank to be 
used for lending directed to SME sector in 2010. Within a short time, observers have 
come to identify Equity Bank with innovative financial banking services and cutting-edge 
technology. The questions about Equity Bank that everyone grapples with include: What 
is behind its success? Is it managerial competency? Is it technology?  
As mentioned above, some of the innovations in Kenya’s fast-growing ICT industry 
include mobile telephone transactions, the celebrated M-Pesa, geographic penetration 
through bank branching, availability of ATMs 24/7 in areas deemed unreachable a 
decade ago, and mobile van ‘village’ banking (Donner & Tellez, 2008). Equity Bank and 
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Postal Bank in Kenya are the two leading providers of financial services to rural areas, 
thereby achieving geographic outreach (Beck, & Honohan, 2007).  
Cracknell (2012) argues that Equity Bank achieved efficiency through delivery channels 
by increasing branch efficiency, designing branches for volume, through supportive 
infrastructures such as ATMs, point of sales (POS) devices, mobile branches, and finally 
investing in alternative channels such as agency banking (Tables 3.11, 3.12, and 3.13).    
3.5.3.2 The Safaricom Factor 
 M-Pesa is the innovative brainchild of Safaricom. As of 2010, Safaricom had about 
40,000 outlets countrywide. Safaricom succeeded due to high level of cooperation 
between regulators and government ministries. Mbiti and Weil (2011) find that use of M-
Pesa increases the probability of being banked and lowers the chances of relying on 
informal savings sources such as rotating savings and credits associations (ROSCAS). M-
Pesa E-float/cash in transactions is secure. Speed, reliability, safety and network outlets 
add to M-Pesa popularity (Mbiti & Weil, 2011). In the words of Mbiti and Weil (2013), 
“the system is safer, cheaper, and far faster than the money transfer system it replaced” 
(p. 369).The downside of M-Pesa is that it may weaken social ties, for example, urban 
migrants who use it to send money may visit rural areas less often. Safaricom through its 
M-Pesa and other products including M-Kesho, and M-Shauri products, is breaking down 
factors of exclusion such as high cost, and non-price barriers.  Like Equity Bank, 
Safaricom is acting to remove adoption barriers, such as offering deposit of e-float 
(mobile money that a subscriber deposits into his or her M-Pesa account), requiring no 
minimum fees and making it free to register (Cracknell, 2012). 
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Table 3.12 presents common financial services that commercial banks provide through 
their agents, including cash deposit, withdrawals, bill payments and account openings or 
balance enquiries. While Table 3.12 presents number of transaction per type, Table 3.13 
breaks down the cumulative value of transactions by bank and type of transactions. 
Equity Bank still leads and KCB follows. Table 3.14 is suggestive of the fact that 
commercial banks are hovering all over Kenya even though they are more concentrated 
in some regions than others. A glance at this table is instructive: being the capital city of 
Kenya, more financial services are located in Nairobi. 
While the spread of ATMs is not exclusive to Kenya, the latter is far ahead than her 
neighbors in many aspects. By 2009, Kenya had 1,655 ATMs, compared to 46 in 
Ethiopia or 47 in Rwanda (Table 3.15). These correspond to 0.1, 3.8 and 0.4 per 100,000 
people, respectively.20 
The number of bank branches has been growing, too, but fluctuating in some years 
whereas ATMs grow steadily (Table 3.16). Physical bank branch acts as complementary 
to ATMs in some cases and substitute in others (Table 3.16). In terms of number of 
branches, KCB leads with 170 (Table 3.17). In all cases, commercial banks have more 
branches in Nairobi than in any other region. Table 3.18 gives us a number of agents of 
                                                          
20 Because I do not have some values for some countries in 2010, I used the 2009 ATM 
figures to illustrate a point about demographic penetration. The number of ATMs in each 
country is divided by population times 100,000 to arrive at the penetration ratios. The 
population figures corresponding to each country are as follows: Ethiopia(,93,877,025) 
Kenya (44,037,656), Rwanda(12,012,589 ), Sudan(34,847,910) Tanzania(48,261,942)  
and Uganda (34,758,80) (Central Intelligence Agency, July 2013 estimates ). The ratios 
correspond to each country are 0.05, 3.76, 0.39, 1.12, 1.65, and 1.54, respectively. 
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each bank which were interviewed and recorded. Equity Bank and KCB are still leading 
in that regard. 
Table 3.19.A provides the number of ATMs by bank by province. Based on these figures 
provided, Equity Bank leads with 510 live ATMs; KCB comes second with 449. Nairobi 
province has the largest number of ATMs. Table 3.19.B gives the total number of ATMs 
by four banks in each province in 2012. Again, Nairobi leads the pack. 
The central message from Table 3.20 is unmistakable: commercial banks are reaching all 
corners of Kenya, though not uniformly, and at the same time, the cashless economy is on 
the rise as ATMS and ATM cards increase. Equity Bank has its footprint all over Kenya, 
as shown in Table 3.20, although it has more ATM cards in Nairobi than in any other 
province, both in relative and absolute terms. Nairobi, for example, has 26 ATM cards 
per 100 people in 2009 compared to North Eastern Province where the ratio is 1.3. 
By the end of 2012, only six deposit-taking MFIs were operational in Kenya. South 
Sudan has no deposit-taking MFIs at the moment. But in Kenya, some of the DTM MFIs 
are aggressive in deposit mobilization, such as Faulu Kenya with 27 branches (Table 
3.21). 
There are 111 foreign exchange bureaus in Kenya by 2012 (See table 3.22) compared to 
75 in South Sudan as of 2011. Foreign exchange bureaus are the conduits through which 
the public can access hard currencies allocated to the banks by the central bank.  
The financial sector in Kenya thus is playing a positive role in achieving greater financial 
inclusion via delivery of financial services to the poor or low-income segments of the 
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society at reasonable cost. Though not comprehensive, the three surveys done by the 
National FinAccess between 2006 and 2013 show some improvements. For example, 
41.3% of the population was financially excluded, and only 18.5% were formally 
included according to the survey in 2006. Three years later, 33% of the population was 
financially excluded, and about 23% was formally included (Table 3.23). So in the words 
of Beck, Cull, Fuchs, Getenga, Gatere, Randa and Trandafir (2010), “access frontier has 
been pushed out between 2006 and 2009.”  The data suggest that men more than women 
tend to use formal bank services while women use more of informal financial services. 
3.5.4 The SME Survey 
This section provides an overview of the Kenya SME survey data. In sum, 341 firms 
were surveyed. Unlike the South Sudan survey where men make up 80% of the sample 
(see Table 4.15), in Kenya men only make up 56.6% of the sample (see Table 3.24).  
Turning to the questions of ethnicity and nationality (Table 3.25), foreigners own less 
than one percent of the Kenyan SMEs compared to 30% in South Sudan, reflecting 
foreign entry into the local market following the CPA in 2005. Kikuyu, the largest ethnic 
group, make up 21.4% of the sample. The next largest groups in the sample, Kamba, Luo 
and Meru, make up about 18.5%, 12.3% and 7.6% of the sample, respectively. Breaking 
down the above table by gender, we find that there are more Kikuyu men than Kikuyu 
women (Table 3.26) 
As is the case with many African economies, sole proprietorships make up close to half 
of the SMEs in the sample (Table 3.27). The next largest category is partnerships, which 
make up about 23% of the sample. 
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As shown in Table 3.28, in term of firm size, 47.7% of the sample is microenterprises (a 
firm whose size ranges from one to four employees). When we break down employment 
by gender, the women are slightly more concentrated in “microenterprise” as well as 
small enterprises (Table 3.29). 
As a percent of the total sample, the retail sector is the largest (25.2%) and repair shops 
are the smallest (2.9%) based on this sample (Table 3.30). As a percent of their respective 
totals, there are more men than women in retail sector. Based on this sample, there are 
more men in retail business and repair shop sector (Table 3.31). 
While a greater proportion of retail sector are in the microenterprise category, 60% of 
repair shops fall in small enterprise, 35.7% of agribusiness firms fall in medium 
enterprise and 13.3% of construction fall under large enterprise (Table 3.32). 
3.5.5 Self-Appraisal on Technology and Managerial Competency 
The introduction and increasing usage of new technologies –email, internet and mobile 
phones—are gradually changing the ways of doing business by the small and large firms 
(Mitullah, Ndung’u, & Waema, 2013). Increasing prevalence of ATMs or installing them 
at convenient places such as airport or supermarket malls has made it easier for customers 
to access them than go to the banks. Taglines advertising this fact are widespread: KCB- 
“banking as mobile as you”; Consolidated-“Growing with you, Instacash”, Standard 
Charterer-“banking, 24 hr” and Equity Kayole Branch-“time is money, save it by using 
ATM.”  
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Table 3.33 bears this phenomenon out with respect to routine cash needs: 48.7% of the 
sample use ATMs for routine cash while 33.7% walk to banks for habitual transactions. 
As shown in the said table not everyone is banked since there are some people who still 
prefer to keep their business cash under “mattress” in the shops, at stores or safekeeping 
vaults at home. As thus, 11.1% of the sample uses personal safekeeping instead of banks 
or ATMs for routine cash.  
Table 3.34 seeks opinions on what is affecting the business performance. Close to 76% of 
the sample believe that they are doing well because of managerial competence and 
reliance on technology to some extent. While 13.8% of the sample do lay blame on 
managerial incompetence and neglect of adopting technology, 6.2% of the sample faults 
“unfavorable business environment” for firm poor performance in Kenya. 
3.5.6 Credit Allocation 
This survey still confirms the perception that not everyone who needs credit receives it in 
Kenya. Despite the significant strides made in financial inclusion strategies to reach 
bottom of the economic pyramid, some people are still excluded or they self-exclude 
from the credit market. Table 3.35 shows a success rate of loans are 66.7%. If this sample 
were truly representative of the firm population in Kenya, a firm that applies for loan is 
likely to receive a loan two-thirds of the time. As a percentage of the total sample, more 
than 50% have applied for loan. 
Table 3.36 presents source of credit and types of lender. Over 50% of the loans come 
from commercial banks, whereas MFIs make up 15.9% of total loans. Informal finance 
— family members, friends, out-of-pocket contributions and moneylenders — make up 
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another 11.5% of the sample. The category “others” which includes cooperatives, 
SACCOs, and ROSCAs makes up the remaining 22.1%.  
Turning to loan allocation on gender basis, about 57% of the loans approved went to men 
and the remaining 43% to women (Table 3.37). If we express loans received as percent of 
the gender totals, the percentages are almost even: overall, 34.0% of all women and 
33.2% of all men received loans. 
The greatest share of loans went to the retail sector, and the smallest to repair shops. But 
as a percent of total loans, construction (53.3%) and restaurant (47.4%) received the most 
while hotels received the least (Table 3.38). 
Because the microenterprise as a category is the largest of all size classification, it 
received more loans in percentage terms (Table 3.39). However, as a percent of the totals 
in each category, medium enterprise received more loans. 
In all, 47.2% of the firms did not apply for loans because of one reason or another (see 
Table 3.40). These firms essentially self-selected out of the credit market and are credit 
constrained in that regard. When asked why the firm did not apply for loans, 41.6% said 
they doubted approval, 18.2% thought applications were burdensome and collateral 
requirement strict and 22.1% believed interest rates were too high (Table 3.40).  Still in 
the same Table 3.40, 52.8% of the firms, which we considered unconstrained, did not 
apply because they did not need credit.  
Women are a little more constrained than men (25.4% vs. 24.3%; see Table 3.41). More 
women cite high interest rate, collateral requirements and cumbersome application 
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procedures as binding hindrances more often than men do. Men, on the other hand, are 
overrepresented in doubting loan approval. In all sectors, a greater percent of firms doubt 
that loan would be approved and they choose not to apply for loan on that basis (Table 
3.41). Table 3.42 dissects why the firm did not apply, and it appears that 100% of the 
repair shop owners who did not apply were not credit constrained. 
As Table 3.43 shows, firms are more likely to rate access to formal, microfinance and 
informal finance as a moderate obstacle. Going down the column, firms are more likely 
to cite lack of access to formal finance as a major obstacle than informal or microfinance 
(Table 3.43). 
The statistics in Table 3.44 show that men are more likely to cite lack of access to formal 
and informal finance as a major obstacle to firm growth whereas women cite lack of 
access to microfinance as a major obstacle. More small firms are likely to cite lack of 
access to formal finance as a major obstacle (See Table 3.45). The same is true for large 
enterprises. 
Table 3.46 is comforting in the sense that chances of getting loan approval outweigh the 
rejection; hence it is worth trying applying for loans in Kenya. As a percent of total 
sample, 34.1% are considered successful borrowers (they applied and received loans) and 
17.1% are unsuccessful or denied borrowers. On the other hand, 23.1% and 25.8% of the 
sample are regarded as discouraged and non-borrowers, respectively. 
In terms of firm size, more micro, small and medium enterprises identify lack of access to 
market as a moderate obstacle (Table 3.47). 46.2% of the large firms identify lack of 
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access to market as a minor obstacle. Lack of access to market is cited by 52.8% of the 
sample as a moderate obstacle to firm growth. 
A closer dissection by gender tells us that more men (18.7%) than women (17.4%) cite 
lack of access to market as a major constraint (Table 3.48). It is never an obstacle 
according to 8.8% and 6.3% of men and women, respectively. Alternatively, 53.5% of 
women and 53.4% of men cite this fact as a moderate obstacle. More women than men 
classify it as a minor obstacle. 
Reading across the column, it is visible that all sectors rank lack of access to market as a 
moderate obstacle (Table 3.49). For example, 70% of repair shops cite lack of access to 
market as a moderate obstacle while 10% and 20% cite it as minor and never an obstacle, 
respectively. If we take another example of the sectoral classification above, 52.3% of 
firms in retail consider lack of access to market as a moderate obstacle while 26.7% take 
it as a major obstacle. In the same sector, 12.8% and 8.1% of the firms classify it as 
minor and never obstacle at all. 
3.5.7 Summary Statistics for Selected Indicators 
Table 3.50 presents summary statistics for other selected variables in the survey. On 
average, a firm takes less than one year to prepare necessary paperwork and fully launch 
officially. The necessary paperwork, as well as the savings process or raising seed capital 
to start a firm, takes time. Some firms have spent four years preparing. The average firm 
has been in operation for over four years, since establishment. Some firms have been in 
operation for few months. 
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Since close to 50% of the sampled firms in this survey are microenterprises, it is not 
surprising that the mean firm size is about 16 employees and such representative firm is 
small enterprise based on this study classification (the mean firm size in South Sudan is 
five employees; see Table 4.44). The maximum firm size in Kenya sample is 333 
employees. The 2012 mean revenue of over $282,000 is quite high but this is because of 
some outliers. One firm, for instance, reported an annual income of almost $14 million. 
Median firm income is $64,000. The minimum income is $80, and this is ten times less 
the country’s GDP per capita income of $ 862. The fact that some respondents recall 
these figures from memory means that they are subject to failing recollection or faulty 
disclosure of accurate revenue from firms for fear of unknown, which may help to 
account for these glaring wide ranges. The mean sample level of education of the head of 
the enterprise of 14 years is really high. This implies that a typical firm owner, on 
average, has reached high school. This is higher than the education levels of firm owners 
in South Sudan where the mean is 11 years (see Chapter 4: Essay on South Sudan). The 
minimum level of education is zero (never attended school) and the maximum (up to the 
graduate level) number of years spent in school is 27 years. 
Finally, among firms that had received loan, access to credit, the maximum is $1,167,000 
and the mean loan received is $ 15,016. The loan receiving firm has 14 employees on 
average. 
Table 3.51 presents simple correlations between firm employment, revenue and loan 
amount. As we can see, employment and revenue are positively correlated (r=.4). The 
revenue and loan amount are weakly correlated (r=.1) while employment and loan 
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amount are also weakly correlated (r=0.1). As far as we expect larger firms to receive 
loans, employment may serve as a good proxy for size than revenue. 
3.6 Econometric Analysis of Access to Credit by SMEs 
3.6.1 Econometric Model 
This section endeavors to assess access to credit by SMEs. The key indicator is loan 
approval. This is the response to the question “have you been approved loan.” The 
variable takes value of 1 if loan was approved and 0 otherwise. We test a relationship 
between loan approved and a range of factors, including gender, size, education and 
sector. A firm size is measured by the number of employees in the firm; education level 
is given by years of schooling completed, and the sector is a dummy representing one of 
the ten identified sectors, namely retail, wholesale, agribusiness, manufacturing, repair 
shops, business service, restaurants, construction, hotels, and a category “others” which 
includes firms that are not classified in these first nine sectors (dummy = 1 for sector, 0 
otherwise). 
In addition to these core factors, we have a number of control variables, including years 
in business and dummies for ethnicity (Kikuyu owner = 1, 0= other Kenyans), complaints 
about the judicial system, ICT use through owning cell phones and websites as well as 
access to market. Empirical evidence in the literature points to the fact that owning a 
mobile phone is associated with increased likelihood of formal financial inclusion (Jack 
& Suri, 2011; Johnson & Nino-Zarazua, 2011; Arnold & Johnson, 2012). The list of 
variables with their definitions is provided in Table 3.52. 
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We hypothesize that if there is a gender bias, women will experience higher credit 
discrimination. The firm size as measured by employment is expected to enhance credit 
approval, insofar as size of the firm acts as an indicator of profitability or signal to 
lenders that loan repayment will not be an issue (Beck et al., 2006; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt 
& Maksimovic, 2008; Bauchet & Murdoch, 2013). We do not expect any sectoral bias in 
favor of any particular sector a priori. The impact of ethnicity could be ambiguous. 
However, one may expect that Kikuyu SME owners could have preferential treatment in 
Nairobi in the banking sector where the Kikuyu are heavily overrepresented. We 
hypothesize that the probability of financial inclusion rises with the level of education 
(see FinAcess National Survey, 2006, 2009 and 2013). 
We use econometric analysis to answer the following questions: 
(i) What factors determine access to credit by SMEs? 
(ii) Does access to credit differ between SMEs headed by men and by women as 
well as by firm size? 
(iii) Does technology enable access to finance for all in Kenya? 
 
The analysis is based on the following model:         𝒚𝒊= Хʹ𝒊𝜷+ 𝜺і                                                                                                                     (1) 
Where у is a dummy for loan approval, Х′ is a vector of determinants of loan approval for 
firm i, and 𝜀𝑖 is a random error term. Given that the dependent variable is a binary 
variable, the model above cannot be estimated with OLS because it does not meet the 
necessary normality conditions ((Dyankin & Moffat, 2002). Specifically, we cannot 
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guarantee that estimates of 𝑦𝑖 lie within the interval {0, 1}. The binary nature of the 
dependent variable calls for Probit specification. The probit model is specified as follows:  
     Pr (𝒚 = 𝟏 ∕ Х) = Φ(Х𝒊′𝜷 )                                                                                            (2) 
Where ɸ (phi) is a cumulative distribution function of standard normal distribution, Х 
ʹ 
=(x1…xk), Pr signifies probability and і refers to individual firm. We use the z-score to 
infer increase or decrease in probability (pr) by b unit. In other words, an increase in 𝑥 
changes Z or probit index by b standard deviation units.  
Based on theory and empirical evidence on credit access to finance, we retain the base 
model which includes a subset of the vector z, comprising three key determinants:  size, 
education, and gender of the owner. Other factors of interest will be tested using the 
general to parsimonious model selection process.  
The base model is the following: 
     Pr (𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙 = 1) = Φ(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽2𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽3𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔)     (3) 
3.6.2 Determinants of Loan Approval: Econometric Results 
Table 3.53 presents the results of the probit regressions for determinants of loan approval. 
A look at the base regression is telling. Gender and the level of education of the head of 
the firm seem not to be significant in explaining the variation in loan approval. In the 
base model we see that only the size of the firm matters; its coefficient is statistically 
significant at the 10% level and its sign in the expected direction. In other words, 
increasing the size of the firm increases the likelihood of receiving loan if a firm applies. 
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The results confirm that as expected, an increase in the size of the firm increases the 
likelihood of receiving a loan (Table 3.53). This confirms the finding in the empirical 
literature that larger firms are less financially constrained (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & 
Maksimovic, 2005, 2008) and have a greater chance of receiving credit.  
Now we present the results from the estimate of the complete model where we implement 
the process of the parsimonious model. First, we estimate the model including all the firm 
characteristics. Then we interactively eliminate the factor with the lowest significance 
level (higher p-value), and rerun the regression until we are left with only significant 
values. In the full model (see the full model one in column 2 of Table 3.53). 
All other control variables, including ethnicity, years in operations and all nine sectors 
prove not to be significant though. But quite surprisingly, the coefficient on education is 
negative and significant, meaning that more educated do no necessary have higher 
probabilities in receiving loan. This latter finding still makes sense in so far as educated, 
mostly young, have no experience in running business ,have little credit history, do not 
have enough connections or networks in the business community, and therefore the 
evidence suggests that having a higher level of education does not necessarily guarantee a 
greater chance of securing loans from banks. 
On the other hand, firms that own a website which connects them with the rest of the 
world and those that are able to take advantage of business networks are more likely to 
receive loans. The coefficients on ICT and business networking are positive both under 
the parsimonious and full specification models (see Table 3.53). Again these results 
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confirms that owning a website or networking with other businesses increases the 
likelihood of receiving credit once a firm applies. 
3.6.3 Obstacles to Access to Finance by SMEs: Econometric Results 
The previous section discussed the factors that affect the likelihood of receiving a loan. In 
this section, we examine how individual SMEs rate access to formal and informal finance 
and microfinance. The questionnaire asks whether a given firm considers access to 
formal finance, microfinance and informal finance (money lenders, out-of-pocket 
contributions, family or friends,) as a major, moderate or minor obstacle or never an 
obstacle to its business operations and its growth. These ordinal responses are coded from 
one to four, in that order. We collapsed these responses into a binary variable, whereby 
major and moderate obstacle was coded as 1, minor obstacle and never as 0. Then we ran 
regressions using the probit model, taking this as the dependent variable. Regressions for 
microfinance yielded no significant results, and so they are not reported here. Estimation 
results for formal and informal finance constraints are reported in Tables 3.54 and 3.55, 
respectively. 
Table 3.54 reports regression results for whether firms considered access to formal 
finance as an obstacle or not. Like before we only report three model specifications: a 
base model,  full model and parsimonious model. The results show that larger firms are 
less likely to indicate that they face obstacles in access to formal finance. The coefficient 
on firm size is negative and statistically significant at ten percent in all three models. The 
coefficients on the gender dummy variable are positive but statistically insignificant. 
Business networking and restaurants have coefficients that are positive and statistically 
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significant. Furthermore, we see that in the parsimonious model, business services 
(salons, printing shops, etc) are more likely to indicate that formal financing constraints 
affect their firm growth. 
Table 3.55 reports comparable results regarding access to informal finance. While the 
signs are in the right direction, the coefficient on gender is statistically insignificant.  
Firm size again has a statistically significant coefficient, suggesting that larger SMEs see 
lack of informal finance as unimportant.  The same is true for firms that use business 
networking ties; these firms are likely to cite lack of informal finance as unimportant 
obstacle. Construction firms appear to be the only category that sees lack of access to 
informal finance as a major obstacle. 
3.6.4 Credit Constrained Firms: Econometric Results 
For the firms that chose not to apply for credit, the questionnaire seeks the rationale 
behind their actions. Some did not apply because they did not need a loan, others thought 
they would be rejected, or reported that collateral requirements or the interest rates are 
too high, or that applications are burdensome. Those that do not need loans are 
considered unconstrained and those that chose not to apply for one reason or another are 
considered as constrained. 
While core independent variables remain the same as in the case of loan approval and 
access to formal/informal credit, the dependent variable, credit constraint, is a binary 
variable taking the value of zero for firms that need no loan and one for those who chose 
not to apply for one reason or another. Table 3.56 reports results for the credit constraint. 
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There is no significant gender bias. The coefficient on firm size is positive and 
statistically significant, meaning that as size increases firms are likely to be credit 
constrained.  In other words, larger firms are more likely to be constrained than small 
firms. This is anomaly but it can be explained this way: even larger, like small firms, are 
likely to self-select out of credit if they see the prospect of approval as slim. 
For firms that have been longer in business we find an insignificant coefficient meaning 
that 𝝏𝒚
𝝏Х
= 𝟎 so Х does not have any relationship with y. 
The category “business services” includes haircut shops, beauty salons, and printing 
booths.  Some of these business services are run by few individuals, mostly the owners, 
hence the size of such firms are small. While they have declined to apply for loan for one 
reason or another, these regression results show they are credit constrained.  
Moreover, wholesalers are credit constrained as well. The coefficient on wholesale is 
statistically significantly and in the right direction in the full model as well as in the 
parsimonious model.  
3.6.5 Determinants of Loan Application: Econometric Results 
The survey asks the question: have you ever applied for loan before? The respondents 
either say yes or no. We take this as a binary dependent variable, taking the value of 1 if 
the answer is yes and 0 otherwise. We wanted to explore the factors that influence the 
decision to apply for a loan. Table 3.57 presents the results from robust probit 
regressions. As a firm begins to place a higher premium on internet communications, its 
probability of applying for loan increases. This is well documented. Owning a website 
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reduces search cost and asymmetric information and the users are more aware of market 
developments. Since the coefficient is positive and significant, owning a website is more 
likely to increase firm likelihood of applying for loan. In other words, firms that own a 
website are more likely to apply for a loan. The magnitude ranges from about 0.63 per 
additional website owned (parsimonious model) to 0.83 (see full model). In a model, 
𝒚𝑖=аХ𝒊 and where Х𝑖 {𝟏,𝟎}, 𝑑𝑦𝑑Х𝑖 = 𝑎� is interpreted as y is  on average . 𝑎�   higher for units 
for which Х=1 relative to those where Х = 0. So in this case, loan application = 0.83 
Website. Therefore, the results confirm that as expected, firms that own a website are 
more likely to apply for a loan. 
None of the variable is statistically significant in the base equation, although firm size has 
the right sign. On the other hand, firms that own website, those that are in wholesale and 
agribusiness are more likely to apply for loan as indicated by positive and statistically 
coefficients on wholesale, agribusiness and website. 
3.6.6 Robustness Test for Loan Approval Estimates 
We examine whether loan approval estimates are robust. Robustness tests are performed 
to tease out selection bias in the estimates. The survey questionnaire asks a given firm if 
it has applied for loan and if so whether it has been approved or not. This question 
sequencing introduces a selection dynamic in the loan approval process but we get only 
to observe outcomes from those who have self-selected first to apply before we know 
whether they have been approved or not.  
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Therefore, following Heckman (1979) who first formulates selection bias as a form of 
omitted variable and subsequent authors such as Berinsky (2004), the argument for 
selection bias is motivated as follows:  First, assume the outcome equation is as given in 
equation (1). We further assume that y is observed if and only if a certain unobserved 
latent variable exceeds a given threshold. Thus, let 𝑍𝑖∗ be a latent variable, indicating a 
propensity to be included in the sample, Ω𝑖′ is a vector of covariates, α is a vector of 
coefficients and 𝜇𝑖 is a random disturbance term. The selection equation is specified as 
follows:    
  𝑍𝑖∗ = Ωα + 𝜇𝑖                                                                                          (4) 
  𝑍𝑖 = �1 𝑖𝑓 𝑍𝑖∗ > 0;0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                                                                  (5) 
The selection equation can be expressed as a probit model of the form: 
Pr (𝑍𝑖 = 1) = Ф(Ω𝑖′α)                                                                                            (6) 
For this analysis, there are some factors that may cause selection bias, for instance, larger 
firms may elect to apply for loans, and those whose owners are literate and 
technologically savvy (for example, those owning a mobile phone) are more likely to 
apply, hence selecting themselves into the sample. In conclusion small firms or firms 
owned by illiterates are more likely to self-select out and we end up not observing them 
in the sample, ceteris paribus.  
We run several robustness tests and some of our results that are noteworthy are presented 
in Table 3.58. We examine the base equation against a number of likely candidates for 
selection dynamic. Reading out Fisher’s Z transformation (/athrho) in column 1, we 
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cannot rule out the presence of some selection bias especially in the wholesale firms. One 
of the variables of interest, years in business, explains a variation in the outcome 
equation. The coefficient on years in business is positive and statistically significant in 
the base model (column1) but is insignificant in the full model (column 2).  But 
altogether, there is no strong presence of selection bias in the model. 
3.7 What Have We Learned from the Econometric Results? 
From the econometric results, we find that business networking, schooling, owning a 
website and firm size are important factors in explaining the variations in the probability 
for applying for loan, receiving a loan or getting rejected, or rating lack of formal finance 
as a major constraint on firm performance. We highlight some of these salient findings 
below.  
3.7.1 No Gender Bias in Access to Formal Credit 
Gender seems not to be a significant determinant of loan approval and the perception of 
credit constraints by SME owners. This finding is similar to Aterido, Beck and Iacovone 
(2013) who when controlling for all individual firm characteristics, find that the gender 
gap disappears.  
3.7.2. There is a Size Bias in Access to Credit 
Larger firms are more likely to receive a loan (Table 3.53) and they are less likely to rate 
access to formal credit as minor or no obstacle at all (Table 3.54).  Also, we see that 
construction firms are more likely to cite informal financial constraints (Table 3.55).  
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3.7.3 ICT Use, Business Networks and Perception of Financing Obstacles 
It appears that firms that engage in business networks are more likely to indicate they are 
less financially constrained, both with regards to formal finance and informal finance. 
Networks facilitate and enable information to flow between firms, providing a basis for 
trade, credit and insurance options. This is consistent with the conclusion by Atieno 
(2009) that cohesive solidarity networks can substitute for market supporting institutions. 
Larger firms are more likely to say that they are credit constrained. This could be both a 
reality and a perception since there is a typical regularity in literature which argues that 
some firms are likely to shift the blame to financing obstacles when in fact they have 
some blames to carry (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2005). It may well be that 
these firms which are more exposed to credit market, are vocal about their experience; 
hence they are likely to state more financial obstacles than they actually face. Uses of 
mobile phones can have a positive impact on development through communication 
channels and development projects. This is consistent with findings from Aker & Mbiti 
(2011, p. 20-26) who conclude that phones or ICT in general connects families, brings 
market information, reduces search costs, improves efficiency between firms, creates 
additional employment, and reduces risks for the firm. They thus enhance chances of 
receiving loans. 
3.8 Conclusion 
This essay, which is a descriptive and quantitative analysis of access to finance by SMEs 
in Kenya, has interesting empirical findings. The essay studies access to credit by SMEs 
and the factors that determine whether a firm applies for loans, whether it receives credit 
or gets rejected, as well as how each firm characterizes the impact of access to finance on 
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their performance. Because this is a discrete choice model, we employ probit model as 
appropriate quantitative tool to analyze and gauge the impact of each factor on the 
likelihood of loan approval or rejection, and the firms’ perception of finance as a major or 
minor constraint.  
We highlight four main emerging findings: 
• First, about 48% of businesses fall in the microenterprise category, defined as 
firms whose size ranges between one and four employees? About 35.6% of the 
sampled SMEs are small enterprises, 13% are medium enterprises, and about 4% 
are large enterprises.  
• Second, small size is a disadvantage; there exists a size bias. The study finds that 
larger firms have greater chances of receiving loans than smaller SMEs and are 
less likely to rate lack of access to formal finance as a constraint. This is 
consistent with the literature which finds that the smallest firms face the most 
binding financial and legal constraints.  
• Third, some SMES are more likely to self-select out of the credit market if they 
perceive that they will be rejected due to lack of collateral and credit history. 
Based on this analysis we could infer self-exclusion from the application behavior 
of the firms. Wholesalers, agribusiness and firms that own a website, for instance, 
are more likely to apply for a loan while other sectors are less likely to apply for 
credit. There is evidence in literature about ‘sectoral selection’ in that women tend 
to select themselves into firms that depend less on external finance. This state of 
affairs also greatly reduces any chance of women-owned firm to apply for credit 
(see Table 3.57). 
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• Fourth and finally, there is an ICT impact on access to finance. We find that firms 
that own a website are more likely to apply for loans while at the same time those 
who own cell phones are likely to be credit constrained.  
The essay validates the role of three important factors with respect to access to finance. 
First, there is a size bias in the sense that larger firms are more likely to access credit and 
less likely to indicate financing constraints. The policy implication of this result is that 
there is need to further spread access to financial services to reach out to both the 
unbanked and bottom of the pyramid. This strategy could go a long way to ameliorate the 
size bias, since smaller firms on average are more likely to experience more severe 
constraints to access for formal finance. 
Second, we find that firms which use business networks are more likely to face fewer 
financing constraint.  Third, we find that firms that own a website are more likely to 
apply for loans. We speculate that owning website reflects a greater access to 
information, or that those firms with websites are more visible and that this is a bonus in 
the credit market. 
In summary, the paper has attempted to provide evidence in favor of promoting financial 
inclusion and why access to finance matters a great deal for the performance of SMEs 
and their impact on the economy and poverty reduction. We cautiously conclude that firm 
size, the level of education and business networks are significant determinants of access 
to credit for SMEs. 
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Table 3.1: Characteristics of Selected Commercial Banks in Kenya, 2011 and 2012 
 Bank Year of 
creation 
No of 
Branches 
State's 
share (%) 
Public 
share (%) 
Total 
assets 
(million 
$) 
Deposits 
(million 
$) 
Loans 
(million $) 
Loan 
/Deposits 
(%) 
Total Current 
Employment 
Bank of India - 4        
Chase Bank* 1996 22   566.3 397.6 289.2 73 400 
Commercial Bank of 
Africa 
1962 21 0 100 1,143 922 549 59.6 536 
Consolidated 1989  17 100 0 180.2 1,41.3 108.2 76.6 265 
Development 1963 1        
Equity  Bank 1984 
 
132 0 100 2,076 1,477 1,249 85 5,565 
Family Bank* 1984 64 0 100 1.2 0.3 0.22 80 1200 
Faulu 2009 33    337 422 125 800 
KCB 1896 170 17.5 82.5 3940 2511 2203 88 5,000 
I & M  19    890 661 550 83 550 
 
*Means that some of the figures were provided to me in Kenya shillings and I have exchanged them to dollars using the official 
exchange rate of KSh.83.6 = $1 as of May 2012.
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Table 3.2: Growth in Customer and SME Accounts in 2012 (in Million) 
Bank Name Customer Bank Accounts  Customer SME Accounts  
July 2011 August 
2011 
March 
2012 
July 2011 August 
2011 
March 
2012 
Bank of India -      
Chase Bank 0.5 0.65 1.5 0.2 0.28 0.49 
Commercial 
Bank of 
Africa 
0.002671 0.002815 0.00294    
Consolidated 0.033654 0.35272 0.046786 0.033653 0.03514 0.04624
5 
Development 0.003726 0.003726 0.002666 0.000022 0.000022 0.00006 
Equity  Bank 5.864,51 6.000,968 6.869,205 
 
   
Family Bank 1 1 1.2 0.2 0.25 0.3 
Faulu 0.358883 0.329875 0.316485    
KCB 1 1.6 1.8    
I & M 0.052641 0.053485 0.059147 0.004201 0.00431 0.00464 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.3: Kenya Commercial Bank Lending to SMEs, 2012 
Bank Name Lending Size ( in US$ ) 
Minimum Loan  
(Ever Approved) 
Maximum Loan 
(Ever approved) 
Bank of India -  
Chase Bank 24,096 11,927,710 
Commercial Bank of 
Africa 6,024 1,313,253 
Consolidated 1,000 1,500,000 
Development 12,000 714,000 
Equity  Bank 11,893 11,892,608 
Family Bank 25,000 600,000 
Faulu 6,024 6,024,000 
KCB 1,500 577,000 
I & M 10,000 500,000 
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Table 3.4: How Banks Describe their Top SMEs 
Bank Name Individual Bank Assessment 
Commercial 
Bank of 
Africa 
Our top SMEs are in : 
Real estate; 
Building & Construction; 
Business services; 
Transport, Manufacturing and  
Individuals in the property development sector. 
Consolidated 
Bank 
Our three of top five SME borrowers are in retail and 
wholesale business; 
The businesses are mostly family owned; 
The other two are in real estate and one of them is an 
investment group, and 
Retail and wholesale sectors as well. 
Development 
Bank 
Growing and exporting of cut flowers; 
 Provision of education services; 
Manufacturing; Plastic products, industrial spares, and 
fabrication of steel products; 
General trading; 
Building and Civil Engineering contractors & Real Estate 
developers; 
In addition to serving SMEs, DBK serves all other, and 
categories of corporate. 
Equity  Bank Characteristics of our top SMEs : 
They have inadequate education; 
Inadequate business skills and management skills 
Inadequate capital; 
Lack of access to credit; global financial and economic 
crisis increases cost of financial services and a drop in 
demand for credit; low levels of relationship management 
makes it difficult for their businesses to be seen as viable 
for lending; 
They also do their businesses in unsupportive national 
policy and regulatory environment;  
Technological changes affect their business 
operations/whole sectors; 
Poor infrastructure (roads, electricity etc) also affect them 
so much; 
They have very scanty markets information; 
Equity does businesses in Building and Construction, and 
Agriculture, Mining and Manufacturing 
Family Bank Large business with organized structures. 
Faulu Bottom of the pyramid customers through group lending 
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methodology. 
KCB They have: 
Turnover from above Kes 100, 000; 
Loan facility from US$ 350,000 to 36 million, and 
 Number of employees above 20. 
I & M We serve mid and large corporate sector; 
We also serve agro-based exporters, and 
We also serve mid and large sized mortgages market. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. 5: How Kenya’s Banks Rank 5 C’s When Appraising SME Projects, 2012 
Ranking Criterion Major 
Obstacle 
Moderate 
Obstacle 
Minor 
Obstacle 
Not 
Obstacle 
Character of the owners 8  1  
Capacity of the firm 7 1 1  
Collateral Requirement 4 5   
Firm initial capital 2 6 1  
Macroeconomic conditions  3 5  1 
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Table 3.6:  Products, Technology and Indicators of Performance 
Name Customized 
Products 
Partnering 
Developme
nt Agencies 
Role of 
Mobile 
Technology 
Steps Toward 
Improving 
Customer 
Service 
Ways to Expand 
Access Frontier 
to all ,specially 
SMEs 
Bank of India -     
Chase Bank Invoice 
discounting; 
Daraja loan; 
Kilele planet 
–portal for 
SMEs; 
Taalamika –
education 
product; 
Kilele 
current 
account 
 
EIB; 
government 
of Kenya; 
women 
enterprise 
fund , and in 
discussions 
with about 
10 others 
clients able to 
transact 
through 
agents; 
Synergies i.e, 
post bank and 
chase bank; 
Mobile 
banking; 
Internet 
banking 
On the system 
we use finals 
to try and 
profile the 
SMEs 
 
agency banking 
and  
 Promotions on 
ATM utilization 
 
through strategic 
partnerships that 
enables the bank 
to get cheaper 
lines which we 
can later on lend 
cheaply to the 
public i.e women 
enterprise fund 
lending at 8% 
 
Commercial 
Bank of Africa 
Overdrafts; 
Term Loans; 
Asset 
Financing; 
Invoice 
Discounting 
Mortgages; 
Construction 
GOWE: 
(Growth 
Oriented 
Women 
Entrepreneu
rs) and 
GROFIN 
 
Mobile 
technology 
has enabled 
the bank to 
tap a wider 
range of 
customers 
with a wide 
By developing e-
banking 
products, mobile 
solutions e.g. 
 M-Pesa and 
partnering with 
other banks for 
provision of 
Opening more 
branches; 
Developing 
products to suit 
SMEs, and 
Playing an 
advisory role to 
SME clients 
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Loan 
 
geographical 
reach; 
Information 
systems are 
currently not 
developed 
enough to 
facilitate 
lending to 
SMEs 
ATM services 
e.g. Kenswitch, 
Pesapoint etc 
 
 
Consolidated 
Bank 
LPO 
financing; 
Invoice 
discounting; 
Asset 
finance;  
Bind bonds; 
Guarantees; 
Mortgage 
financing 
European 
Investment 
Bank (EIB); 
Industrial 
and 
Commercial 
Developme
nt 
Corporation 
(ICDC) 
Mobile 
technology 
has mostly 
helped in 
money 
transfer 
services to 
remote areas 
of the 
country.  
However due 
to illiteracy in 
the rural areas 
it has not been 
possible to 
have a major 
impact as far 
as other 
banking 
services are 
concerned;  
Introduction of 
technology 
driven services 
e.g. mobile 
banking, internet 
banking and 
ATMs; 
Increasing foot-
print and service 
outlets by use of 
agents; For 
savings –Use of 
bonus interest 
where no 
withdrawals 
have been made 
over a certain 
time-frame, 
elimination of 
charges for 
savings accounts 
By use of 
investment 
groups and 
informal merry 
go-round groups.  
Members in these 
groups will be 
required to 
guarantee one 
another; 
Expanding reach 
to the under and 
un-banked 
citizens through 
the use of 
banking agents 
and mobile 
banking services 
using mobile 
phones 
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Information 
systems are 
still not 
developed 
adequately to 
facilitate 
lending in 
SMEs.  This 
is especially 
pronounced in 
the area of 
credit rating. 
 
and offering a 
good return 
through 
competitive 
interest rates. 
 
Development 
Bank 
Trade 
Finance 
Products; 
Working 
capital 
facilities; 
Short term 
loans 
 
Regional & 
Internationa
l Financial 
Institutions 
– in lines of 
Credit for 
on lending. 
 
Exploring a 
suitable core 
information 
system 
considering 
the bank’s 
mandate 
/target market. 
 
Efficient service 
delivery system 
is in place and is 
continuously 
reviewed 
through 
appropriate 
feedback system 
/ surveys.  
 
Secure 
appropriate lines 
of credit (sources 
of funds) to 
support the 
SMEs; Continue 
to develop 
suitable products 
targeting SMEs; 
Improve on 
accessibility 
through 
sustainable 
outreach 
programmes. 
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Equity  Bank Working 
capital;  
Asset 
finance; 
Mortgage; 
Development 
Plot 
purchase; 
Project 
Finance 
 
This has 
been 
achieved 
through 
partnering 
with 
Developme
nt Financial 
Institutions 
(DFI’s) e.g 
IFC, Blue 
Orchard, 
EIB, and 
CDB. 
 
The platform 
allows 24/7 
access to 
banking 
services and 
also improves 
communicatio
n between 
customer and 
bank by way 
of transaction 
alerts. 
 
There are 
various 
initiatives that 
the bank has 
employed to 
ensure improved 
customer 
service, and 
reduce long 
waiting hours at 
bank premises. 
These include,  
Offering of 
financial literacy 
training through 
the Equity Group 
Foundation as 
part of the 
Bank’s CSR, 
No account 
maintenance fees 
are charged to 
customers. 
Cash deposits to 
accounts are free 
irrespective of 
the bank channel 
used. 
Paying interest 
on deposit 
accounts with 
Creation of SME 
centers supported 
by active SME 
business club;  
Re-designing & 
tailoring products 
and services; 
Provisional of 
more SME-
friendly delivery 
channels like e-
banking 
Provision of 
advisory services; 
Relationship 
management 
approach 
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more 
competitive rates 
on the term 
deposits. 
Alternate 
Banking 
Channels - these 
have widened 
the bank network 
to reach greater 
populace. The 
Channels include 
Family Asset 
Finance; 
Business 
loans; 
Trade 
finance; 
Overdrafts; 
Capex loans  
 
FSD ; 
Euro Bank, 
and 
Africa 
Guarantee 
Fund 
Increasing the 
reach of our 
customers; 
Reducing the 
costs of doing 
business; and 
Improving 
turnaround 
time in 
decision 
making 
Investing in 
technology and 
Investing in 
Agency Banking 
 
Seminars 
Being involved in 
their workshops 
Direct Marketing 
Referrals 
 
Faulu Biashara 
SME 
 
AfDB Everybody 
from the rich 
to the poor 
has been able 
to benefit 
from their 
mobile phone; 
our customers 
Customer care –
There have been 
a lot of trainings 
on how to handle 
customers; 
Customer 
satisfaction 
surveys to 
Offering 
competitively 
priced loans; 
Training our 
customers on 
mobile banking; 
Training our 
clients on how to 
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can now 
access money 
from their 
accounts 
through their 
phones; 
Currently 
lending to 
SME is not 
done on 
phone but that 
is the next 
technology; 
The current 
information 
system has 
not been 
designed in a 
way that our 
SME clients 
can pay loans 
through the 
phone but 
through 
upgrade we 
will be able to 
achieve this. 
understand the 
areas of 
weaknesses; 
Supervision and 
monitoring of 
the branches ; 
We do not have 
challenges with 
long queues , 
most of our 
banking halls are 
not very 
congested 
utilize their loan 
funds to grow 
business;  
Group lending 
methodology 
 
KCB Biashara 
club;  
Mapato 
account,  
USAID, 
IFC 
Great deal- 
mobile 
banking has 
created 
Opening agency 
banking where 
clientele can get 
same service as 
Referrals from the 
large corporate; 
The bank 
suppliers; 
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Simba 
accounts 
 
flexibility in 
payment that 
one can 
transfer 
money from 
phone to the 
account and 
from the 
account to the 
phone; 
Mobile 
banking has 
created 
branchless 
banking and is 
enabling the 
banks to reach 
a wider 
clientele who 
were 
previously 
using only 
mobile;  
Agent 
banking is 
also 
facilitated by 
mobile 
technology in 
that a 
customer does 
banking;  
Signing in 
customers in 
different 
channels of 
transacting like 
mobi bank,  
ATM and 
internet banking; 
There are 
products that are 
tailor-made to 
encourage 
savings with 
interest rates and 
discourage 
frequent 
withdrawals 
(Simba Savings) 
 
Specialized bank 
employees trained 
to deal with this 
segment from 
small to growth; 
Value chain from 
corporate (s) 
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not have to 
come to the 
bank to open 
an account or 
give 
instructions. 
I & M Composite 
loans to take 
care of 
working 
capital and 
fixed asset 
financing; 
Composite 
working 
capital 
facilities 
such as LC 
cum 
overdraft 
 
IFC and 
Proparco 
(Proparco- 
French 
Developme
nt Bank) 
 
With the help 
of mobile 
technology, 
mobile 
banking has 
taken off very 
well. Mobile 
banking has 
become very 
popular in the 
context of 
domestic and 
international 
remittances. 
However, we 
have not seen 
any major 
impact on 
SME lending 
business.  
I & M is not 
into micro 
segment. We 
are more into 
middle 
We spend a lot 
of time and 
money on 
training of our 
staff in the 
branches and 
delivery points; 
We run on most 
advanced 
technology 
platform, which 
ensures all our 
branches and 
departments are 
networked on a 
real-time basis. 
This helps us in 
providing 
anywhere and 
everywhere 
banking services 
to our customers; 
We have 
launched internet 
banking and 
We are focusing 
more on SMEs by 
stipulating a 
specific budget 
for SMEs based 
asset financing; 
We are 
penetrating in the 
market in 
partnership with 
various credit 
insurance 
schemes, whereby 
risk perception 
for the Bank is 
minimized;  
We have 
simplified our 
process for SME 
business, with 
delegation of 
sanctioning 
powers to middle 
management and 
simplifying credit 
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segment 
 
mobile banking 
recently, which 
helps our 
customers in 
managing in 
their accounts by 
them. This is a 
major leap in 
terms of 
technology based 
services; We 
constantly 
undertake 
business process 
re-engineering to 
ensure our 
process are 
smooth and 
deliver services 
in the most 
efficient manner 
 
appraisal formats 
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Table 3.7: Distribution of Nonperforming Loans among Businesses, 2005-2011 
Chase Bank Year Total NPL 
(%) 
% of NPL 
Due to SMEs 
% of NPL Due to 
Large Businesses 
2008 3   
2009 3   
2010 3   
2011 3   
Consolidated 
Bank 
2005 98   
2006 83   
2007 53   
2008 45   
2009 22   
2010 16   
2011 11   
2012 10   
Equity Bank 2004 10.90   
2005 11.08   
2006 6.95   
2007 5.39   
2008 5.84   
2009 7.36 8.11 11.66 
2010 4.65 4.75 2.24 
2011 2.84 1.87 0.59 
2012 3.18 1.68 2.55 
Faulu Kenya 2010 18.45   
2011 10.41   
2012 8.3   
I & M 2010 <1   
2011 <1   
2012 <1   
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Table 3.8: Bank Expectations from Central Bank and SMEs 
Name Things Banks Wish to See 
Happen in Order to Expand 
Lending to SMES 
Commercial bank 
Expectations from Central 
Bank of Kenya 
Bank of 
India 
-  -  
Chase Bank More training on financial 
literacy; 
More workshops to entrepreneurs 
on raising capital; 
More strategic partners who will 
lend funds to financial institutions 
and they later on lend cheaply; 
Cheaper sources of funds thus 
reducing cost of funds, and 
The government continues 
intervention in reviving various 
sectors. 
The Kenyan central bank 
has come a long way and 
we are proud of what they 
have done; 
Islamic banking needs more 
scholars at CBK; 
Regulation of MFIs, and 
SACCOs to the equivalent 
of banks to give us all at a 
level playing ground 
 
Commercial 
Bank of 
Africa 
Provide accurate information; 
Utilization of facilities granted for 
the purpose intended, and 
Availability of industry 
information / Data. 
Lower interest rate; 
More controls on inflation, 
and foreign bureaus etc to 
avoid erratic business 
environment. 
Consolidate
d Bank 
Create proper structures 
(management and governance); 
Keep proper records; 
Formalize their business (not 
jacks of all trades!), and 
Improve on financial discipline. 
Maintain a stable interest 
and exchange rate regime; 
Maintain a low interest and 
inflation regime, and 
Build confidence among the 
public for the banking 
sector. 
Developme
nt Bank 
SMEs to maintain records and 
other relevant information on 
business activities in the 
prescribed form, including 
statutory accounts;  
SMEs to operate businesses on 
acceptable standards and 
practices; 
SMEs to honor obligations on 
borrowed funds, and 
Banks / Financial institutions to 
provide funds with appropriate 
aspects such as cost and tenor; 
and to offer relevant products, 
and Regulatory authorities to 
ensure conducive business 
Ensure Price Stability – 
including cost of funds; 
Ensure Exchange rate 
stability, and 
Ensure effective regulations 
and guidelines, and 
monitoring of the 
institutions. 
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environment 
Equity  
Bank 
Better legislation to foster better 
business working environment 
(e.g. business registration, tax 
compliance, etc) ; 
information sharing; 
Use of technology by SMEs & 
government, and 
Adoption of new innovations 
suited for emerging markets. 
Speedier change/review of 
guidelines to accommodate 
changes in the market  e.g. 
new innovations, 
development of trading 
blocs like EAC, etc; and 
Provision of business 
related data or investment 
opportunities through some 
portal or any other means. 
Faulu Investing in profit making 
businesses – avoid miss use of 
loan; 
Timely loan repayment; 
Saving with Faulu; 
Consistency in banking – avoid 
bank hoping, and 
Transparency during loan 
appraisal. 
Reduce MFI regulations and 
licensing, and 
Lower lending rates. 
 
KCB Regulation; 
Stable macroeconomic conditions 
i. e stable shilling, inflation; 
Government subsidies on the 
exports to start-ups; 
Government to guarantee the 
start-ups, and 
Strong enablers like the 
infrastructure. 
Classification of the SME 
assets, and 
Reduce the BCR rate which 
affects the lending rates 
 
I & M Bookkeeping 
Proper management. 
Continue being a stronger 
regulator, and 
Maintain stable fiscal and 
monetary policy 
environment. 
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Table 3.9: Kenya Banking Annual Lending and Number of SMEs Served, 2011 
Bank  Variable/Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
CBA Loan in 
million US$ 
       12.3 6.9 8.4 13.1  
# SMEs        2057 2541 2671 2880  
Consolid
ated 
Loan in 000 
US$ 
9.1 12.7 13.2 13.3 15.3 19.6 26.7 32.7 49.7 72.0 109.5 118.7 
# SMEs             
Develop
ment 
Loan in 000 
US$ 
        149.2 92.1 118.6 292.9 
# SMEs         43 27 29 60 
Equity 
Bank 
Loan in 000 
US$ 
      88.8 105.8 153.8 139.3 266.1 112.7 
# SMEs       2,788 4,667 11,107 11,247 15,231 6,312 
I & M             95.0 
            3900 
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Table 3.10: Mobile Payment Statistics, March 2007- December 2011 
Year Agents Customers(Million) Transactions(Million) Value(Ksh. 
billion) 
2007 1,582 1.35 5.47 16.32 
2008 6,104 5.08 62.74 166.57 
2009 23,012 8.88 193.5 473.41 
2010 39,449 16.45 311.05 732.22 
2011 50,471 19.19 433 1,169.15 
Source: Author's compilation based on CBK Industry Surveys, 2011 
 
 
 
Table 3.11: Agency Banking, Performance and Distribution Networks across Kenya 
 Institution Date of Agency 
Network  Approval 
No. of Agents 
Appointed  
Percentage 
of Total 
agents 
Equity Bank Ltd 18th May 2010 5,874 73.4% 
Kenya 
Commercial 
Bank Ltd 
22nd July 2010 
1,380 17.3% 
Transnational 
Bank  
25th October 
2010 
- - 
Consolidated 
Bank  
23rd November 
2010 
4 0.05% 
Co-operative 
Bank of Kenya 
Ltd 
20th December 
2010 
578 7.2% 
Chase Bank Ltd 2nd February 
2011 
37 0.46% 
Family Bank Ltd 9th June 2011 - - 
First Community 
Bank 21
st June 2011 6 0.08% 
Diamond Trust 
Bank  1
st July 2011 - - 
Citibank 4th July 2011 120 1.5% 
Total  7,999  
Source: BSD Databank and off-site surveillance Returns, 2012 
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Table 3.12: Agency Model as Expanding Financial Services 
Institution Number of Transactions Per Transaction Type 
Cash 
Deposit 
Cash 
Withdraw
al 
Bill 
Payme
nt 
Account/
Opening 
/Balance 
Enquiries 
Total 
Equity Bank 1,886,533 1,458,624 15,815 1,247,042 4,608,014 
KCB 44,774 9,598 - - 54,372 
Transnational - - - - - 
Consolidated - - - - - 
Co-operative 32,251 50,743 1,513 20,945 105,452 
Chase Bank - - - 44 44 
Family Bank - - - - - 
First 
Community 
- - - - - 
Diamond 
Trust Bank 
- - - - - 
Citibank  1,375 4 - - 1,379 
 1,964,933 1,518,969 17,328 1,268,031 4,769,261 
     Source: BSD Databank and Off-site Surveillance Returns, 2012 
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Table 3.13: Agent Transaction Types 
Institution Transaction Type 
Cash 
Deposits 
(Ksh. Mn) 
Cash 
Withdrawal 
(Ksh.Mn) 
Bill 
Payment 
(Ksh.M
n) 
Total 
(Ksh. 
Mn) 
Equity Bank 13,473.18 8,019.31 70.35 21,562.84 
KCB 332.70 57.85 - 390.56 
Transnation
al Bank - - - - 
Consolidate
d Bank - - - - 
Cooperative  
Bank 242.77 297.63 2.78 543.18 
Chase Bank - - - - 
Family 
Bank - - -  
First 
Community  - - -  
Diamond 
Trust - - -  
Citibank  247.0 1.60 - 248.60 
Total 14,295.65 8,376.39 73.13 22,745.18 
Source: BSD Databank and off-site surveillance returns, 2012 
 
Table 3.14: Geographical Distribution of Financial Services in Kenya 
Province No. of 
Transactions 
Percentage 
of 
Transaction
s  
Value of 
Transactions 
Conducted 
(Kshs’M) 
Percentage 
of Value of 
Transaction
s 
Nairobi 1,436,237 30% 7,457.96 33% 
Central 1,062,840 22% 5,413.64 24% 
Eastern 998,444 21% 4,744.56 21% 
Rift Valley 447,063 9% 2,140.57 9% 
Western 297,658 6% 1,032.35 5% 
Nyanza 306,439 6% 1,007.97 4% 
Coast 196,236 4% 807.72 4% 
North Eastern 24,346 1% 140.15 1% 
Total 4,769,261 100% 22,745.18 100% 
      Source: BSD Databank and off-site surveillance returns, 2012 
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Table 3.15 : East African Comparative ATM Expansion, 2004-2010 
Number of ATM Machines Across The Great Lakes Region  
Country/Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 Ethiopia 8 8 13 18 31 46 145 
 Kenya 320 323 617 1,012.00 1,325 1,655 ... 
 Rwanda 2 12 12 16 22 47 ... 
 Sudan 0 0 87 200 292 390 681 
 Tanzania 67 120 139 424 591 798  
 Uganda 152 220 267 321 405 536 599 
 Source: Authors’ compilation using IMF Database, 2013 
 
 
 
  
121 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.16: A Glance at Kenyan Banking Network, ATMs and DTMs Growth, 1997-2011 
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Branches 695 692 530 465 494 466 512 532 534 575 740 887 996 1063 1102 
ATM     166  230 324 555 617 1012 1325 1717 1979 2183 
DTMs             1 5 6 
Source: Author’s compilation using the Central of Kenya various Publications, 2012 
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Table 3.17: Selected Bank Branch Distribution by Provinces, 1991-2012 
  The Total Number of  Branch Networks Per Province Per Year, 1991-2012 
Bank 
Name 
Year Central 
 
Coast Eastern Nairobi Northern 
Eastern 
Nyanza 
 
Rift 
Valley 
Western 
Province 
Chase 
Bank 
(32) 
2012  5  22   2 3 
Consol
idated 
Bank 
(17) 
1991 4 2 2 4 0 0 0 0 
1992 4 2 2 4 0 0 0 0 
1993 4 2 2 4 0 0 0 0 
1994 4 2 2 4 0 0 0 0 
1995 4 2 2 4 0 0 0 0 
1996 4 2 2 4 0 0 0 0 
1997 4 2 2 4 0 0 0 0 
1998 4 2 2 4 0 0 0 0 
1999 4 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 
2000 3 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 
2001 3 2 4 2 0 0 0 0 
2002 3 2 4 2 0 0 0 0 
2003 3 1 5 2 0 0 0 0 
2004 3 1 5 2 0 0 0 0 
2005 3 1 5 2 0 0 0 0 
2006 3 1 5 2 0 0 0 0 
2007 3 1 5 2 0 0 0 0 
2008 3 1 5 2 0 0 0 0 
2009 3 1 5 3 0 0 0 0 
2010 3 1 5 4 0 0 0 0 
2011 3 1 5 5 0 0 3 0 
2012 3 1 5 5 0 0 3 0 
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Equity 
Bank 
(142) 
1991 4 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
1992 4 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
1993 4 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
1994 4 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
1995 4 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
1996 4 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
1997 4 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
1998 6 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
1999 7 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
2000 9 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 
2001 9 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 
2002 9 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 
2003 9 0 1 4 0 0 1 0 
2004 10 0 3 5 0 0 3 0 
2005 12 1 3 8 0 1 6 0 
2006 14 1 6 10 0 1 8 0 
2007 20 4 9 16 2 3 11 3 
2008 24 5 11 23 2 7 18 5 
2009 25 6 14 26 4 7 22 7 
2010 26 9 14 29 4 7 23 8 
2011 26 11 14 34 4 9 25 8 
2012 26 12 15 40 5 10 26 8 
I & M 
(19) 
2010 0 1 0 13 0 1 1 0 
2011  2  13  1 1  
2012  2  14  1 2  
Devel
opmen
t Bank 
(1) 
2012    1     
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Faulu 
Kenya 
(33) 
 
2012 6 4 3 6  1 6 6 
KCB(
170) 
2012 
26 26 14 37 7 10 31 19 
Family 
Bank 
(57) 
2005 8        
2006 10      2  
2007 12      3  
2008 10   15  1 5 2 
2009 15   17  2 7 3 
2010 16   20  3 8 4 
2011 18   20  3 10 4 
2012 20   20  3 10 4 
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Table 3.18: Distribution of Agents by Province and Selected Banks, 2007-2012 
 The Total Number of  Bank Agents Per Province Per Year, 
1991-2012 
Total 
Bank 
Name 
Year Cent
ral 
 
Coa
st 
 
East
ern 
 
Nairo
bi 
 
Norther
n 
Eastern 
Nyanza 
 
Rift 
Vall
ey 
Wester
n 
Provin
ce 
Chase 
Bank 
(380) 
2012         
Consoli
dated 
Bank 
(30) 
2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2008 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2009 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2010 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2011 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2012 4 4 9 5 0 0 8 0 
Equity 
Bank 
(6,123) 
2010 156 30 73 103 0 36 81 39 
2011 759 244 448 595 51 279 769 237 
2012 476 109 279 440 26 117 556 220 
KCB 
(2,573)
21 2012 431 377 362 332 26 305 522 218 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
21 After two months, the interviewee wrote back to me clarifying that they have revised 
their numbers. Thus, as of June 30, 2012 there were 2573 and in September the same 
year, that figure rose to 3900 which is equivalent to 52% change. 
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Table 3.19 A:  Distribution of ATMs by Provinces 
  The Total Number of Live ATMs Per Province, 1991-2012 
Bank 
Name 
Year Cent
ral 
 
Coast 
 
Eastern 
 
Nairobi 
 
Northern 
Eastern 
Ny
an
za 
 
Rift 
Vall
ey 
Wester
n 
Provin
ce 
Consol
idated 
Bank 
 
2005 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 
2006 3 1 5 2 0 0 0 0 
2007 3 1 5 2 0 0 0 0 
2008 3 1 5 2 0 0 0 0 
2009 3 1 5 3 0 0 0 0 
2010 3 1 5 4 0 0 0 0 
2011 3 1 5 5 0 0 3 0 
2012 3 1 5 5 0 0 3 0 
I & M 2012  2  18  1 2  
Chase 
Bank22 
(200+) 
2012         
KCB 2012 85 46 21 116 10 14 81 76 
Equity 
Bank 
2008 56 24 26 171 2 15 63 14 
2009 65 24 30 191 11 25 88 16 
2010 75 24 46 175 11 31 84 22 
2011 77 30 51 184 12 33 87 22 
2012 76 31 52 189 13 36 91 22 
              
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
22 Chase Bank has over 200 plus ATMs in the country. In addition, one of the bank 
interviewees states that “we are a partner to Kenswitch and through this partnership, 
clients can access up to 1000 ATMs and also a member of Pesapoint, with over 200 
ATMs our own 24 hours.” 
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Table 3.19 B: Bank Distribution of ATMs by Provinces, 2012 
 The Total Number of Live ATMs and Ratios Per Province 
Bank Name CL CO 
 
E 
 
NBI 
 
NE NY RV W 
Consolidated 3 1 5 5 0 0 3 0 
I & M 0 2 0 18 0 1 2 0 
KCB 85 46 21 116 10 14 81 76 
Equity 76 31 52 189 13 36 91 22 
Total ATMs 164 80 78 328 23 51 177 98 
Population23 
(in ‘000000) 
4.6 3.6 6.0 3.5 3.0 5.8 11.1 4.7 
ATMs/1000000 35.62 22.05 12.96 93.21 7.65 8.79 15.88 20.95 
NB: The names of former provinces are provided in short form; CL = Central; CO = 
Coast; E = Eastern; NBI = Nairobi, NE = North Eastern; NY = Nyanza; RV = Rift 
Valley; W = Western 
  
                                                          
23 This population per province figures is based on my own projections using 1999 and 
2009 census data from Kenya National Bureau of Statistics. 
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Table 3.20: Equity Bank Distribution and Growth in ATM Cards over the years 
 The Total Number of ATM Cards Per Province Per Year, 1991-2012 
Year CL CO E NBI NE NY RV W 
2006 74,368  15,476  25,705  122,698  0  11,658  89,839  3  
2007 200,839  56,022  89,983  363,798  8,399  49,823  231,465  33,599  
2008 372,506  109,603  163,892  644,178  19,502  108,932  422,878  84,871  
2009 488,055  150,651  221,284  840,195  30,999  163,922  561,450  124,085  
2010 
599,333  186,225  275,456  
1,014,7
72  38,692  207,010  685,012  157,468  
2011 
726,055  276,769  442,219  
1,213,4
34  47,424  250,192  848,363  198,865  
2012 
805,728  311,482  490,909  
1,340,7
25  63,105  279,693  952,844  224,124  
         
Province Per Capita ATM Cards, 2009 
Populati
on 
4,383,7
43 
3,325,3
07 
5,668,1
23 
3,138,3
69 
2,310,7
57 
5,442,7
11 
10,006,8
05 
4,334,2
82 
ATM 
Cards 
488,055 150,651 221,284 840,195 30,999 163,922 561,450 124,085 
Per 100 
people 
11.1 4.5 3.9 26.8 1.3 3.0 5.6 2.9 
NB: The names of former provinces are provided in short form; CL = Central; CO = 
Coast; E = Eastern; NBI = Nairobi, NE = North Eastern; NY = Nyanza; RV = Rift 
Valley; W = Western 
 
 
Table 3. 21: Kenya’s Deposit-Taking Microfinance Institutions 
Name of DTM Year Licensed Number of 
Branches 
Head 
Office 
Faulu Kenya DTM Limited 21/05/2009 27 Nairobi 
Kenya Women Finance 
Trust DTM Limited 
31/03/2010 16 Nairobi 
Rafiki Deposit Taking 
Microfinance 
14/06/2011 3 Nairobi 
Remu DTM Limited 31/12/2010 3 Nairobi 
SMEP  Deposit Taking 
Microfinance Limited 
14/12/2010 6 Nairobi 
UWEZO  Deposit Taking 
Microfinance Limited 
08/11/2010 2 Nairobi 
Total 57  
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Table 3.22: Distribution of Foreign Bureaus by City and Province, 2012 
Province City/Town Number of Foreign 
Exchange Bureaus 
Central   
Coast 
Mombasa 
Malindi 
10 
2 
Eastern   
Nairobi Nairobi 92 
North Eastern  0 
Nyanza  0 
Rift Valley 
Eldoret 
Nakuru 
Namanga 
2 
2 
1 
Western Kisumu 2 
Total 111 
Source: Central Bank of Kenya, 2012 
 
Table 3. 23: Improvements in Formal Financial Inclusion over the Years, 2006-2009 
(In %) 
Year Formal  Formal Other Informal  Excluded 
2006 18.5 7.8 32.4 41.3 
2009 22.6 17.9 26.8 32.7 
2013*     
     Source: FinAccess National Survey 2009, and 2013 
 
Table 3.24: Classification of SMEs by Gender 
Gender Number %  
Female 144 42.23 
Male 193 56.60 
Non-respondents                4                                                   1.17
Total 341 100 
 
Table 3.25: Classification of SMEs by Ethnicity 
Ethnic Group Number %  
Kikuyu 73 21.41 
Kamba 65 19.06 
Luo 41 12.02 
Meru 28 8.21 
Other Kenyans 115 33.72 
Foreigners 4 1.17 
Non-respondents 15 4.4 
Total  341 100 
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Table 3.26: Classification of SMEs by Ethnicity and Gender (Row % in 
Parentheses) 
Ethnic Group Male Female  Total 
Kikuyu 50 
(68.5) 
23 
(31.5) 
73 
Kamba 36 
(55.4) 
29 
(44.6) 
65 
Luo 20 
(48.8) 
21 
(51.2) 
41 
Meru 14 
(50.0) 
14 
(50.0) 
28 
Other Kenyans 65 
(56.5) 
50 
(43.5) 
115 
Foreigners 1 
(33.3 
2 
(66.7) 
3 
Total  186 
(57.2) 
139 
(42.8) 
325 
Non-
respondents 
7 
(58.3) 
5 
(41.7) 
12 
Note = 4 firms which did not respond to the gender question 
 
 
 
Table 3.27: Firm Classification by Legal Status 
Firm Legal Status Number %  
1. Sole proprietor 160 46.92 
2. Private limited company 55 16.13 
3. Public limited company 23 6.74 
4. Partnership 78 22.87 
5. Co-operative 13 3.81 
6. Other Form 9 2.64 
7. Non-respondents 3 0.88 
Total 341 100 
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Table 3.28: Firm Size by Current Employment 
 Classification Firm Size Number % 
Microenterprise 1- 4  162 47.65 
Small Enterprise              5- 19 121 35.59 
Medium Enterprise              20 - 99 44 12.94 
Large Enterprise               ≥ 100 13 3.82 
 Total 340                           100 
Missing =1  
 
Table 3.29: SME Current Employment by Gender and Firm Size 
 
Classificat
ion 
Firm 
Size 
Men Women total As % 
of all 
Men 
As % 
of all 
women 
As % 
of all 
Microente
rprise 
1- 4 91 70 161 47.15 48.61 47.77 
Small 
Enterprise 
5- 19 68 53 121 35.23 36.81 35.91 
Medium 
Enterprise 
20- 
99 
26 17 41 13.47 11.81 12.17 
Large 
Enterprise 
≥ 100 8 4 12 4.15 2.78 3.56 
 Total 193       144                                     337 100 100 100 
Missing = 4 
 
Table 3.30: SME Classification by Sector 
Sector Number %  
1. Retail 86 25.22 
2. Business Service 64 18.77 
3. Manufacturing 31 9.09 
4. Wholesale 36 10.56 
5. Agribusiness 28 8.21 
6. Construction  15 4.40 
7. Hotels 27 7.92 
8. Restaurant/Catering 20 5.87 
9. Repair Shops 10 2.93 
10. Other Sector (e.g gas) 23 6.74 
 Non-respondents 1 0.29 
Total 341 100 
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Table 3.31: SME Classification by Sector and Gender (on % representation) 
 
 
Sector 
 
 
Number 
Distribution by 
Gender  
Distribution by 
Gender as % 
Men Women men Women 
1. Retail 86 47 39 44.56 27.08 
2. Business 
Service 63 41 22 32.64 15.28 
3. Manufacturing 31 17 14 16.06 9.72 
4. Wholesale 36 21 15 18.65 10.42 
5. Agribusiness 28 16 12 14.51 8.33 
6. Construction 15 9 6 7.77 4.17 
7. Hotels 27 12 15 13.99 10.42 
8. Restaurants/Cat
ering 19 11 8 9.84 5.56 
9. Repair Shops 10 7 3 5.18 2.08 
10. Other Sector 
(e.g gas) 22 12 10 11.40 6.94 
Total 337 193 144 57.27 42.73 
Note: Missing = 4 
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Table 3.32: SME Classification by Sector and Firm Size 
Sector Number of Employees 
 (% in Parentheses) 
  1- 4   5-19 20-99    ≥ 100 
1. Retail 64 
(74.42) 
18 
(20.93) 
2 
(2.33) 
        2        
(2.33) 
2. Business Service 35 
(54.69) 
19 
(29.69) 
8 
(12.50) 
2 
(3.13) 
3. Manufacturing 10 
(32.26) 
12 
(38.71) 
6 
(19.35) 
3 
(9.68) 
4. Wholesale 15 
(41.67) 
18 
(50.00) 
2 
(5.56) 
1 
(2.78) 
5. Agribusiness 2 
(7.14) 
15 
(53.57) 
10 
(35.71) 
1 
(3.57) 
6. Construction 1 
(6.67) 
7 
(46.67) 
5 
(33.33) 
2 
(13.33) 
7. Hotels 11 
(40.74) 
12 
(44.44) 
4 
(14.81) - 
8. Restaurants/Cater
ing 
9 
(45) 
7 
(35) 
4 
(20) 
 - 
9. Repair Shops 3 
(30) 
6 
(60) 
1 
(10) - 
10. Other Sector (e.g 
gas) 
12 
(52.17) 
7 
(30.43) 
3 
(13.04) 
1 
(4.35) 
Total( as % of 
341) 
162 
(47.51) 
121 
(35.48) 
45 
(13.20) 
13 
(3.81) 
 
Table 3.33: Usage of ATMs, Bank Visits and Under Mattress Facilities 
Facility Number %  
ATM Withdrawals 166 48.68 
Bank Visits 115 33.72 
Store Safekeeping Vault 38 11.14 
Both ATM Withdrawals and Bank Visits 18 5.28 
Non-respondents 4 1.17 
Total 341 100 
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Table 3.34: Firm Self-Appraisal 
Overall Assessment Number %  
Technology Adoption and Managerial Competence 259 75.95 
Managerial Incompetence and technology Neglect 21 6.16 
Unfavorable Business Environment 47 13.78 
Non-respondents 14 4.11 
Total 341 100 
 
Table 3.35: Loan Characteristics of SMEs 
Status Number %  
Received Approvals (success Rate) 114 66.67 
Denied Applications (rejection rate) 57              33.33 
Total Loan Applications         171                                   100.00 
Memorandum:  Loan Application % of Total # 
of SMEs 
 171/341 50.15 
Acceptance rate(Loan Approval As % of total # 
of SMEs) 
 114/341 33.43 
 
Table 3.36: Loan Approval by Lender 
Lender Type Number % 
Commercial Banks 57 50.44 
Microfinance Institutions 18 15.93 
Informal Finance /Money Lenders/Family 
Members 13 11.50 
Others 25 22.12 
Total 113 100 
 
Table 3.37: Loan Approval by Gender 
Gender Number %   % ( of gender) 
Male 64                                  56.64 33.16 
Female  49                                     43.36 34.03 
Total  113                             100 33.14 
(Note: One Loan Applicant did not specify gender; missing = 1) 
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Table 3.38: Loan Approval by Sector 
Sector Quantity % of the total 
Approved 
Loans 
Approved as 
% of Sectoral 
Totals 
1. Retail 24 21.05 27.91 
2. Business 
Service 
24 21.05 38.10 
3. Manufacturing 10 8.77 32.26 
4. Wholesale 10 8.77 27.78 
5. Agribusiness 9 7.89 32.14 
6. Construction 8 7.02 53.33 
7. Hotels 7 6.14 25.93 
8. Restaurants/Ca
tering 
9 7.89 47.37 
9. Repair Shops 4 3.51 40.00 
10. Other Sector 
(e.g gas) 
9 7.89 40.91 
Total       114 100               33.43               
 
Table 3.39: Loan Approval by Firm Size 
Size 
Classification 
Firm 
Employees 
Quantity % of the total 
Approved 
Loans 
As % of Firm 
Size 
Classification 
Total 
Microenterprise 1-4  47                                                              41.23 29.01
Small 
Enterprise 
    5- 19                                
35                                  
29.82 28.10 
Medium 
Enterprise 
                
20-99 
28                                                         24.56 63.64
Large 
Enterprises 
  ≥ 100 5- 4.39 38.46 
 Total        114                                     100 33.43 
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Table 3.40: Why Firm Did Not Apply for Loan 
Reason Self-Selection Out from Credit 
Market24 
Number % of Total 
Constraint 
% of  
All 
(163) 
1. Firm does not think it will be 
approved 32 
41.56 19.63 
2. Application procedures are too 
burdensome 
14 
 
18.18 8.59 
3. Collateral requirements are strict 14 18.18 8.59 
4. Interest rates are too high 17 22.08 10.43 
Total Constrained Firms 77 100.00 47.24 
5. The firm does not need loan 
(unconstrained firms) 
86 - 52.76 
 
Table 3.41: Why Firm Did Not Apply for Loan by Gender 
Reasons Men Women Total As % 
of all 
men 
As % 
of all 
women 
% 
Total 
1. It does not think it 
will be approved 
21 11 32 10.88 7.64 19.88 
2. Application 
procedures are 
too burdensome 
7 7 14 3.63 4.86 8.70 
3. Collateral 
requirements are 
strict 
8 6 14 4.15 4.17 8.70 
4. Interest rates are 
too high 
8 9 17 4.15 6.25 10.56 
5. The firm does not 
need loan 
49 35 84 25.39 24.31 52.17 
Total  93 68 161 48.19 17.3 100 
Two did not specify gender, Missing = 2 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24 This means that the firms had wanted to apply but chose to not because of the reasons 
enumerated one through four.  
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Table 3.42: Why Firm Did Not Apply for Loan by Sector (% in parentheses) 
Category Doubted Approval 
Burdensome 
Application 
Strict 
Collateral 
High 
Interest  
No Need 
1. Retail: 
quantity  
12 
(22.64) 
2 
(3.77) 
3 
(5.66) 
5 
(9.43) 
31 
(58.49) 
2. Business 
Service 
8 
(25.81) 
4 
(12.90) 
4 
(12.90) 
3 
(9.68) 
12 
(38.71) 
3. Manufacturi
ng 
3 
(21.43) 
1 
(7.14) 
3 
(21.43) 
1 
(7.14) 
6 
(42.86) 
4. Wholesale 2 
(22.22) 
1 
(11.11) 
1 
(11.11) 
- 5 
(55.56) 
5. Agribusines
s 
2 
(20.00) 
- 1 
(10.00) 
1 
(10.00) 
6 
(60.00) 
6. Constructio
n 
- - 2 
(33.33) 
1 
(16.67) 
3 
(50.00) 
7. Hotels 2 
(11.76) 
3 
(17.65) 
- 4 
(23.53) 
8 
(47.06) 
8. Restaurants/
Catering 
- 2 
(33.33) 
- 1 
(16.67) 
3 
(50.00) 
9. Repair 
Shops 
- - -  4 
(100.00) 
10. Other Sector 
(e.g gas) 
3 
(25.00) 
1 
(8.33) 
- 
 
1 
(8.33) 
7 
(58.33) 
Total as % of 341 32 
(9.38) 
14 
(4.11) 
14 
(4.11) 
17 
(4.99) 
85 
(24.93) 
 
 
 
Table 3.43: Financing as Constraint to Firm Growth 
Source of 
Credit 
SMEs Identifying a Factor as a Constraint 
 (% in parentheses) 
Major Moderate Minor Never Total Sample 
Formal 
Finance 
70 
(20.83.) 
196 
(58.33) 
43 
(12.80) 
27 
(8.04) 
336 
(98.53) 
Microfinance 
 
39 
(11.75) 
145 
(43.67) 
75 
(22.59) 
73 
(21.99) 
332 
(97.36) 
Informal 
Finance 
50 
(15.06) 
144 
(43.37) 
88 
(26.51) 
50 
(15.06) 
332 
(97.36) 
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Table 3.44: Financing Constraint to Firm Growth by SME Gender 
Source of 
Credit 
Number Identifying a Factor as 
a Constraint 
% Identifying a Factor 
as a Constraint 
Male Female Total Male Female Total 
Formal 
Finance 191                                     142 333 98.96 98.61 97.65 
Microfinance 
188                        141             329  97.41 97.92 96.48 
Informal 
Finance 189 140 329 97.93 97.22 96.48 
 
 
Table 3.45: Financing Constraint to Firm Growth by SME Size 
Source of 
Credit 
Firm Identifying a Credit Source as a Major Constraint 
 (% in parenthesis) 
Microenterprise 
Small 
Enterprise 
Medium 
Enterprise 
Large 
Enterprise  
Formal 
Finance 
158 
(97.53) 
121 
(100) 
44 
(100) 
13 
(100) 
Microfin
ance 
 
158 
(97.53) 
119 
(98.35) 
42 
(95.54) 
12 
(92.31) 
Informal 
Finance 
157 
(96.91) 
121 
(100) 
42 
(95.54) 
13 
(100) 
Missing = 4 
 
Table 3.46: Credit Allocation and Types of Borrowers 
Type of Borrowers Number % of Total Sample 
Successful borrowers 114 34.13 
Denied Borrowers 57 17.07 
Discouraged Borrowers 77 23.05 
Non-borrowers 86 25.75 
Total 334 100.00 
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Table 3.47: Lack of Access to Market as a Constraint on Firm Performance by Size 
Number Identifying Access to Market as a Constraint 
(% in bracket of each size) 
Firm Size 
                               
Major Moderate Minor 
 
Never 
1-4 28 
(17.72) 
92 
(58.23) 
25 
(15.82) 
13 
(8.23) 
5-19 25 
(21.19) 
65 
(55.08) 
19 
(16.10) 
9 
(7.63) 
20-99 7 
(15.91) 
18 
(40.91) 
15 
(34.09) 
4 
(9.09) 
≥ 100 1 
(7.69) 
5 
(38.46) 
6 
(46.15) 
1 
(7.69) 
 
Total(% 
out of 341) 
61 
(17.89) 
180 
(52.79) 
65 
(19.06) 
27 
(7.92) 
 
Table 3.48: Lack of access to Market as a Constraint on Firm Performance by 
Gender 
Category Male  (% in bracket) 
Female 
 (% in bracket) 
Major 36 (18.65) 
25 
(17.36) 
Moderate 103 (53.37) 
76 
(53.47) 
Minor 32 (16.58) 
31 
(21.53) 
Never 17 (8.81) 
9 
(6.25) 
Non-respondents 5 (0.25) 
2 
(1.39) 
Total  
(as % of 337 SMEs ) 
           193            
(57.27) 
144                                    
(42.73)                                     
Missing = 4 
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Table 3.49: Lack of Access to Market as a Constraint on Performance by Sector 
Category Major Moderate Minor Never 
1. Retail 23 
(26.74) 
45 
(52.33) 
11 
(12.79) 
7 
(8.14) 
2. Business Service 13 
(20.97) 
28 
(45.16) 
17 
(27.42) 
4 
(6.45) 
3. Manufacturing 3 
(9.68) 
19 
(61.29) 
6 
(19.35) 
3 
(9.68) 
4. Wholesale 3 
(8.57) 
22 
(62.86) 
8 
(22.86) 
2 
(5.71) 
5. Agribusiness 4 
(14.29) 
17 
(60.71) 
7 
(25.00) 
-  
6. Construction 3 
(20.00) 
9 
(60.00) 
2 
(13.33) 
1 
(6.67) 
7. Hotels 5 
(19.23) 
14 
(53.85) 
4 
(15.38) 
3 
(11.54) 
8. Restaurants/Cate
ring 
5 
(26.32) 
7 
(36.84) 
4 
(21.05) 
3 
(15.79) 
9. Repair Shops - 7 
(70.00) 
1 
(10.00) 
2  
(20.00) 
10. Other Sector (e.g 
gas) 
2 
(9.52) 
12 
(57.14) 
5 
(23.81) 
2  
(9.52) 
Total (As % of all 341 
firms) 
61 
(17.89) 
180 
(52.79) 
65 
(19.06) 
27 
(7.92) 
Missing = 8 
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Table 3.50: Summary Statistics for Selected Variables 
Variable Name 
/Description 
Mean Median St. 
dev.  
Max Min Observations 
Time to Start SME 0.66 0.33 0.68 4 0.08 337 
Years of business 
Operations 4.36 3 4.48 54 0.08 340 
Current Number of 
Employees 15.76 5 33.73 333 1 340 
Employment History 15.66 5 33.92 333 1 336 
Revenue in 2012 (‘000 
$) 282 64 1,103 14,000 0.08 0.318 
Years of Schooling of 
the Firm Head 14.47 15 5.05 27 0 336 
Average Distance from 
Nairobi in Miles 1.64 0 7.69 40 0 341 
Number of Employees in 
year when firm received 
loan 14.01 4 32.11 333 1 337 
Revenue in year when 
loan was received (‘000 
$) 279.2 64.0 1,089.2 14,000.0 0.12 0.32 
Loan received in the 
latest year 15.0  88.4 1,167.1 0 0.33 
 
 
Table 3.51: Correlation between Employment, Revenue and Loan Received 
 Employment  Revenue  Loan Amount 
Employment  1   
 Revenue  0.40 1  
Loan Amount 0.08 0.11 1 
N = 341
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Table 3.52: Definitions of Variables in Tables 3.53 - 3.58 
Variable Explanation 
approved 
Employment 
A dummy for whether a loan is received 
Current number of employees; a proxy for firm size 
Distance Distance from Nairobi in miles 
Foreign A dummy for a foreign owned firm; SME nationality 
Retail Sector A dummy for retail firm; proxy for sectoral bias test 
Wholesale Sector 
Business Conferences 
 
Manufacturing 
Agribusiness 
Construction 
Hotels 
 
Restaurant 
Repair shops 
A dummy for whether a firm is a wholesale 
Whether a firm participates in business networks to gain 
skills for running the business 
Whether a firms is a manufacturing 
Whether a firm is classified as agribusiness 
Whether a firm is a construction company 
Whether a firm is considered a service sector specializing in 
lodging 
Whether a firm specializes in food or catering service 
Whether a firm deals in repair or maintenance business 
Gender A dummy for gender. Female = 1 ; male = 0 
Ethnicity 
Education 
Technology Constraint 
 
Collateral Requirement 
 
Bureaucratic Constraint 
 
Poor Judicial System 
Business Service 
 
Interest Rate Constraint 
Years in Business 
Launch Time 
Poor Infrastructure 
Market Access 
 
ICT Use/Telephone 
Study Visits  
 
Own Website     
Business Training           
 
Theft insurance                           
Whether a firm is owned by an ethnic group Kikuyu 
Years of school of the head of the firm owner 
Whether firm considers implementation of new technology 
as a constraint on firm growth 
Whether a firm considers collateral requirement as an 
obstacle to growth or not 
Whether firm cites bureaucratic hurdles as obstacle to 
growth 
Whether SME cites poor Judicial system as harming them 
Whether a firm is a business service such as haircuts, 
printing shops, photocopying or not 
Does the firm consider interest as a constraint on growth? 
Years business has been in operation 
Times to start a company 
If the firm considers poor infrastructure as obstacle 
A dummy indicating whether a firm considers lack of 
access to market as a constraint to growth or performance 
If the firm uses mobile phone for communications 
If the firm participates in study visits to other firms or 
conferences to learn how to run own business 
A dummy indicating whether a firm owns a website 
If the firm has participated in skill training offered by 
business association, government or NGOs 
Whether a firm has a theft insurance/protection against theft 
Source: Author’s Compilation 
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Table 3.53: Probit Estimates of Loan Approval 
 Base 
Equation 
Full 
Specification 
Parsimonious 
Model 
Gender 0.008 
(0.146) 
0.109 
(0.153) 
 
Employment 0.006* 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
 
School - 0.020 
(0.015) 
- 0.042** 
(0.018) 
- 0.33** 
(0.015) 
Owning Website  0.671*** 
(0.255) 
0.747*** 
(0.239) 
Business Networking  0.488*** 
(0.164) 
0.503*** 
(0.157) 
Years in Business  0.016 
(0.024) 
 
Ethnicity  0.204 
(0.180) 
 
Retail   -0.238 
(0.327) 
 
Wholesale  -0.187 
(0.375) 
 
Business Service  0.088 
(0.345) 
 
Manufacturing  0.145 
(0.401) 
 
Agribusiness  - 0.178 
(0.380) 
 
Construction  0.301 
(0.481) 
 
Hotels  - 0.380 
(0.402) 
 
Restaurants  0.271 
(0.408) 
 
Repair Shops  0.163 
(0.528) 
 
Constant -0.205 
(0.230) 
- 0.187 
(0.377) 
- 0.206 
(0.222) 
Prob>chi2 0.316 0.008 0.000 
Wald chi2 3.38 32.84 23.85 
No. Observations 328 321 325 
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy for loan approval (= 1 if approved, 0 
otherwise);  ***, ***, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively, and 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.   
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Table 3.54: Probit Estimates of Access to Formal Financing 
 Base Equation Full Specification Parsimonious Model 
Gender -0.005 
(0.156) 
-0.022 
(0.160) 
 
Employment -0.005* 
(0.003) 
-0.010* 
(0.003) 
- 0.004* 
(0.002) 
School 0.012 
(0.017) 
0.021 
(0.018) 
 
Ethnicity 0.327 
(0.204) 
0.266 
(0.212) 
 
Years in 
Business 
 0.032 
(0.022) 
 
Owning A 
website 
 0.218 
(0.290) 
 
Business 
Networking 
 - 0.371** 
(0.171) 
- 0.279** 
(0.163) 
Retail   0.052 
(0.338) 
 
Wholesale  0.345 
(0.405) 
 
Business 
Service 
 0.427 
(0.374) 
0.348* 
(0.212) 
Manufacturing  - 0.024 
(0.414) 
 
Agribusiness  0.155 
(0.388) 
 
Construction  0.438 
(0.581) 
 
Hotels  0.319 
(0.427) 
 
Restaurants  - 0.396 
(0.419) 
- 0. 664** 
(0.300) 
Repair Shops  - 0.189 
(0.512) 
 
Constant 0.633** 
(0.261) 
0.393 
(0.372) 
0.943 
(0.113) 
Prob>chi2 0.304 0.283 0.003 
Wald chi2 4.84 18.73 15.94 
Observations 331 325 335 
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy for financing constraint (= 1 if firm considers 
access to formal finance as major and moderate, 0 if they consider it minor or never an 
obstacle); ***, ***, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively and while 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 3.55: Probit Estimates of Access to Informal Financing 
 Base Equation Full Specification Parsimonious Model 
Gender 0.005 
(0.141) 
0.008 
(0.147) 
 
Employment -0.010** 
(0.003) 
-0.007** 
(0.004) 
- 0.007** 
(0.003) 
School - 0.001 
(0.015) 
- 0.010 
(0.017) 
 
Ethnicity  - 0.138 
(0.176) 
 
Years in 
Business 
 0.007 
(0.021) 
 
Owning A 
website 
 - 0.206 
(0.253) 
 
Business 
Networking 
 - 0.249 
(0.160) 
- 0.262* 
(0.149) 
Retail   0.216 
(0.316) 
 
Wholesale  0.004 
(0.370) 
 
Business 
Service 
 0.423 
(0.337) 
 
Manufacturin
g 
 0.468 
(0.383) 
 
Agribusiness  0.189 
(0.369) 
 
Construction  1.103** 
(0.497) 
0.680* 
(0.371) 
Hotels  0.212 
(0.385) 
 
Restaurants  0.613 
(0.391) 
 
Repair Shops  0.974* 
(0.551) 
 
Constant 0.303 
(0.225) 
0.238 
(0.364) 
0.359*** 
(0.093) 
Prob>chi2 0.116 0.272 0.004 
Wald chi2 5.92 18.94 13.14 
No. 
Observations 
333 325 335 
Note:  The dependent variable is a dummy for financing constraint (= 1 if firm considers 
access to informal finance as a major and moderate constraint, 0 if they consider it minor 
or never an obstacle);  ***, ***, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively, 
and standard errors are reported in parentheses.   
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Table 3.56: Probit Estimates of Credit Constraints 
 Base Equation Full Specification Parsimonious 
Model 
Gender 0.024 
(0.153) 
0.075 
(0.161) 
 
Employment 0.008** 
(0.003) 
0.007* 
(0.004) 
0.006* 
(0.003) 
School - 0.030** 
(0.015) 
- 0.054*** 
(0.019) 
- 0.030** 
(0.015) 
Ethnicity  - 0.155 
(0.199) 
 
Years in 
Business 
 - 0.013 
(0.023) 
 
Owning 
Telephone 
 - 0.530 
(0.366) 
 
Business 
Networking 
 0.129 
(0.173) 
 
Retail   0.022 
(0.331) 
 
Wholesale  0.941** 
(0.430) 
0.538** 
(0.279) 
Business 
Service 
 0.596* 
(0.363) 
0.397* 
(0.204) 
Manufacturin
g 
 0.556 
(0.417) 
 
Agribusiness  0.396 
(0.399) 
 
Construction  0.594 
(0.500) 
 
Hotels  0.055 
(0.396) 
 
Restaurants  0.661 
(0.459) 
 
Repair Shops  - 0.050 
(0.527) 
 
Constant 1.007*** 
(0.234) 
1.503*** 
(0.493) 
0.359*** 
(0.093) 
Prob>chi2 0.062 0.042 0.038 
Wald chi2 7.35 26.93 10.14 
Observations 333 325 336 
Note:  The dependent variable is a dummy for financing constraint (= 1 if firm considers 
access to informal finance as a major and moderate constraint, 0 if they consider it minor 
or never an obstacle);  ***, ***, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively, 
and standard errors are reported in parentheses.   
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Table 3.57: Probit Estimates of Loan Applications 
 Base Equation Full Specification Parsimonious Model 
Gender - 0.040 
(0.140) 
0.009 
(0.149) 
 
Employment 0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
 
School - 0.003 
(0.014) 
- 0.025 
(0.017) 
 
Ethnicity  0.093 
(0.178) 
 
Years in Business  0.025 
(0.022) 
 
Owning Website  0.826*** 
(0.255) 
0.631*** 
(0.225) 
Business 
Networking 
 0.332** 
(0.162) 
 
Retail   - 0.169 
(0.314) 
 
Wholesale  0.742** 
(0.368) 
0.553** 
(0.235) 
Business Service  0.307 
(0.335) 
 
Manufacturing  0.430 
(0.382) 
 
Agribusiness  0.629 
(0.388) 
0.450* 
(0.253) 
Construction  0.302 
(0.490) 
 
Hotels  - 0.097 
(0.383) 
 
Restaurants  0.525 
(0.405) 
 
Repair Shops  0.050 
(0.527) 
 
Constant 0.044 
(0.217) 
- 0.118 
(0.357) 
- 0. 137* 
(0.081) 
Prob>chi2 0.873 0.002 0.001 
Wald chi2 0.70 37.36 15.81 
No. Observations 332 324 334 
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy for credit application (= 1 if firm applies, 0 
otherwise); ***, ***, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively, and 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 3.58: Robustness Test for Loan Application and Approvals 
Probit Model with Sample Selection 
Outcome Equation: Loan Approval Base Equation 1 Model 2 
Gender 0.135 
(0.164) 
0.170 
(0.195) 
Employment 0.010 
(0.007) 
0.015* 
(0.009) 
Education -0.016 
(0.022) 
-0.022 
(0.023) 
Years in Business 0.043* 
(0.026) 
0.041 
(0.030) 
Ethnicity   0.210 
(0.235) 
Business Services   0.295 
(0.276) 
Retail   0.450 
(0.307) 
Constant -0.422 
(0.448) 
-0.394 
(0.500) 
Probability Chi2 0.386 0.496 
Wald Chi2 4.15 6.38 
No Observations 329 328 
Selection Equation: Loan Application 
Education -0.001 
(0.014) 
-0.001 
(0.014) 
Owning Mobile phone -0.334 
(0.0262) 
-0.386 
(0.264) 
Wholesale 0.545** 
(0.210) 
0.508** 
(0.229) 
Business Networking                        -
0.194 
(0.293) 
-0.256 
(0.273) 
Constant                        
0.291 
(0.329) 
0.341
(0.333) 
/athrho 1.104 
(0.834) 
0.664 
(0.635) 
Prob>chi2 0.186 0.296 
Chi2(1) 1.75 1.09 
Note: Loan approval and loan applications are outcome equation and loan application are 
selection equation, respectively; also, ***, ***, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%  and 
10% respectively, and standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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CHAPTER 4 
LACK OF ACCESS TO FINANCE BY SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED 
ENTERPRISE AS A CONSTRAINT TO DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH SUDAN 
4.1 Introduction 
 South Sudan attained independence in 2011 with weak economic and financial sector 
development indicators (SSCCSE, 2010; Natsio & Abramovitz, 2011; Bricéno-
Garmendia & Ranganath, 2011). Sudan and pre-independent Southern Sudan were locked 
in conflicts over resource allocation, political autonomy, and governance issues, 
including the tug-of-war between the center versus periphery (Deng, 1990; Nyaba, 1998; 
Young, 2003; Akol, 2007; de Waal, 2007; SSDP, 2011; Hale, 2012; D'Agoôt, 2013) and 
the role of religion in the public sphere (Ylönen, 2005; Natsio & Abramovitz, 2011; 
Collins, 1976). The impact of those longstanding conflicts remains partly responsible for 
the present-day South Sudan dismal development outcomes. 
Preoccupation with the civil wars meant that economic development and access to 
finance for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) were never central issues in the 
political economy of Sudan and pre-independent South Sudan. For more than 50 years, 
South Sudan has preoccupied itself with issues of liberation at the expense of 
development. While Kenya and Uganda, for instance, have literacy rates of 87.4% and 
66.8% respectively, South Sudan has a literacy rate of 27% (SSCCSE, 2010; Central 
Intelligence Agency, 2013). Saying that South Sudan is a “poor performer” is not a 
hyperbole, with 51% of the population below the poverty line. In addition,  83% of the 
population is rural (5th Population and Housing Census, 2008), only 55% has access to 
clean drinking water, and only 1% of the households have bank accounts (NBHS, 2009).  
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A World Bank report on Doing Business in Juba, which compares 183 economies of the 
world, highlights a number of issues that affect private sector development in South 
Sudan (World Bank, 2011). It mentions a few factors that constrain access to finance. 
According the report, only about 10% of total loans provided by South Sudan banking 
sector go to SMEs (SSDP, 2011). 
The report adds that: “On the ease of protecting investors, getting credit and closing 
down business, Juba would rank 173rd, 176th and 183rd” (p. 8). The last rating is 
disquieting since the existing literature tells us that higher exit costs correspond with 
larger informal economies (Ayyagari, Beck & Demirguc-Kunt, 2007). 
On a scale 0 to 6, Juba scores zero when it comes to credit information depth, because it 
does not have a public registry or credit bureaus (World Bank, 2011). As of today, there 
are still no credit bureaus or public registries that play a role in sharing such information 
on the borrowers and between lenders. Regarding cross- border trade, Juba ranks 181st, 
just above Central Africa (182nd) and Afghanistan (183rd).  This reflects being land-
locked and the fact that goods have to travel from the port of Mombasa in Kenya through 
Uganda (Bricéno-Garmendia & Ranganath, 2011). 
Although Juba ranks ahead of Kenya and Uganda when it comes to enforcing contracts 
and paying taxes as well as starting a business (World Bank, 2011), institutional 
persistence (that institutions persist and that much of the cross country differences in 
economic performance could be explained by “impacts of institutions on economic 
development”; see Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2001) 
and lack of trust in disjointed systems (old Sudan laws vs. New Sudan laws) mean that 
 151 
few people in South Sudan trust the country’s legal system. This is why fewer people 
look to courts as a way to resolve disputes in South Sudan because they think that no one 
would care. Such a path-dependent predates the independence of South Sudan.  
There is both empirical and theoretical evidence in the literature regarding institution 
persistence. Poor legal system according to Beck, Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic (2005) 
tends to constrain firm growth. As to the persistence of institutions, Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2006) cite a clear example of Southern United States.  According to this 
hypothesis, South was relatively poor in the antebellum period and after the war, nothing 
much changed because low wage, low education level, labor intensive production and 
repressive economy like before the war still characterize southern economy (Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2006). In other words, abolition of slavery and following enfranchisement had 
no major impact on economic institutions in Southern United States, hence the argument 
for persistence of institutions. 
Since fewer cases pass through the courts for adjudication, the main reason for faster 
enforcement mechanisms may be short court caseloads.  Similarly, many firms in Juba 
remain informal and avoid paying taxes altogether, so that tax collectors concentrate on 
the few registered firms. This partly explains the dominant role of the oil sector which 
account for 98 percent of government budget before the shutdown (SSDP, 2011). 
This study is unique in that to the best of my knowledge, it is the first such study on this 
subject in South Sudan. Various reports done by South Sudan National Bureau of 
Statistics (NBS) have looked at private sector development but they have not focused on 
the question of access to finance and goals of financial inclusion. The World Bank report 
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on Doing Business in Juba 2011 analyzes nine specific private sector development 
indicators, and the question of access to finance was not one of them. Other studies that 
do focus on access to finance do not analyze the context in South Sudan (for example, 
Demirguc-Kunt, & Klapper, 2012; Asiedu, Freeman & Nti-Addae, 2012; Sacerdoti, 
2005; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 2005, 2006, 2008). 
This essay analyses SME characteristics with a view to understanding how SME access 
to finance could play a role in economic development. The data for this essay comes from 
7-month field survey in South Sudan conducted between July 2011 and February 2012. 
This research was conducted in three of the ten states in South Sudan. The three states 
include Central Equatoria, Western Bahr el Ghazal and Northern Bahr el Ghazal. Five 
cities— Juba, Yei, Wau, Aweil and Mayom Angok— were covered in those states when 
administering the questionnaire and interviewing relevant SME respondents. The SME 
sample size is 334.   
Since this study was before independence, the number of commercial banks in South 
Sudan was small. All eight commercial banks that were operational at the time provided 
data on the banking sector for the study. The number of commercial banks has increased 
since then to reach 20 by the end of 2011 and 25 by 3 July 2013 (Bank of South Sudan, 
2013). The same is true for number of foreign exchange bureaus which stands at 80 as of 
23 July 2013 .This essay does not only ask SMEs what constraints they face, but also digs 
deeper by speaking to financial sector players, asking what they are doing to expand the 
financial access frontier and what is holding them back. The aim is to hear both sides of 
the argument to formulate a diagnosis.  
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 4.1 provides the context of South Sudan’s 
political economy. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 give an overview of the banking and SME sectors 
in Post-independence South Sudan, respectively while 4.4 analyses survey results of the 
banking sector and SMEs in South Sudan. Section 4.5 presents an econometric analysis 
of SME access to credit. Section 4.6 draws lessons from the econometric results, and 
section 4.7 concludes the essay. 
4.1.1 Pre-independence South Sudan’s Banking Sector, 2005-2011 
Banks have a central role in financial sector development. They intermediate fund 
between savers and borrowers. In pre-independent South Sudan, small scale and 
informality of banks, political interference/poor governance of banks, and unpredictable 
shocks to banks, made intermediation difficult. Poor infrastructure and communications 
made matters worse (World Bank, 2011; Bricéno-Garmenndia, & Ranganath, 2011).   
Before independence, the dual banking system in Sudan comprised Islamic banking in 
the north and the traditional banking system in the South. This arrangement was referred 
to as ‘two systems, one country.’ But after the July 9, 2011, South Sudan adopted a 
traditional banking system.  During the interim period, from 2005 through 2011, a few of 
Khartoum-based banks opened up throughout the ten states in South Sudan, but mostly in 
Juba. Nonetheless, Kenya Commercial Bank was the largest of all banks with head office 
in Juba and branches in Rumbek, Yei, and Bentiu.  
Foreign bank presence is a post-independence phenomenon in South Sudan and this is 
welcome news. Studies show that foreign banks bring capital, technology, expertise in 
banking, and independence from political elites (Beck, & Honohan, 2007; World Bank, 
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2008; see Chapter 3). Foreign banks are relatively large, however, and they generally 
stick to financing of high-income persons and large enterprises. They can have a positive 
side too, by forcing local banks to focus on lower- income groups, including SMEs.  
4.1.2 Microfinance and Informal Finance in South Sudan 
Microfinance institutions still depend on financial support from donors. Unlike the 
neighboring countries such as Uganda with about 18 MFIs or Ethiopia with 27, South 
Sudan microfinance sector came into being after the signing of the CPA in 2005. The 
number of MFIs is now growing and it has a huge potential to grow if conditions prove 
supportive. At the moment, MFIs depend on external technical and financial support from 
bodies such as USAID, UNDP, and UNCDF, among others. 
South Sudan has a thin financial sector. At the end of 2010, South Sudan had only eight 
microfinance institutions, five insurance companies and eight commercial banks, three of 
which are foreign-owned. 
There is a growing recognition in the economics discipline of importance of the financial 
sector for expanding access to finance for all, with far-reaching implications for poverty 
reduction (Andrianaivo & Kpodar, 2010; Singh & Tandon, 2012). A financial system 
geared solely toward money-making schemes may drag the whole economy into chaos, 
due to lax supervision and a culture of excessive financial deregulation, as demonstrated 
by the recent world financial and economic crisis.  
To assess the financial sector development needs in South Sudan, an environment where 
no relevant data exist, I found survey methods appropriate.  Examples of data I collected 
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include SME employment, sales, amount of credit owed to the banks, obstacles to 
obtaining finance, terms of loans, location of banks, regional distribution of lending, and 
extent of mobile phone use in financial services, among others. 
Additionally, use has been made of the 2009 Republic of Sudan National Poverty Survey 
Questionnaire, the 2010 Business Survey, and 5th Population and Housing Census 2008 
which provide some data on household access to finance. Through interviews, I also 
investigated how businessmen get finance, what sort of formulae are used for loan-
making, the extent of funding gaps, and the presence of credit-rationing.  
 4.1.3 Difficulties in Measuring Financial Access 
One difficult thing about measuring financial access is to differentiate between access to 
and use of financial services (CGAP, 2009). The amount of loans, from and to whom, 
does not tell us who chooses not to borrow or who was denied. For these reasons, we 
should not take observed demand for credit as equal to need for credit (Meyer & Zeller, 
2002). The findings from the World Bank Investment Climate Assessment Survey 
(whose calculations were based on surveys from Kenya, Madagascar, Senegal and 
Uganda) for Africa are telling. African enterprises cite lack of access to finance as the 
most serious handicap to their growth (Nkurunziza, 2008). Another study finds that 
“more African entrepreneurs report that access to and cost of finance is the major 
constraint on the operations and growth of the firms than do entrepreneurs in other 
regions” (Beck & Honohan, 2007, p. 62).  
The finance constrained category includes firms that applied for loans and were rejected, 
and firms that did not apply at all because they do not have sufficient collateral, find 
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application process too exacting, regard the interest rates too high, or fear rejection (Beck 
& Honohan, 2007). This could explain a paradox of excess liquidity in the banks and 
limited investable funds in the economy. SMEs are sometimes called the ‘missing link’ in 
access to finance. Large firms can access formal finance, while micro-firms and poor 
households can turn to MFIs. SMEs fall in between: they may be too big to qualify for 
microfinance loans, and too small to qualify for formal bank loans.                                                                                                                      
4.2  Banking Sector in Post-independence South Sudan 
South Sudan’s banking sector is at an early stage of development. The financial service 
providers are commercial banks, insurance companies and microfinance institutions. 
There are no securities markets to talk of, nor are there public registries or credit bureaus 
(World Bank, 2011). South Sudan’s banking sector is poised to grow quickly, however25. 
With 20 commercial banks, South Sudan ranks third out of six countries in the region by 
this measure, and first in the number of banks relative to population. 
While South Sudan’s financial sector development is at its early phase, there is a positive 
prospect as evidence by entry of regional banks. This new frontier could prove potentially 
a growing market.  There is free entry (and exit possibly despite lower ranking according 
to Doing Business in Juba 2011) from regional financial markets, as evident with Kenyan 
and Ethiopian commercial banks. While the financial sector is still very thin, the fact that 
foreign banks have opened up branches in South Sudan shows that they are a financing 
                                                          
25 All the same, the ongoing crisis in South Sudan, which starts on 15 December 2013, 
presents significant uncertainty over the future financial sector development if it last 
long. 
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potential for SMEs which could be the engine of growth across the board. A higher 
number of banks per population can be a positive thing by increasing competition for 
resource deposit mobilization, and savings, and by bringing down lending rates to 
competitive levels. 
4.3 SME Sector in Post-independence South Sudan 
An analysis of the South Sudan National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) 2010 Business 
Survey provides a broad picture into South Sudan SME Sector. Of the 7333 businesses 
surveyed by South Sudan National Bureau of Statistics (NBS, 2010), 6,587 of the 
businesses fall under the category “Microenterprises.” Of the remainder, 662 falls under 
Small enterprises; 78 under medium and only 6 are considered larger enterprises (equally 
to or greater than 100 employees). In terms of percentages the distributions are 89.83%, 
9.03%, 1.06% and 0.08%. Hence, according to this survey, over 99% of the firms in 
South Sudan fall under the SME. 
Furthermore, of the ten states, Central Equatoria has the largest number of the businesses 
surveyed. About 37% of the sample comprised firms located in Central Equatoria State. 
Again, of the six largest firms, four of them come from Central Equatoria State. It is 
logical to conclude that about 70% of the larger firms are located in Central Equatoria, 
mostly in Juba were the center of the government is located. While 84% of the firms were 
listed as restaurants or shops, Juba had 2,683 enterprises out of total 7333 firms surveyed 
(NBS, 2010). 
In addition, all 7333 firms had combined number of employees totaling to 22,193. It is 
not surprising that about 10,546 or 48% of all employees from these businesses come 
 158 
from Central Equatoria. This is because majority of firms come from Juba and they also 
happen to be largest firms compared to ones we find in other surveyed cities. Not only do 
more firms operate in Central Equatoria but also those enterprises create more 
employment opportunities than in any other states. 
About14% (1,029) of the business operating in South Sudan was created between 1923 
and 2004. The remaining 86% (6,304) of the firms were established between 2005 and 
2010. In other words, more businesses in South Sudan came into being after the CPA. We 
now turn to the analysis of the detailed survey undertaken for this study.   
4.4 Analysis of the Survey Results 
The data on SMEs and commercial banks for this essay come from fieldwork conducted 
in three of the ten states in South Sudan between July 2011 and February 2012. Survey 
questionnaires and interviews were used to obtain the data from individual SMEs, as well 
as from commercial banks, and selected institutions, such as the Central Bank of South 
Sudan, Chamber of Commerce, Agriculture and Investment and the Ministry of 
Commerce, Investment and Industry. 
Juba, Wau and Aweil, which are the capitals of Central Equatorial, Western Bahr el 
Ghazal and Northern Bahr el Ghazal states, respectively, were chosen as sites for 
investigation. Based on ease of mobility or proximity, two more cities (Yei and Mayom 
Angok) were added. Within these locations, every business or firm in the city selected 
stood an equal chance of being sampled, because each street was identified and every kth 
element was sampled (kth refers to a systematic sampling in which every other element is 
included in the sample through random walk- skip method). 
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4.4.1 Survey of South Sudan Commercial Banks 
While there are currently 25 commercial banks operating in South Sudan, this analysis 
focuses only on eight banks present at the time of this research. I set up interviews and 
administered questionnaires to all eight banks operating in South Sudan in July 2011 
through February 2012. I have also supplemented this with data from other sources such 
as the central bank. 
Table 4.1 provides an overview of the commercial banks operating in South Sudan in 
2011. At the time of this survey, all lent less than 50% of their deposits as loans. Kenya 
Commercial Bank (KCB) leads the pack in terms of both branches and total employment. 
Altogether, foreign banks (KCB, Equity, and CBE) have more employees than the local 
banks (Agriculture Bank, Buffalo, Ivory, MTDB and Nile Commercial Bank). 
We theorize that more South Sudanese will open up bank accounts as they earn incomes 
from jobs following peace. Even with little individual deposits, oil transfers to the state 
coffers have been significant source of bank deposits until the shutdown in January 2012. 
To assess how banks are working to promote financial inclusion, the survey asked all 
eight banks to record their account holders in two successive months: July and August 
2011. As Table 4.2 shows, the number of bank accounts was growing rapidly at this time. 
Notwithstanding this growth, the fact remains that the bankable population in South 
Sudan is still insignificant. As this survey shows, those holding accounts as of August 
2011 are approximately 2% of the country’s population. Compared to her neighbors, 
South Sudan has fewer adult populations with bank accounts at formal financial 
institutions.  
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Table 4.3 reports data on the extent of bank lending to SMEs and other borrowers in 
South Sudan. At the time of assessment, five out of the eight banks issued loans. The 
other three indicated that they were not lending yet as business environment was 
uncertain due to impending referendum and lack of acceptable collateral and property 
rights laws. There is a wide range in the size of loans approved from a minimum of 
$3,704 to a maximum of $1,851,852. 
The survey asked banks to rate what they consider the major barrier to extending credit to 
SMEs. The barriers listed included lack of collateral, lack of profitability, limited 
information, illiteracy, and distance from the bank premises. When banks were asked to 
state one obstacle that they thought was hindering them to extend credit to all, all eight 
banks chose lack of collateral. 
Table 4.4 reports data on how much banks lent over the years and the number of loans to 
SMEs. We find here that Agriculture Bank of Sudan had issued more loans to qualified 
farmers and small-scale producers. Ivory Bank had made the least loans, while Equity 
Bank is second to Agriculture Bank of Sudan in terms of number of customers served so 
far. 
Table 4.5 presents information on how four banks described their lending to SMEs. That 
the remaining four banks were silent or muted about lending to SMEs underscores the 
limited access to finance in the new nation. 
Table 4.6 lists responses when the banks were asked to rate borrower characteristics from 
major to never an obstacle. All banks considered the characteristics of the owners and 
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collateral as important when lending to SMEs. Only three banks considered any of the 
five-Cs—(1) characters of the firm owners, (2) capacity of the firm, (3) collateral 
requirement, (4) firm initial capital, and finally (5) macroeconomic conditions not to be a 
problem. 
Table 4.7 shows the customized products that each bank provided, and the names of 
development institutions partnering with them to pool resources and lend to SMEs. Banks 
also described what they considered to be role of mobile technology, steps taken to 
improve customer services, and steps they deemed necessary to expand the access 
frontier. For example, Agriculture Bank of Sudan lends to small producers and small 
farmers. It partners with NGOs, EU, IFEAD, IDA and World Bank as a way of securing 
loans to small-scale famers.  
The Agricultural Bank of Sudan made the case that mobile technology reduces 
administration costs and provides real -time information to customers on loan rates, 
payments, and other exchanges. A number of banks see application of IT as a means to 
improve services and flexibility in collateral requirements as innovations to expand 
access to borrowers. 
To find out whether SMEs have a higher default rate compared to larger borrowers, the 
survey asked each bank to give time series data on non-performing loans to SMEs and 
large business. Table 4.8 presents that information for each bank. Of all the banks that 
have responded, Agriculture Bank of Sudan gives the highest default rate (see for 
example, the default rate was 41% in 2008). But in asking what the banks would like the 
government or Central Bank of South Sudan to do to encourage them lend to SMEs, they 
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stated that they would like the government to do more in providing a conducive policy 
environment. Lack of legal framework affecting transactions and multiple taxations also 
comes up frequently in the interviews (see Table 4.9). 
At the time of independence, South Sudan had eight microfinance institutions with 
women as the majority borrowers. An overview of their operations is reported in Table 
4.10. SUMI has the largest client base and Frontier Finance has the smallest share. 
To put everything in context, only 2% of South Sudan population holds accounts at 
formal financial institutions (we hope that growth of banking sector will improve this 
situation; see Tables 4.11 and 4.12). This pales in comparison to African average figures. 
While only 24% all adults in Sub-Sahara Africa have bank accounts, adult population 
with accounts at formal financial institutions in  Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Sudan 
stand at 42%, 20%, 17% and 7% respectively (Word Bank, 2012; see Table 1.2).  
Also these results on the banking sector shows one common phenomenon nowadays that 
is commercial banks are partnering with international financial institutions to pool 
resources to lend to SMEs. As an illustration, the World Bank has an active policy in 
supporting SMEs across the globe. For instance, it approved $2.8 billion in 2004 and 
provided $10 billion to promote SME sector between 2000 and 2005 (Ayyagari, Beck & 
Demirguc-Kunt, 2007; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 2005).    
4.4.2 Survey of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises  
This section provides a descriptive overview of the South Sudan SME data. In total, 334 
SME firms were surveyed. As shown in Table 4.13, 72.5% of the sample comes from 
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Central Equatoria State where capital, Juba, is situated. Two reasons accounted for the 
high representation of this one state. First, Juba is the headquarters of the government and 
as a previous Business Listing Survey 2010 indicates, many registered businesses operate 
there.  
Second, the concentration in Juba was in part due to logistics and difficulties of mobility 
across ten states. The remainder of the sample comes from the states of Northern and 
Western Bahr el Ghazal, accounting for 23% and 4.5%, respectively. 
Table 4.14 provides a breakdown in terms of cities. Juba, Aweil and Wau are the capital 
cities of their states, namely Central Equatoria, Northern and Western Bahr el Ghazal, 
respectively. Two additional cities included in the sample, Yei and Mayom Angok, come 
from Central Equatoria and Northern Bahr el Ghazal States, respectively.  
As reported in Table 4.15, men make up over 80% of firm owners in the sample. With the 
legacy of war and unyielding traditional values which still consider formal business a 
male domain, it is not surprising that less than 20% of the population engaging in 
commercial enterprises is female. Women in South Sudan remain concentrated in 
subsistence agriculture and unpaid household production and are largely “missing” in the 
markets. Overall, 1.5% of the sample declined to respond to the gender question. 
Turning to the ethnicity and nationality of the firm owners, Table 4.16 shows that about 
30% of the firms in South Sudan are owned by foreigners. This validates the long-held 
public view that Kenyans, Ugandans, Ethiopians, and other Africans have flocked to Juba 
to exploit business opportunities. Included in this category “foreigners” are Sudanese 
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from the North, whether they are from Darfur, the Nuba Mountains, Southern Kordofan 
or Khartoum.  
In collecting these data, I came to the conclusion that South Sudan’s government has 
been friendly to countries and neighbors that gave a helping hand during the dark days of 
the liberation struggle. In addition, the public was and remains tolerant toward foreign 
businesses. 
While the Dinka ethnic group is about 20% of the South Sudan population (5th Sudan 
Population and Housing Census, 2008), they represent 33.2% of the sample. The main 
investigator and four assistants were all Dinka; hence Dinka respondents may have been 
oversampled or language barriers over English or Juba Arabic. About 9% of the 
respondents declined to indicate their ethnic identity, reflecting the fact that some people 
in social settings are uncomfortable disclosing this for fear of the unknown (unexpected 
reprisal following disclosing certain personal information). 
Table 4.17 reports the legal status of firms in the sample. Over 70% considered 
themselves sole proprietors. Most SMEs in South Sudan are family or individual owned, 
hence the prevalence of sole proprietorship. Next in prevalence, 13.2% are private limited 
companies and 9.6% are partnerships. Some of these latter ones are business partnerships 
between South Sudanese partners and foreign nationals, an arrangement which is 
prevalent in fuel stations. 
Table 4.18 reports firm size by current employment. The picture is consistent with the 
finding in Table 4.17 that most SMEs in South Sudan are sole proprietorships. About 
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70% of SMEs fall in the “microenterprise” category defined as a firm whose size ranges 
between one and four employees (small, medium and large enterprises are defined 
analogously, see Table 4.18). About 26% of the sampled SMEs are small enterprises, 4% 
are medium enterprises and only one is a large enterprise (this was a bottling water 
company). Assuming that this sample is reasonably representative of the population, it 
follows then almost all firms in South Sudan are SMEs. An examination of Table 4.19 
which reports firm size by gender of the owner shows no notable difference in this 
respect between male-owned and female-owned firms.  
Medium and large enterprises are located exclusively in Juba in Central Equatoria State, 
as shown in Table 4.20. Microenterprises account for more than 85% of SMEs in 
Northern and Western Bahr el Ghazal, whereas in Central Equatoria State they account 
for 64%. 
Table 4.21 shows the breakdown of the firms by sector. Retailing is the largest sector in 
the sample. Business services (haircuts, salons, printing shops, etc), wholesalers, hotels 
and restaurants are also sizable by accounting for 9.3%, 9%, 6.6% and, 6.9%, 
respectively. While South Sudan had a comparative advantage in agriculture (abundant 
water, and large arable lands), agriculture is not commercialized but mainly subsistence. 
There was only one agribusiness firm in the sample. 
Table 4.22 dissects the sample into sectors by gender of the firm owner. We find that 
88.8% of all SMEs in retail are owned by men. Men dominate all other sectors except 
restaurants, where 54.6% of SMEs are owned by women. 
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Table 4.23 shows the sectoral distribution of firms by size. Microenterprises predominate 
in the retail, business service, wholesale, restaurant and repair shop sectors. The hotel 
sector has the largest share of medium enterprises. 
4.4.3 SME Self-Appraisal on Technology and Managerial Competency 
One of the objectives of this dissertation is to assess the role of technology in enabling 
access to financial services. It is on this basis that the questionnaire asked firm owners to 
indicate whether they frequently use ATM withdrawals, visits to the nearest bank branch, 
or personal safekeeping for their routine cash needs. Because there are few ATMs in 
Juba, many firms use banks. In our sample as reported in Table 4.24, about 7% of the 
respondents use ATMs, whereas over 50% and 30% visit banks and keep cash in the shop 
vaults, respectively (the remaining 10% of the sample did not respond). The banking 
sector is still weakly developed with no known financial regulator like FDIC or consumer 
watchdogs (see SSDP, 2011).  
When asked whether the enterprise is doing well or not, 6.6% of all respondents think 
that managerial incompetence and neglect to adopt technology were to blame for poor 
performance, whereas 33% believe that they are doing well because of managerial 
competency and technology (Table 4.25). Regrettably, more than half of the firms blame 
an “unfavorable business environment” (such as multiple tax rates at point of entry, 
irregular enforcement or confiscatory attitude among officials) as responsible for poor 
performance (World Bank, 2011). Blaming outsiders for their woes has been established 
as one typical bias when surveying firms because some firms exaggerate or underestimate 
some obstacles (Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 2006). 
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4.4.4 Credit Allocation 
This survey confirms that financial access in South Sudan is limited. As Table 4.26 
shows, only 46 SMEs— 13.8% of all firms in the sample—had ever applied for loans 
from any source. Of these, roughly, 69.6% received loans while 30.4% did not; meaning 
the odds of an SME applicant applying for a loan and being rejected are 30.4%. 
Table 4.27 shows that about 68.8% of the loans received came from commercial banks 
(see Chapter 3 for similar exposition). About 13% and 19%, respectively, came from 
microfinance institutions and informal finance (money lenders and family members). 
Based on the fieldwork observations, moneylenders are not really common in South 
Sudan, at least as creditors for SMEs. 
Of those who have received loans, 80% are men (Table 4.28). This is equivalent to 8.9% 
of the SMEs that are headed by men. The women who received loans amount to only 
10.3% of all women in the sample. 
Turning to the sectoral distribution of the loans, retail business and hotels received more 
than half the loans. We see that 7.5% of all firms in retail received loans, compared to 
27.3% of firms in hotels (Table 4.29). Neither business service firms nor, rather 
surprisingly, manufacturing firms had ever received a loan even though they have 
applied. 
As Table 4.30 shows, one-half of all approved loans were received by microenterprises, 
43.8% went to small enterprise and medium enterprise category received 9.4%.   
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Again, expressed as a percent of each size class totals, we see a different picture: 6.4%, 
16.3% and 21.4% of the microenterprise, small enterprise and medium enterprises 
received loans, respectively. This is not surprising because microenterprises are 70% of 
the sample. 
Table 4.31 presents all the firms that have never applied for loan. The table identifies a 
category called “credit constrained” because they reported a desire for credit but have not 
applied for one reason or another. This category accounted for 63% of the total number of 
firms, of which 30% of the firms did not apply because they thought they would be 
denied loans, 7% thought application process is too cumbersome, 20% feared not meeting 
collateral requirements, and 5% considered interest rates too high. The other 37% of the 
firms that did not apply were not credit constrained, reporting that they did not need a 
loan.  
Table 4.32 reports differences by gender. Similar percentages of men and women were 
credit constrained. Table 4.33 takes a look at why firms did not apply for loans by sector. 
In three sectors—business services, construction and restaurant— half or more of the 
firms responded that they did not need loans. Among credit constrained firms, most did 
not apply because they doubted approval in all sectors except retail, manufacturing and 
repair shops, for which collateral requirements were reported as the main reasons. 
Table 4.34 shows that 71.9% of all loans approved went to firms in Central Equatoria 
state, the same state with the largest number of firms in the sample (see Table 4.1). The 
percentage of SMEs receiving loans was highest in Western Bahr el Ghazal State, but this 
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finding should be interpreted with caution due to the relatively small size of the sample 
there. 
Table 4.35 compares loans across states by lender. Of all loans in Central Equatoria, 
78.3% come from commercial banks, 13% from microfinance institutions and 9% from 
moneylenders and family members. Firms in Northern Bahr el Ghazal received smaller 
percentage of loans from commercial banks. The survey asked the firms to rank how each 
source of credit is a constraint on firm growth. As shown in Table 4.36, 35.9% rank lack 
of access to formal finance as a major constraint; 29.3% rank lack of access to 
microfinance as a major constraint, and 21.9% say the same thing for informal finance. In 
this analysis, as typical of African economies (Nkurunziza, 2008; Chapter 3), SMEs thus 
rank lack of access to formal finance as the most constraint. 
Table 4.37 breaks down financing constrains by gender. It shows that 100% of all 
women-owned firms consider lack of access to formal finance, microfinance and 
informal finance as a constraint. For men, the figures for the same sources of credit are 
82%, 82% and 83% respectively. The statistics in this table seem to imply that access to 
credit is more binding barrier for women compared to men. Besides traditions, culture 
and home-making/household production, it could be one reason why women are fewer in 
businesses in the first place.  
In terms of firm size, lack of access to finance tends to become perceived as a greater 
constraint as size increases. This seems like an anomaly because as firm sizes increases, 
theory predicts that firms turn to external source of financing (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & 
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Levine, 2005; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 2005). Intuitively, large firm 
exposure to external financing and fear for loan rejection could account for this anomaly. 
Table 4.38 shows that 79.4%, 93% and 100% of microenterprises, small enterprises and 
medium enterprises, respectively, cited lack of formal finance as a major or moderate 
constraint, respectively. For microfinance and informal finance, the percentages were 
more stable, meaning they remain constant. 
Table 4.39 summarizes credit access by grouping the firms into four broad categories. 
“Successful borrowers” are those that applied and received loans, while “denied” are 
those that applied and were rejected. “Discouraged borrowers” are those who chose not to 
apply for one reason or another, whereas non-borrowers are those who indicated no 
desire for loans. 
Table 4.40 summaries responses to whether the firm considers lack of access to market as 
an additional constraint. Of the 280 firms that responded, the majority (64.3%) consider it 
a major constraint, while only 5% consider it not an issue. This finding is not surprising 
because much of South Sudan has no infrastructure and is cut off from main towns during 
the rainy season. Lack of feeder roads and access to major commercial centres is a major 
issue. 
Table 4.41 dissects Table 4.40 into four categories by size. As firm size increases from 
microenterprise to medium enterprise, the major weight put on access to market increases 
from 50.2% to 71.4%. The one large firm, however, reported that it was not an issue. 
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Again, this is consistent with the literature, in that, larger firms report lower financing 
obstacles (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & Laeven, 2006). 
More than half male SME owners (55.7%) say lack of access to market is a major 
constraint, compared to 44.8% of women owners, as shown in Table 4.42. It is said that 
firms that use more external finance tend to report greater financing obstacles (Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 2008). In this case, we can postulate that since firms 
headed by men are likely to seek credit, they are more likely to express greater financing 
obstacles. 
Agribusiness, hotels and manufacturing are the top three sectors in terms of the 
percentage that rank lack of access to market as a major constraint on firm performance, 
as shown in Table 4.43. 
4.4.5 Summary Statistics for Selected Variables  
Table 4.44 presents summary statistics for other variables in the survey. On average, a 
firm takes about one year to fully officially launch. The necessary paperwork, as well as 
the savings process or raising seed capital to start a firm, takes time. Some firms have 
spent three years preparing. The average firm has been in operation for three years, and 
these were established following the 2005 CPA. Some firms have been in operation for 
less than a year. 
Since many firms in this survey are microenterprises, it is not surprising that the mean 
firm size is five employees. The maximum is 100 employees (the same firm reported 120 
employees in response to another question). The 2011 mean revenue of over $50,000 is 
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quite high but this is because of some outliers. One firm, for instance, reported an annual 
income of almost $4 million. Median firm income is $10,000. The minimum income is 
$318, and this is consistent with poverty levels in the country. Some firms that won oil 
contracts during the reconstruction era/interim period made very high annual income, and 
these help to account for wide range. 
The mean level of education for firm owners in the sample is quite high. The mean 
sample level of education of the head of the enterprise is 11 years. The minimum level of 
education is zero (never attended school) and the maximum (up to the university level) 
numbers of years spent in school is 19 years.  This is lower, however, than the average 
education level of firm owner in Kenya (14.5 years; see Essay on Kenya, Chapter 3).  
While most firms are in Juba, the average firm is 140 miles away from the capital. We 
will test the hypothesis that the further away from Juba the firm is, the slimmer the 
chance of getting access to credit. 
Finally, among firms that had access to credit, the minimum loan received is $100 and 
the maximum is $60,000. 
Table 4.45 presents simple correlations among the firm’s employment, revenue and the 
amounts of the loan received. Employment level and revenue are strongly correlated (r = 
.85). The loan amount is weakly correlated with employment (r = .15) and uncorrelated 
with revenue (r = .002).  As far as we expect larger firms to receive bigger loans, this 
suggests that employment may serve as a better proxy for size than revenue. 
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4.5 Econometric Analysis of Access to Credit by SMEs 
4.5.1 Econometric Model 
This section endeavors to assess SME loan approval. We test a relationship between loan 
approved and a range of factors, including gender, size, distance, and sector. Loan 
approved is a dummy variable indicating whether or not credit was obtained; size is 
measured by the number of employees in a firm; distance is measured in miles between 
Juba and the SME city; and the sector is a dummy representing whether firm considers 
itself a retail or not (dummy = 1 for retail, 0 otherwise). 
In addition to these core factors, we have a number of control variables including, the 
interest rate, length of schooling in years, and dummies for SME nationality (foreign 
owner = 1, 0= South Sudanese), ethnicity, complaints about judicial system, and 
bureaucratic constraints, ICT use, wholesale activity and access to market. The list of 
variables with their definition is provided in Table 4.52. 
We hypothesize that SMEs in or closer to Juba are more likely to get credit; hence 
distance should have a negative impact on loan approved. If there is a gender bias, 
women will experience credit discrimination. The firm size or employment is expected to 
enhance credit approval, insofar as size of the firm acts as an indicator of profitability or 
signal to lenders that loan repayment will not be an issue (Beck et al., 2006; Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 2008). We do not expect any sectoral bias a priori but we 
hypothesize that foreign firms may have an advantage because of perceived expertise, 
credit history and name recognition to secure loan approval. On ethnicity, the impact 
could be ambiguous. Being the dominant tribe, Dinka SME-owners could have 
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preferential treatment in Juba in the banking sector. On the other hand, they are mostly in 
rural South Sudan or away from Juba which means that they have no knowledge about 
availability or unable to access credit. On account of distance, they have slimmer 
probability of accessing loan approval.  
The dependent variable, loan approved, and the list of independent variables elaborated 
above feeds into a regression whose results help to answer the following questions: 
(i) Does access to credit vary with distance from Juba? 
(ii) Does access to credit differ between SMEs headed by men and by women? 
(iii) Does access to credit differ between foreign-owned and South Sudanese 
owned SMEs? 
(iv) Among South Sudanese entrepreneurs of different ethnic backgrounds, does 
access to credit differ?  
The general estimator equation can be formulated as follows: 
        𝒚𝒊= 𝜒𝑖′𝜷+ 𝜺і                                                                                                                 (1) 
Where 𝑦𝑖 is the loan approved dummy for firm i, and 𝜒𝑖′  is a vector of determinants of 
loan approved as discussed above and 𝜀𝑖 is a random error term. Given that the dependent 
variable is a binary variable, the model above cannot be estimated with OLS because it 
does not meet the necessary conditions ((Dyankin & Moffat, 2002). Specifically, we 
cannot guarantee that estimates of 𝑦𝑖 lie within the interval {0, 1}. The binary response 
model calls for probit regression. The probit estimate model is specified as follows:       𝐏𝐫 (𝒚 = 𝟏 ∕ 𝒙) = 𝚽(𝒙𝒊′𝜷 )                                                                                        (2) 
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Where ɸ (phi) is a cumulative distribution function of standard normal distribution, 𝑥 ʹ 
=(x1…xk), Pr signifies probability and і refers to individual firm. We use the z-score to 
infer increase or decrease in probability (pr) by b unit. In other words, an increase in 𝑥 
changes Z or probit index by b standard deviation units.  
The above equation is estimated to test whether access to loan approved or access to 
credit is influenced by firm characteristics, notably size, distance to Juba, gender of the 
owner, and sector while controlling for time to launch company, years in operations, 
education level, ethnicity, the interest rate, and access to market. Based on theory and 
empirical evidence on credit access to finance, the base model will include four key 
determinants (1) size, (2) distance, (3) gender, and (4) sector. Other factors of interest 
will be tested case by case. With these variables for base equation, we would thus like to 
fit this model: 
   Pr (𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙 = 1) = Φ(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟+𝛽2𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽3𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽4𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟) (3)     
4.5.2 Determinants of Loan Approval: Econometric Results 
Table 4.46 presents the results of the probit regressions for determinants of loan approval. 
A look at the base regression in model 1 is telling. Gender, distance and sector of the firm 
seem not to be significant in explaining the variation in loan approval. However, in the 
first column we see that only size does matter, its coefficient being statistically significant 
at the 10% level and its sign in the expected direction. The likelihood of receiving a loan 
increases by 0.014 with a one unit increase in employment. This confirms the finding that 
larger firms are less financially constrained ((Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 
2005, 2008). 
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We see no significant gender bias. For distance from Juba, the coefficient is significant if 
we include all relevant variables in the model (see models 2 through 3) and it has the 
expected sign: as distance increases, the likelihood of getting approved diminishes.  
The coefficient on ethnicity is positive and significant, suggesting that access to market 
interact with ethnicity to determine loan approval (see column 3). Foreign firms seem to 
have some advantage in getting loans when we assess the full model. 
4.5.3 Obstacles to Access to Finance by SMEs: Econometric Results 
The previous section discussed the factors that affect the actual loan received. In this 
section, we examine how individual SMEs rate access to formal finance, informal finance 
and microfinance. The questionnaire asks whether a given firm considers access to 
formal finance, microfinance and informal finance (money lenders, out of pocket 
contributions, family or friends,) as a major, moderate or minor obstacle or never an 
obstacle. These ordinal responses range from one to four, in that order. We collapsed 
financing constraint into a binary variable, whereby major and moderate were coded as 1 
and minor and never as 0. Then we ran regressions using the probit model, taking this as 
the dependent variable. Regressions for microfinance yielded no significant results, and 
so they are not reported here. Tables 4.47 and 4.48 report estimation results for formal 
and informal finance constraints.  
Table 4.47 reports regression results for whether firms considered access to formal 
finance as an obstacle or not. While only three of the six model specifications are 
reported here, the results show that women are more likely to indicate that they face 
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obstacle in access to formal finance. The coefficients on the gender dummy variable are 
positive and statistically significant. 
The coefficient on distance from Juba is also statistically significant but in the opposite 
direction than expected. This is surprising, because we expected that firms would express 
more hardship as they move away from Juba. Nonetheless, the results would still make 
sense if rural firms have relied on informal sources of finance such that they do not even 
bother about formal finance in town. Alternatively, it may be that the majority of them 
have no idea of what is (or is not) available. This could explain why the further away 
from Juba, the more firms would indicate access to formal finance as a minor or never an 
obstacle. 
Furthermore, wholesalers are more likely to indicate lack of access to formal finance as a 
constraint. This makes sense because these categories of firms, located in urban centers, 
may have greater need for financing. None of the other variables were statistically 
significant. 
Table 4.48 reports comparable results regarding access to informal finance. While the 
signs are in the right direction, the coefficient on gender is statistically insignificant. 
Personal contributions, families and friends are the main sources of informal finance as 
there are no known moneylenders. Distance is again significant, with SMEs further away 
from Juba showing fewer tendencies to report this as a constraint.  While this seems to 
contradict explanation in Table 4.47, it would still make sense because firms in rural 
areas do not regard both distance as a major constraint in informal finance. As for formal 
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finance, the fact that they have no knowledge about what is available or not available 
makes distance a less constraint. 
These findings confirm what already exists in the literature.  Studies have shown that 
many firms consider financing and legal constraints as the most constraining factor and 
mostly importantly, firms in least developed countries tend to report these financing 
factors (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2005).  
4.5.4 Credit Constrained and Unconstrained Firms: Econometric Results 
For the firms that chose not to apply for credit, the questionnaire seeks the rationale 
behind their actions. Some did not apply because they did not need a loan, others thought 
they would be rejected, or reported that collateral requirements or interest rate is too high 
or that applications are burdensome. Those that do not need loans are considered 
unconstrained and those that chose not to apply for one reasons or another are considered 
as constrained. 
While core independent variables remain the same as above, the dependent variable, 
credit constrained, is a binary variable taking the value of zero for firms that need no loan 
and one for those who chose not to apply for one reason or another. Table 4.49 reports 
results for the credit constraint. From these results, distance does matter. Firms away 
from Juba are more constrained on average. There is no significant gender bias. But more 
literate SMEs, wholesales and business services are more likely to be constrained due to 
self-selection out. Normally, we would expect SMEs owned by more literate to be less 
constrained because of wider networks, past credit history, higher profitability or ability 
to place collateral if demanded. However, there are two reasons that could account for 
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this anomaly. First, the initial conditions or business environment in the early days of the 
CPA were unfavorable to all businesses. Second, those who are more literate live in 
towns, near services, tend to be more vocal regarding their needs. 
The category “business services” includes haircut shops, beauty salons, repair shops, and 
printing booths.  Some of these business services are run by few individuals, mostly the 
owners, hence the size of such firms are small. While they have declined to apply for loan 
for one reason or another, these regression results show that they are nevertheless credit 
constrained. The retail sector is significantly constrained once we include all variables in 
the model. On the other hand, level of education of the SME owner is positive and 
statistically significant when we include all variables except collateral requirements, 
suggesting that literate SMEs are likely to read the probability of loan rejection and 
decide not to apply. 
4.5.5 Determinants of Loan Application: Econometric Results 
The survey asks the question: have you ever applied for loan before? The respondents 
either say yes or no. We take this as a binary dependent variable. We wanted to explore 
the factors that influence the decision to apply for a loan. Table 4.50 presents the results 
from robust probit regressions.  As the firm size increases, the probability of SME 
applying for loan increases. The magnitude ranges from about 0.016 per additional 
employee (column 1) to 0.08(column 5).These results confirm as expected, that as firm 
size increases, it is more likely to apply for credit. 
On the other hand, firms which cite high interest rate as an obstacle are more likely to 
apply (columns 2 and 5). Access to market is also statistically significant, suggesting that 
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firms without access to market are less likely to apply for loan (column 5). Other 
variables including poor infrastructure, education, launch time, bureaucratic constraint 
and years in business seem to have no significant effect on the likelihood to apply for 
loans. 
4.5.6 Robustness Test for Loan Approval Estimates 
We examine whether loan approval estimates are robust. Robustness test is performed to 
tease out selection bias in the estimates. The survey questionnaire asks a given firm if it 
has applied for loan and if so, has it been approved or not. This question sequencing 
introduces a selection dynamic in loan approval process but we get only to observe 
outcomes from those who have self-selected first to apply before we know whether they 
have been approved or not.  
Therefore, following Heckman (1979) who first formulates selection bias as a form of 
omitted variable and subsequent authors such as Berinsky (2004), the argument for 
selection bias is motivated as follows:  First, assume the outcome equation is as given in 
equation (1). We make further assumption, that variable y is observed only and only if a 
certain unobserved latent variable exceeds a given threshold.  
Thus, let 𝑍𝑖∗ be a latent variable, indicating a propensity to be included in the sample, 𝜔𝑖′ 
is a vector of covariates, α is a vector of coefficients and 𝜇𝑖 is a random disturbance for 
unit i for selection equation, respectively. Along these lines, we have selection equation:    
  𝑍𝑖∗ = 𝜔𝑖′α + 𝜇𝑖                                                                                       (4) 
  𝑍𝑖 = �1 𝑖𝑓 𝑍𝑖∗ > 0;0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                                                                (5) 
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Precisely, the selection equation is a probit: 
Pr (𝑍𝑖 = 1) = Ф(α′𝜔𝑖)                                                                                          (6) 
For this analysis, there are some factors that may cause selection bias, for instance, firms 
closer to Juba, those whose owners are literate and foreigners are more likely to apply, 
hence selecting themselves into the sample. On the other hands, firm away from Juba or 
illiterates are more likely select out and we end up not observing them in the sample, 
ceteris paribus.  
We run several robustness tests and our results are presented in Table 4.51. We examine 
the base equation against a number of likely candidates for selection dynamic. Reading 
out Fisher’s Z transformation (/athrho) in column 1, we cannot rule out presence of some 
selection bias. However, when we deselect robust standard errors and opt for a default, 
we find different results; selection bias is no longer an issue (see column 2). None of 
variables of interest explains a variation in the outcome equation. The same is true in 
column 3; we see that athrho is not statistically significant and no variables in the 
outcome equation are statistically significant as well. We could not include all four 
variables in selection equation because of failure problem. In short, though, there is 
selection bias it is not a big issue as the above discussion shows (Table 4.51).  
4.6 What Have We Learned from the Econometric Results? 
From the econometric results, we find that distance, gender and size are important factors 
in explaining the variation in the probability to apply for loan, receive loan or get rejected 
or rating lack of formal finance as a major constraint on firm performance. To some 
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extent, the sector and the nationality appears to be also integral to access to finance under 
some conditions. We highlight below some of these salient findings.  
4.6.1 Radius of Finance  
In terms of the actual loan received, firms away from Juba are less likely to receive credit 
(Table 4.46). However, when you ask the firms whether they consider access to formal 
and informal finance as a constraint, firms away from Juba are equally less likely to cite a 
constraint (Tables 4.47 and 4.48). It is also evident from the econometric results that 
firms away from Juba are less likely to apply. They are thus credit constrained (Table 
4.49). These results are an eye opener in the sense that distance does matter.  This is what 
I call the radius of finance. Firms that are in close proximity to Juba are more likely to 
receive loans.  
At the same time, we find that firms away from Juba do not cite access to credit as a 
major constraint. First, they have no idea about the existence of these services, 
reaffirming the proverbial phrase “out of sight, out of mind”. Second, such firms rely on 
informal finance. Therefore, in explaining or teasing out factors that affect access to 
finance, it is important to consider distance.   
4.6.2 Gender Bias in Access to Formal Credit 
While gender seems not to be a significant determinant of the actual loan approved 
(Table 4.46), there is a gender bias when it comes to financing obstacles. Women are 
more likely to say that access to formal credit is a major constraint (Table 4.47). Of 
course, it makes sense that they rate access to informal credit as a less constraint because 
this is their main source of finance (4.48). Larger firms are more likely to apply for loan 
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(Table 4.50). Clearly, there is a gender bias in whether firm considers lack of access to 
formal credit as an obstacle. There is empirical evidence in the literature that women face 
greater obstacle to accessing external finance (Asiedu, Freeman & Nti-Addae, 2012). 
4.6.3 Firm Size and Access to Credit 
In case of the actual loan approved, larger firms are more likely to receive a loan (Table 
4.46) and are less likely to rate access to formal credit as minor or no obstacle at all 
(Table 4.47). Gender matters. Women are more likely to indicate lack of access to credit 
(Tables 4.47 and 4.48).  
This could be both a reality and a perception since there is a typical regularity in literature 
which argues that some firms are likely to shift blame to financing obstacles when in fact 
they have some blames to carry (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 2005). Similarly, 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Laeven (2006) find that older, larger and foreign owned firms 
tend to report less financing obstacles. 
4.7 Conclusion 
This essay has interesting findings with regard to access to finance in South Sudan. The 
essay studied access to credit by SMEs and the factors that determine whether a firm 
applies for loans, whether it receives credit or gets rejected, as well as how each firm 
characterizes the impact of access to finance on their performance. Because this is a 
discrete choice model, we employ probit model as appropriate tool to analyze and gauge 
the impact of each factor on the probability of loan approval or rejection, and the firms’ 
perception of finance as a major or minor constraint.  
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The essay validates the role of three important factors with respect to access to finance. 
There is an urban bias in the sense that firms further away from the capital city Juba are 
less likely to access credit.  Such is the radius of finance which tends to cluster in the 
center. The radius of finance also makes distant firms to be less likely to rate access to 
credit as a major constraint, because they have no idea about the existence of formal 
credit services or they resort to local informal sources for financing enterprise operations. 
The solutions may lie in spreading out financial services to reach both the unbanked and 
bottom of the pyramid in the rural areas. This strategy could go a long way to ameliorate 
gender bias, since women on average are more likely to experience a constraint to access 
for formal finance. 
In terms of size, larger firms as opposed to smaller firms have an advantage in accessing 
credit. This is the trend the world over, and it is one reason to devise ways for expanding 
the access frontier for all enterprises, especially for SMEs which are financially 
constrained. 
In analyzing the current state of SME access to finance in South Sudan, five main 
findings emerge: 
• First, about 70% of businesses fall in the “microenterprise” category, defined as a 
firm whose size ranges between one and four employees (small, medium-sized 
and large enterprises are defined analogously. About 26% of the sampled SMEs 
are small enterprises, 4% are medium enterprises, and only one is a large 
enterprise (this was a bottling water company). Assuming then that this sample is 
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reasonably representative of the population, it follows then almost all firms in 
South Sudan are SMEs. 
•  Second, the access to finance is inversely related to the distance from Juba, hence 
validating the hypothesis of rural-urban bias in resource allocation. Findings from 
this field survey indicate that about 72% of all loans went to Juba. Nevertheless, 
we find that firms away from Juba do not cite access to credit as a major 
constraint. First, many of them have no idea about the existence of these services. 
Second, such firms rely on informal finance from friends, family members or out-
of pockets, consistent with the evidence in literature. In addition, other 
impediments such as collateral requirement, bank bureaucracies, need for special 
connections or any other access issues tend to affect small firms the most. Such a 
firm tends instead to choose to internally or informally finance, which is in line 
with the pecking order hypothesis which states that firms tend to exhaust internal 
financing before turning to outside financing sources. 
• Third, small size is a disadvantage. The study finds that larger firms have greater 
chances of receiving loans than SMEs. This is consistent with the literature which 
finds that the smallest firms face the most binding financial and legal constraints. 
The authors state that any improvements in legal and financial sector 
developments goes a great length to benefit the smallest firm the most and that 
firms dependent on external finance grow faster  or bigger.  
• Fourth, SMES are more likely to self-select out of the credit market if they 
perceive that they will be rejected due to lack of collateral and credit history. 
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Based on this analysis, wholesalers and business services, for instance, are more 
likely to indicate the lack of access to finance as a major constraint. 
• Fifth, while gender seems not to be a significant determinant in the actual loan 
approvals, women are more likely to rate lack of formal finance as a major and 
informal finance as minor constraint. This finding is similar to what Asiedu, 
Freeman and Nti-Addae (2012) find that white women did not face discrimination 
in access to credit and paid lower interest rate than white men in 1998 in the USA. 
Of course, huge disparities exist in access to credit between black-owned, 
Hispanic-owned and white-owned businesses: the first two groups face some 
discrimination either due to pure prejudice or statistical discrimination. But for 
Sub Sahara Africa in particular, other studies show that female-owned firms are 
more financially constrained than male-owned firms. 
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Table 4.1: Characteristics of Commercial Banks in South Sudan, 2011 
Name   Year of 
creation 
No of 
Branche
s 
State's 
share 
(%) 
Public 
share 
(%) 
Total 
assets 
(million 
$) 
Deposits 
(million $) 
Loans 
(million 
$) 
Loan 
/Deposits 
(%) 
Total Current 
Employment 
Agriculture 
Bank of Sudan 
1959 4 - - - 30 11.5 38 
 
100 
Buffalo 
Commercial 
Bank 
2008 3 - 100 71.4 26.5 13 49 40 
Commercial 
Bank of Ethiopia 
2009 1 100 - 189 65 - - 21 
Equity Bank 2009 4 
 
- 100 150 119 16 13 125 
Ivory Bank 1994 9 - 100 111 104 12 12 150 
Kenya 
Commercial 
Bank 
2005 19 - 100 100 1000 100 10 300 
Mountains Trade 
and 
Development 
Bank 
2010 1 - 100 2 13 0 0 24 
Nile Commercial 
Bank 
2003 13 40 60 45  36  16 44 40 
TOTAL          800 
Source: Author’s compilation from Survey Data, 2011. 
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Table 4.2: South Sudan Bankable Indicator, Growth in Customer Accounts, 2011 
 
Bank Name 
Customer Bank Accounts 
July August % Change  
1. Agriculture Bank of 
Sudan 11,000 13,000 19% 
2. Buffalo Commercial 
Bank 1,200 1,800 50% 
3. Commercial Bank of 
Ethiopia 437 466 6.6% 
4. Equity Bank 40,000 45,000 12.5% 
5. Ivory Bank 16,00 17,000 6.3%  
6. Kenya Commercial 
Bank 52,144 55,407 6.3% 
7. Mountain Trade and 
Development Bank 781 896 14.7% 
8. Nile Commercial Bank 10,000 10,300 3% 
Total 131,562 143,869 9.4% 
Source: Author’s compilation, 2011. 
 
 
Table 4.3: South Sudan Commercial Bank Lending to Firms, 2011 
 
 
Bank Name 
Lending Size ( in US$ ) 
Minimum Loan  
(Ever Approved 
Maximum Loan 
(Ever Approved) 
1. Agricultural Bank 
of Sudan 3,704 740,740 
2. Buffalo Commercial 
Bank - 555,556 
3. Commercial Bank 
of Ethiopia - - 
4. Equity Bank 5,556 1,300,000 
5. Ivory Bank 3,704 962,963 
6. Kenya Commercial 
Bank 
18,519 1,111,111 
7. Mountain Trade and 
development Bank - - 
8. Nile Commercial 
Bank 444 1,851,852 
Total 
 
                   31927 
 
 
                       6,522,222 
 
Exchange Rate 1 US$ =2.7 SSP at independence in South Sudan 
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Table 4.4: South Sudan Banking Annual Lending and Number of SMEs Served, 
2011 
Bank Name Variable/
Year 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Ivory Bank  Loan in 
‘000000$ 
    0.2 0.3 0.3 
# SMEs     40 75 120 
Kenya 
Commercial  
Bank 
Loan in 
‘000000$ 
   7.4 14.8 18.5 2.2 
# SMEs N/A       
Buffalo 
Commercial 
Bank 
Loan in 
000000$ 
   0.2 1.3 2.8 0.5 
# SMEs N/A       
Agriculture 
Bank of 
Sudan 
Loan in 
‘000000$ 
2.6 3.7 4.8 5.6 5.9 6.7 5.6 
 
# SMEs 500 500 800 1000 1100 12
00 
1300 
Equity Bank Loan in 
'000000$ 
    0.7 2.9 4.4 
# SMEs     150 920 1,200 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.5: How South Sudan Banks Describe Their Lending to SMEs 
Bank Name Individual Bank Assessment 
Agriculture 
Bank of Sudan 
Lend to small producers and farmers. 
Commercial 
Bank of 
Ethiopia 
We are not yet giving loans to customers, leave alone 
SMEs. The bank has just opened its operations in South 
Sudan. 
Equity Bank Top SMEs include real estate, general trade, importers 
and materials as well as commerce. 
Kenya 
Commercial 
Bank 
Some SMEs are doing very well and some fall behind; 
others have fallen into delinquency in their loan 
repayments. 
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Table 4.6: South Sudan Banks Ranking of 5 C’s in Appraising SME Projects, 2011 
 Major 
Obstacle 
Moderate 
Obstacle 
Minor 
Obstacle 
Not 
Obstacle 
Total 
Character of the 
owners 
8    8 
Capacity of the firm 5 2 1  8 
Collateral 
Requirement 
3 5   8 
Firm initial capital 2 3 2 1 8 
Macroeconomic 
conditions  
3 1 2 2 8 
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Table 4.7: Indicators of Bank Services 
Name Customized 
Products 
Partnering 
Development 
Agencies 
Role of Mobile 
Technology 
Steps Toward 
Improving Customer 
Service 
Ways to Expand 
Access Frontier to 
all ,specially SMEs 
Agriculture 
Bank of 
Sudan 
Small Producers’ 
Loan and 
Small Farmers’ 
Loan 
Most of NGOs, EU, 
IFAD, IDA, and 
World Bank 
 
Technology 
reduces the 
administrative costs 
and 
Provides customers 
with information 
Application of IT, 
and Capacity 
building for the 
bank & customers 
 
Flexibility in terms 
of collateral 
requirement and 
Provisioning of 
information 
 
Buffalo 
Commercial 
Bank 
N/A Attempts to 
collaborate with 
other foreign 
institutions not 
great; their 
eagerness to work 
with local banks is 
minimal. 
In negotiating 
phase with mobile 
operators abroad to 
expand outreach  
Offer additional 
windows and add 
cashiers, 
open branches, 
arrange services 
according to 
customers’ needs, 
encourage check 
usage instead of 
cash, 
current abnormal 
queuing will die out 
as soon as new 
currency exchange 
is over 
Loan to poor 
borrowers through 
umbrella 
organizations 
 
Commercial 
Bank of 
Ethiopia 
N/A N/A N/A Upgrading service 
by introducing new 
IT; implementing 
BPR (business 
Has not yet 
introduced mobile 
banking 
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process 
Reengineering); 
Expanding branch 
networks; 
hiring additional 
HR; and to 
encourage the 
culture of public 
savings, we pay 
interest on savings 
Equity Bank Business loan; 
development 
loan; 
asset finance and 
working capital 
 
Talking with IFC, 
World Bank, 
USAID, DFID, 
Norway, KEWF, 
and 
Planning discussions 
are on-going 
 
It is a major role 
and a way to go in 
today’s banking 
business 
 
Building capacity 
for staff; 
Branch network 
expansion; 
Financial literacy on 
banking (trust, 
confidence); and 
Deployment of 
technology  
(e.g, ATMs) 
Financing in 
housing sector and  
Agriculture  
 
Ivory Bank not specialized 
bank but 
commercial bank 
 
Considering it in 
future 
 
Truly connected to 
the internet and 
throughout the 
region 
We hope to improve 
the technology; 
currently connected 
to Khartoum and 
experiencing 
technical problems 
(immediately after 
independence). 
We are doing this 
through 
Establishing bank 
branches in local 
areas 
 
Kenya 
Commercial 
Bank 
Water, biscuit, 
ice 
manufacturing in 
World Bank; 
Ministry of trade ; 
Investment; and  
Very important and 
makes 
communications 
Good queue 
management 
system; cross selling 
Training SMEs in 
trade opportunities, 
and bank 
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addition to other 
specialized loans 
business winners easy and quick of products; 
advantage banking 
and E-banking. 
requirements 
Mountain 
Trade and 
Development 
Bank 
N/A N/A N/A Rolling out of 
ATMs (24 hrs.) 
services and 
embarking on 
training agents to 
tap the usefulness of 
technology in 
facilitating bank 
activities 
At present we are 
not providing any 
kind of borrowing 
whether big or 
small, but in the 
future we are going 
to provide the poor 
ones against a 
security. 
Nile 
Commercial 
Bank 
Salary earners  
and skills for 
deductions 40% 
of salary (can be 
done times 12) 
 
IFC attempt/problem 
of standard; line 
credit of $ 5 million 
; and Loita Capital 
partners = $ 10 m. 
N/A Improving staff 
capacity and 
Giving quality 
service (it is 
measured against 
the service we are 
giving) 
 
Different products 
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Table 4.8: Nonperforming Loans among Businesses, 2005-2011 
Year Total NPL 
(%) 
% of NPL Due 
to SMEs 
% of NPL Due to 
Large Businesses 
(1) Buffalo Commercial Bank 
2005    
2006    
2007    
2008    
2009    
2010    
2011 13 3 10 
(2) Kenya Commercial Bank 
2005 10   
2006 10   
2007 10 N/A N/A 
2008 10   
2009 10   
2010 10   
2011 10   
(3) Ivory Bank 
2008 25 18 7 
2009 20 12 8 
2010 18 11 7 
2011 15 10 5 
(4) Agricultural Bank of Sudan 
2005 15 7 8 
2006 15 7 8 
2007 15 7 8 
2008 41 11 30 
2009 30 14 16 
2010 25 10 15 
2011 20 10 10 
(5) Equity Bank 
2011 1.02 0.6 0.52 
(6) CBE, MTDB and Nile Commercial  bank all responded with 
“ N/A” 
 
 
 
 
  
 195 
 
Table 4.9: Commercial Bank Expectations from Central Bank and SMEs  
Name Things Banks Wish to See 
Happen in Order to 
Expand Lending to SMES 
Commercial bank 
Expectations from Central 
Bank of South Sudan 
Agriculture 
Bank of 
Sudan 
Enough capital; 
Good agricultural 
practices; 
Land registration; 
Collateral, and 
Market information 
 
Targeting balanced growth 
in money supply; 
Provisioning of financing 
to the productive sectors 
and provision of medium 
of exchange 
Provisioning of adequate 
liquidity for the economy 
Buffalo 
Commercial 
Bank 
The legal framework 
concerning banks; 
mortgage and 
regulation that affect 
the financial sector be 
revised and acted 
 
Taxation issues be clear; 
Service at government 
officers (license, building 
permits, etc) should not be 
a subject of 
procrastination, and 
Actions to approve or 
reject should be fast 
Commercial 
Bank of 
Ethiopia 
Establish business based 
on feasibility study; 
Raise adequate capital 
required for the 
establishment of business; 
Build strong management 
team and skilled HR; 
Establish proper financial 
records (accounts) 
 
Check the fulfillment of 
the minimum capital 
requirement for the 
establishment of business; 
Check before licensing, he 
physical address of the 
business- to inspect 
whether the business has 
office and working 
premise; 
Enforce the proper 
maintenance  
(establishment) of 
accounting (financial 
records); 
Initiate legislature body to 
introduce laws, such as 
foreclosure laws, which 
speed up loan collection 
process and protect lending 
banks; 
Practice proper and 
systematic registration of 
fixed assets (properties) so 
as to protect bankers 
(lenders) when they hold 
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the properties as collateral 
Establish credit , and 
information center 
Equity Bank Record keeping; 
Sound management 
system; 
Good succession plans 
Relevant business plan; 
with a good likelihood of 
success; 
Ability to offer some form 
of collateral 
 
Formulate relevant legal 
framework to guide 
secured lending; 
Incentives to encourage 
commercial banks to invest 
in rural areas; 
Financial literacy programs 
through mass media and 
public meetings; 
To run guarantee schemes 
to help banks to mitigate 
risk, and 
To bring down cost of 
establishment and set-up 
Ivory Bank Attract us/develop 
business attitude, 
Appreciate the value of 
money; 
Work hard and have no 
place to gossips all day, 
and work and create 
wealth 
Ensure “no eating of 
people money” 
Kenya 
Commercial 
Bank 
Training of entrepreneurs 
Banking of all SMEs; 
Proper bookkeeping 
system, and 
Having permanently 
located SMEs 
 
Mountain 
Trade and 
Development 
Bank 
Business must have 
adequate accounting 
records; 
Demonstrate history of 
profitability activity 
through documentation; 
Business must have 
accounts with us; 
Borrower must be 
recommended and his 
character approved, and 
Must have a collateral 
Expedite process of 
repossessing a collateral 
(debt collection); 
Establish a credit 
referencing bureau, and 
Establishment of unified 
collateral registry 
Nile 
Commercial 
Bank 
Needs for plan for 
projects; 
Quality of staff; 
Upgrading legal 
framework; 
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Economic conditions; 
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Table 4.10: The State of Microfinance Sector in the Republic of South Sudan as At 30th September 2011 
Institution Type Total 
Clients 
% of 
Women 
Total 
Borrowers 
Portfolio 
Size 
Portfolio 
Weight 
PAR>30% 
BRAC South Sudan NGO 25,026 100 16,553 4,217.968 0.284 69.02 
Sudan 
Microfinance 
Institution 
CLG 10,225 36 10,247 3,933,222.9 0.264 25.00 
Finance Sudan Ltd CLG 9,487 25 5,373 5,100,619 0.343 9.27 
Rural Microfinance  CLS  69 1,037 547,495.5 0.037 1.79 
WOYE MEI NGO 1450 71 1,106 1,047,759 0.070 19.64 
Christian Agenda 
for Development 
NGO     0.000 0.00 
Frontier 
Microfinance 
CLS 230 80 154 27,650 0.002 0.50 
Financial 
Development 
Service 
CLS Operations have been suspended in process of 
restarting 
0.000 0.00 
Total  47,444  34,470 14,874,714 1.000  
Total Portfolio ($)     5,042,276.1   
Average PAR >30       30.81 
Source: Private Sector Development Department, Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Investment, South Sudan. 
 
Note: CLS= Company Ltd by Shares and CLG =Company Ltd by Guarantees.
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Table 4.11: Commercial Bank Ownership in South Sudan26, 2013 
S/N Bank Name Branches Total 
Branches 
Ownership Operating 
Since 
1 African National 
Bank 
Juba 1 N - 
2 Agriculture Bank Juba  N  
3 Buffalo 
Commercial 
Bank 
Juba, Wau 
and Aweil 
3 N 2/21/2008 
4 Eden 
Commercial 
Bank 
Juba 1 N 8/8/2012 
5 Ivory Bank Juba, Wau, 
Bentiu, 
Aweil, Torit, 
Renk and 
Rumbek 
8 N 8/6/2006 
6 Liberty 
Commercial 
Bank 
Juba 1 N 2/27/2012 
7 Nile Commercial 
Bank 
Juba, 
Rumbek, , 
Wau, Aweil, 
Yei, Yambio, 
Torit, and 
Malakal 
8 N 4/27/2006 
8 Mountains Trade 
and 
Development 
Bank 
Juba 1 N 1/25/2010 
9 National 
Commercial 
Bank 
Juba 1 N 11/22/201
2 
10 People Bank Juba 1 N 1/24/2013 
11 Kenya 
Commercial 
Bank 
Juba, Yambio, 
Yei, Wau, 
Malakal, 
Numule, 
Torit, Kuajok, 
Rumbek, 
12 F 3/6/2006 
                                                          
26 South Sudan Central Bank Branches are in Wau, Yei and Malakal with headquarter in 
Juba. 
 200 
 
Aweil, Bentiu 
and Bor 
12 Charter One 
Bank 
Juba 1 F 6/21/2011 
13 Commercial 
Bank of Ethiopia 
Juba, Malakal 2 F 6/18/2009 
14 Equity Bank Juba, 
Malakal, 
Kajokeji, 
Yambio, 
Wau, Nimule, 
Torit, Aweil, 
Yei, and 
Bentiu 
10 F 4/29/2009 
15 National Bank 
Abu Dhabi 
 1 F  
16 Qatar National 
Bank 
Juba 1 F 11/1/2011 
17 Stanbic Bank 
(CFC) 
Juba 1 F 3/29/2012 
18 Afriland First 
Bank 
Juba 1 P 5/4/2012 
19 International 
Commercial 
Bank 
Juba 1 P 1/25/2012 
20 South Sudan 
Commercial 
Bank 
Juba 1 P 2011 
Source: Banking Supervision Unit, Bank of South Sudan, 2013 (Note: N = national bank; 
F = foreign Bank and P = partly, meaning it is both foreign and locally owned). 
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Table 4.12:  South Sudan Banking Sector Relative to East Africa, January 2013 
Name of 
Country 
Number 
of Banks 
Population  
(July 2013 Estimate) 
Banks per 10 
million people 
Burundi 10 10,888,321 9.18 
Rwanda 14 12,012,589 11.65 
South Sudan 20 11,090,104 18.03 
Uganda 26 34,758,809 7.48 
Tanzania 40 48,261,942 8.29 
Kenya 43 44,037,656 9.76 
Source: Author’s compilation from various publications, Central Intelligence Agency, 
2013 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.13: SME Questionnaire Respondents by State 
State Number %  
Central Equatoria 242 72.5 
Northern Bahr el Ghazal 77                                            23.0 
Western Bahr el Ghazal     15                                          4.5 
Total        334                                  100 
 
 
 
Table 4.14: SME Questionnaire Respondents by City 
State Number % 
Juba 218 65.27 
Aweil     74                                          22.16
Mayom Angok  3                                               0.90
Wau     15                                          4.49
Yei 24 7.19 
Total 334 100 
 
 
 
Table 4.15: Classification of SMEs by Gender 
Gender Number %  
Female 58 17.4 
Male 271 81.1 
Non-respondents 5                                               1.5
Total 334 100 
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Table 4.16: Classification of SMEs by Ethnicity 
Ethnic Group Number %  
Dinka 111 33.2 
Bari 24 7.2 
Acholi  10 3.0 
Kakwa 10 3.0 
Pojulu 10 3.0 
Other South Sudanese 40 12.0 
Foreigners  101 30.2 
Non-respondents   29                                   8.7 
Total  334 100 
 
Table 4.17: Firm Classification by Legal Status 
Firm Legal Status Number %  
Sole proprietor 239 71.6 
Private limited company 44                           13.2 
Public limited company 4                             1.2 
Partnership 32 9.6 
Co-operative 8 2.4 
Other Form 1 0.30 
Non-respondents 6 1.8 
Total 334 100.0 
 
 
Table 4.18 A: Firm Size by Current Employment 
Classification Firm Size Number % 
Microenterprise            1-4  233 69.8 
Small Enterprise 5-19 86                                    25.7 
Medium Enterprise 20-99 14                                    4.2 
Large Enterprise ≥ 100 1                                      0.3 
 Total 334                                 100 
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Table 4.18 B: Firm Size by Current Employment 
Classification Firm Size Number % 
Microenterprise  1-4 6,587 89.83 
Small Enterprise          5-19                                    
662 9.03 
Medium 
Enterprise 
       20-99                                    
78 1.06 
Large Enterprise          ≥ 100                                      
6 0.08 
 Total                                 
7333 
100 
Source: Author’s construction based on South Sudan Business Survey, 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.18 C: Firm Distribution by State 
State Number %  
Central Equatoria 2,683 36.6 
Eastern Equatoria State 259 3.5 
Western Equatoria State 339 4.6 
Northern Bahr el Ghazal 525                                            7.2
Lakes Sate 489                                           6.7
Warrap State                 457                6.2 
Western Bahr el Ghazal 1113                                         15.2
Jonglei State 269                                            3.7
Upper Nile State 894                                            12.2
Unity State 305                                            4.2
Total 7333                                          100.0
 
 
 
 
Table 4.19: SME Current Employment by Gender and Firm Size 
Classification Firm 
Size 
Men Women Total As % 
of all 
Men 
As % 
of all 
women 
As % 
of all 
Microenterprise 1-4 191 41 232 70.5 70.7 70.5 
Small Enterprise 5-19 70 14                                         84 25.8 24.1 25.5 
Medium Enterprise 20-99 9    3                                     12 3.3 5.2 3.6 
Large Enterprise ≥100 1   -                       1 0.4 -      0.3 
 Total 271  58                                               329 100 100 100 
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Table 4.20: SME Current Employment by State/Geographical Location 
Classification Firm 
Size 
Central 
Equatoria 
Northern 
Bahr el 
Ghazal 
Western 
Bahr el 
Ghazal 
Total 
Microenterprise 1-4 154 
(63.6) 
66 
(85.7) 
13 
(86.7) 
69.
8 
Small Enterprise 5-19 73 
(30.2) 
11 
(4.3) 
2 
(13.3) 25.7 
Medium Enterprise27 20-99 14 
(5.8) 
                      
-                                
-
4.2 
Large Enterprises  ≥100 1 
(0.4) 
                      
- 
-
0.3 
 Total 100 100                                                       100 100
 
 
 
Table 4.21: SME Classification by Sector 
Sector Number % 
1. Retail 161 48.2 
2. Business Service 31                     9.3 
3. Wholesale 30 9 
4. Restaurants/Catering 23 6.9 
5. Hotel 22 6.6 
6. Repair Shop 14 4.2 
7. Manufacturing 8 2.4 
8. Construction 6 1.8 
9. Agribusiness 1 0.3 
10. Other Sector (e.g gas) 35 10.5 
 Non-respondents 3 0.9 
Total 334 100.0 
 
 
  
                                                          
27 According to this classification, medium and large enterprises are based in Central 
Equatoria state, South Sudan. 
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Table 4.22: SME Classification by Sector and Gender 
 
 
Sector 
 
Number 
Distribution by 
Gender  
Distribution by 
Gender as % 
Men Women men Women 
1. Retail 160                 142 18 88.75 11.25 
2. Business Service 31 21 10 67.75 32.26 
3. Manufacturing 8 5 3 62.5 37.5 
4. Wholesale 30 25 5 83.33 16.67 
5. Agribusiness 1 1 - 100 - 
6. Construction 6 6 - 100 - 
7. Hotels 19 15 4 78.95 21.05 
8. Restaurants/Cate
ring 
22 10 12 45.45 54.55 
9. Repair Shops 14 13 1 92.86 7.14 
10. Other Sector (e.g 
gas) 
35 30 5 85.71 14.29 
Total 326 268 58 82.21 17.79 
Note: Missing = 8 
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Table 4.23: SME Classification by Sector and Firm Size 
Sector Number of Employees (% in 
Parentheses) 
1- 4  5-19 20-99      ≥ 100 
1. Retail 135 
(83.9) 
24 
(14.9) 
2 
(1.2) - 
2. Business Service 26 
(83.9) 
5 
(16.1) - - 
3. Manufacturing 3 
(37.5) 
5 
(62.5) - - 
4. Wholesale 21 
(70.0) 
8 
26.7) 
1 
(3.3) - 
5. Agribusiness 
- 
1 
(100) - - 
6. Construction 
 
6 
(100) - - 
7. Hotels 2 
(9.1) 
14 
(63.6) 
6 
(27.3) - 
8. Restaurants/Catering 13 
(56.5) 
10 
(43.5) - - 
9. Repair Shops 14 
(100) - - - 
10. Other Sector (e.g gas) 16 
(45.7) 
16 
(45.7) 
2 
(5.7) 
1 
(2.9) 
Total( as % of 331) 230 
(69.5) 
89 
(26.9) 
11 
(3.3) 
1 
(0.3) 
Note: missing = 3 
 
 
 
Table 4.24: Usage of ATMs, Bank Visits and Under Mattress Facilities 
Facility Number %  
ATM Withdrawals 24 7.19 
Bank Visits 173 51.80 
Store Safekeeping Vault 106 31.74 
Non-respondents 31 9.28 
Total 334 100.0 
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Table 4.25: Firm Self-Appraisal on Technology and Management Experience 
Overall Assessment Number %  
Technology Adoption and Managerial Competence 110 32.93 
Managerial Incompetence and technology Neglect      22         6.59 
Unfavorable Business Environment 189 56.59 
Non-respondents 13 3.89 
Total 334 100.0 
 
 
Table 4.26:  Loan Characteristics 
Status Number %  
Received Approvals (success Rate) 32 69.57 
Denied Applications (rejection rate)      14                                                                 30.43
Total Loan Applications      46                                      100
Memorandum:  Loan Application % of Total # of 
SMEs 
46/334 13.77 
Acceptance rate(Loan Approval As % of total # of 
SMEs) 
32/334 9.58 
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Table 4.27: Loan Approval by Lender 
Lender Type Number % 
Commercial Banks 22 68.75 
Microfinance Institutions 4 12.5 
Informal Finance /Money Lenders/Family Members 6 18.75 
Total 32 100 
 
 
 
Table 4.28: Loan Approval by Gender 
Gender Number %   % ( of gender) 
Male 24                                  80 8.86 
Female  6                                     20 10.34 
Total  30                              100 8.98 
(Note: Two Loan Applicants did not specify gender; missing = 2) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.29: Loan Approval by Sector 
Sector Quantity % of the total 
Approved 
Loans Approved as 
% of Sectoral Totals 
1. Retail 
 12                                                                                37.5 7.45 
2. Business Service 
              -                        -    - 
3. Manufacturing  -                                            - - 
4. Wholesale 4                                               12.5 13.33 
5. Agribusiness 1                                                                                      3.13 100.0 
6. Construction 2                                                                            6.25 33.33 
7. Hotels 6                                                18.75 27.27 
8. Restaurants/Cate
ring 
                                              
3 9.38 13.04 
9. Repair Shops 1                                                                   3.13 7.14 
10. Other Sector (e.g 
gas) 3                                                 9.38 8.57 
Total 32      100                                 9.67                               
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Table 4.30: Loan Approval by Firm Size 
Size 
Classification 
Firm 
Employees 
Quantity % of the total 
Approved 
Loans 
As % of Firm 
Size 
Classification 
Total 
Microenterprise 1-4 15                                                                      46.875 6.44 
Small 
Enterprise 
 5-19 14                                                                43.75 16.28 
Medium 
Enterprise 
20-99         3                                                        9.375 21.43 
Large 
Enterprises 
               
≥ 100 
- -                       
- 
  
Total 
                               
32                            
                                                   
100 9.58 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.31: Why Firm Did Not Apply for Loan 
Reasons Firm self-Selection Out from 
Credit Market28 
Number % of Total 
Constraint 
% of  All 
(272) 
1. Firm does not think it will be 
approved 
82 47.95 30.0 
2. Application procedures are too 
burdensome 
19 11.11 7.0 
3. Collateral requirements are strict 57 33.33 20.9 
4. Interest rates are too high 13 7.60 5.1 
Total Constrained Firms 171 
  
100 62.9 
5. The firm does not need loan 
(unconstrained firms) 
101 - 37.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
28 This means that the firms had wanted to apply but chose to not because of the reasons 
enumerated one through four.  
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Table 4.32: Why Firm Did Not Apply for Loan by Gender 
Reasons Men Women Total As % of 
all men 
As % 
of all 
women 
Total 
1. It does not think it will 
be approved 
67 15 82 29.8 31.9 30.1 
2. Application 
procedures are too 
burdensome 
17 2 19 7.6 4.3 7.0 
3. Collateral 
requirements are strict 
47 10 57 20.9 21.3 21.0 
4. Interest rates are too 
high 
14 2 16 6.2 4.3 5.9 
5. The firm does not 
need loan 
80 18 98 35.6 38.3 36.0 
Total  225 47 272 82.7 17.3 100 
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Table 4.33: Why Firm Did Not Apply for Loan by Sector (% in parentheses) 
Category Doubted Approval 
Burdensome 
Application 
Collat
eral 
High 
Interest  
No 
Need 
1. Retail: quantity  35 
(25.2) 
10 
(7.2) 
38 
(27.3) 
8 
(5.8) 
48 
(34.5) 
2. Business 
Service 
11 
(37.9) 
2 
(6.9) 
1 
(3.4) 
- 15     
(51.7) 
3. Manufacturing 1 
(16.7) 
1 
(16.7) 
2 
(33.3) 
- 2 
(33.3) 
4. Wholesale 11 
(55) 
3 
(15) 
2 
(10) 
- 4 
(20) 
5. Agribusiness - - - - - 
6. Construction 1 
(25) 
- - 1 
(25) 
2 
(50) 
7. Hotels 6 
(54.5) 
- 2 
(18.2) 
- 3 
(27.3) 
8. Restaurants/Ca
tering 
- 1 
(5.3) 
6 
(31.6) 
1 
(5.3) 
11 
(57.9) 
9. Repair Shops 4 
(33.3) 
- 5 
(41.7) 
 3 
(25.0) 
10. Other Sector 
(e.g gas) 
13 
(41.9) 
2 
(6.5) 
1 
(3.2) 
4 
(12.9) 
11 
(35.5) 
Total as % of 334 82 
(24.6) 
19 
(5.7) 
57 
(17.1) 
14 
(4.2) 
99 
(29.6) 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.34: State29 and Number of Loans Received 
State Loans 
received 
As % of total 
loans received 
As % of SMEs in 
each State 
Central Equatoria 23 71.875 9.95 
Northern Bahr el 
Ghazal 
7 21.875 9.09 
Western Bahr el 
Ghazal 
2 6.25 13.33 
Total 32 100 9.58 
 
                                                          
29 Number of loans received according to cities: 1 in Wau, 2 in Aweil, 2 in Yei and 16 in 
Juba. 
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Table 4.35: Loan Received by State and Lender (percentages in parentheses) 
State Lender 
Commercial 
Banks 
Microfinance 
Institutions 
Moneylenders 
and Family 
Members 
Total 
Central 
Equatorial 
18 
(78.26) 
(81.82) 
3 
(13.04) 
(75) 
2 
(8.70) 
(33.33) 
23 
(100) 
(71.88) 
Northern 
Bahr el 
Ghazal 
3 
(42.86) 
(13.64 
- 
 
4 
(57.14) 
(66.67) 
7 
(100) 
(21.88) 
Western 
Bahr el 
Ghazal 
1 
(50.00) 
(4.55) 
1 
(50.00) 
(25) 
- 2 
(100) 
(6.25) 
Total 22 
(68.75) 
(100) 
4 
(12.50) 
(100) 
6 
(18.75) 
(100) 
32 
(100) 
Note: The first figures in the cells are for row percentages; the second parentheses 
present column values. 
 
Table 4.36: Financing Constraint to Firm Growth 
Source of 
Credit 
SMEs Identifying a Factor as a Constraint  
(% in parentheses) 
Major Moderate Minor Never Total Respondents 
Formal 
Finance 
120 
(35.9) 
66 
(19.8) 
75 
(22.5) 
19 
(5.7) 
280 
(83.8) 
Microfinance 98 
(29.3) 
54 
(16.2) 
104 
(31.1) 
24 
(7.2) 
280 
(83.8) 
Informal 
Finance 
73 
(21.9) 
103 
(30.8) 
89 
(26.6) 
18 
(5.4) 
283 
(84.7) 
 
Table 4.37: Financing Constraint to Firm Growth by SME Gender 
Source of Credit Number Identifying a 
Factor as a Constraint 
% Identifying a Factor 
as a Constraint 
Male Female Total Male Female Total 
Formal 
Finance 
222                                     58 280 81.9 100 85.1 
Microfinance 222                        58        280  81.9 100 85.1 
Informal 
Finance 
225 58 283 83.0 100 86.0 
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Table 4.38: Financing Constraint to Firm Growth by SME Size 
Source of 
Credit 
Firm Identifying a Credit Source as a Major Constraint 
(% in parenthesis) 
Microenterpr
ise 
Small 
Enterprise 
Medium 
Enterprise 
Large 
Enterprise  
Formal 
Finance 
185 
(79.4) 
80 
(93.0) 
14 
(100) 
1 
(100) 
Microfinance 
 
196 
(84.1) 
70 
(81.4) 
13 
(92.9) 
1 
(100) 
Informal 
Finance 
199 
(85.4) 
71 
(82.6) 
12 
(85.7) 
1 
(100) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.39: Credit Allocation and Types of Borrowers 
Type of Borrowers Number 
Successful borrowers 32 
Denied Borrowers 14 
Discouraged Borrowers 171 
Non-borrowers 101 
Total 318 
 
 
Table 4.40: Lack of Access to Market as a Constraint to Firm Performance 
Firms Identifying Access to Market as a Constraint 
(% Identifying a Factor as a Constraint in Parentheses) 
Major Moderate Minor Never Total 
180 
(64.3) 
60 
(21.4) 
27 
(9.6) 
13 
(4.6) 
280 
(100) 
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Table 4.41: Lack of Access to Market as a Constraint to Performance by Firm Size 
Number Identifying Access to Market as a Constraint  
(% in bracket of each size) 
Firm Size Major Moderate Minor 
 
Never 
1-4 
117 
(50.2)                                                                     
42 
(18.0)
18 
(7.7) 
 
8 
(3.4) 
5-19 
53 
(61.6) 
16 
(18.6) 
7 
(8.1) 
 
4 
(4.7) 
20-99 10 
(71.4) 
2 
(14.3) 
2 
(14.3) 
- 
≥ 100 
- -  
1 
(100) 
Total 
(% out of 334) 
180 
(53.9) 
60 
(18.0) 
27 
(8.1) 
       13 
(3.9) 
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Table 4.42: Lack of Access to Market as a Constraint to Firm Performance by 
Gender 
Category Male (% in bracket) 
Female (% in 
bracket) 
Major 151 (55.7) 
      26 
(44.8)                                                                    
Moderate 42 (15.5) 
18 
(31.0) 
Minor   19 (7.0)                           
7 
(12.1) 
Never 11 (4.1) 
2 
(3.4) 
Non-respondents 48                            (17.7) 
5 
(8.6) 
Total (as % of all 
329 SMEs ) 
           271 
       (82.4) 
 58                                                                           
(17.6) 
 
 
 
Table 4.43: Lack of Access to Market as a Constraint to Performance by Sector 
Category Major Moderate Minor Never 
1. Retail 84 
(64.6) 
28 
(21.5) 
14 
(10.8) 
4 
(3.1) 
2. Business Service 16 
(61.5) 
6 
(23.1) 
1 
(3.8) 
3 
(11.5) 
3. Manufacturing 6 
(84.7) 
1 
(14.3) 
  
4. Wholesale 15 
(57.7) 
5 
(19.2) 
3 
(11.5) 
3 
(11.5) 
5. Agribusiness 1 
(100)  
 
 
 
6. Construction 4 
(66.7) 
 
 
2 
(33.3) 
 
7. Hotels 17 
(85) 
2 
(10) 
1 
(5) 
 
8. Restaurants/Catering 10 
(50) 
8 
(40) 
2 
(10) 
 
9. Repair Shops 5 
(71.4) 
2 
(28.6) 
  
10. Other Sector (e.g gas) 21 
(61.8) 
7 
(20.6) 
3 
(8.8) 
3 
(8.8) 
Total 179 
(64.9) 
59 
(21.4) 
26 
(9.4) 
12 
(4.3) 
Missing = 3 
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Table 4.44: Summary Statistics 
Variable Name 
/Description 
Mean Median Stdev Max Min observations 
Time to Start SME 0.72 0.5 0.64 3 0.01 327 
Years in business  3.43 3 2.09 15 0.17 333 
Current Number of 
Employees 
5.22 3 9.97 100 1 334 
Employment 
History 
5.24 2 10.64 120 1 329 
Revenue in 2011 
(in’000$) 
50.5 10.0 249.6 3,800.0 0.3 0.251 
Years of Schooling 
of the Firm Head 
11.25 12 4.36 19 0 319 
Average Distance 
from Juba in Miles 
141 0 215 560 0 334 
Number of 
Employees in year 
when firm 
received loan 
5 2 10. 120 1 329 
Revenue in year 
when loan was 
received (‘000 $) 
49.4 10.0 249.7 3,800.0 0.3 0.251 
Loan received in 
latest year (‘000$) 
0.8 0 5.0 59.6 0 0.329 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.45: Correlation between Employment, Revenue and Loan Received  
 Employment  Revenue  Loan Amount 
Employment  1   
 Revenue  0.849 1  
Loan Amount 0.147 0.002 1 
              N = 334 
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Table 4.46: Probit Estimates of Loan Approvals 
 Model (Base Equation) 
(1) 
Model 
(2) 
Model 
(3) 
Gender 0.046 
(0.251) 
0.266 
(0.466) 
-0.725 
(0.812) 
Employment 0.014* 
(0.008) 
0.116** 
(0.051) 
0.148* 
(0.076) 
Distance 0.0003 
(0.004) 
-0.003** 
(0.002) 
-0.008** 
(0.003) 
Retail Sector - 0.111 
(0.202) 
1.107** 
(0.564) 
1.125 
(0.926) 
Wholesale Sector  2.093* 
(1.181) 
1.383 
(1.043) 
Foreign  3.361*** 
(1.082) 
6.392*** 
(2.245) 
Ethnicity   2.463** 
(1.243) 
Education   0.081 
(0.087) 
Poor Judicial 
system 
 0.250 
(0.221) 
0.029 
(0.430) 
Bureaucratic 
Constraint 
 0.409* 
(0.216) 
-0.160 
(0.312) 
Technology 
Constraint 
  1.398 
(0.609) 
Access to Market   -1.010** 
(0.489) 
constant -1.423*** 
(0.167) 
-
5.276*** 
(1.622) 
-
6.843*** 
(2.106) 
Probability > chi2 0.411 0.016 0.17 
Wald chi2 3.96 20.37 18.31 
No. observations 329 68 60 
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy for loan approval (= 1 if approved, 0 
otherwise); ***, ***, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively, and 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 4.47: Probit Estimates of Formal Financing Constraints 
 Base Model 
(1) 
Model 
(2) 
Model 
(3) 
Gender 0.547*** 
(0.202) 
0.548*** 
(0.203) 
0.546*** 
(0.209) 
Employment 0.016 
(0.014) 
0.017 
(0.014) 
0.019 
(0.015) 
Distance -0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.001** 
(0.0003) 
-0.001** 
(0.0003) 
Retail Sector -0.003 
(0.147) 
0.053 
(0.149) 
0.206 
(0.173) 
Foreign  0.263* 
(0.158) 
0.244 
(0.187) 
Credit 
History 
  0.290 
(0.257) 
Wholesale 
Sector 
  0.543* 
(0.288) 
Ethnicity   -0.065 
(0.186) 
Business 
Sector 
  0.251 
(0.294) 
constant 0.099 
(0.144) 
-0.024 
(0.162) 
-0.175 
(0.194) 
Probability > 
chi2 
0.003 0.003 0.004 
Wald chi2 16.10 18.30 24.23 
No. 
observations 
329 329 328 
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy for financing constraint (= 1 if firm considers 
access to formal finance as major and moderate, 0 if they consider it minor or never an 
obstacle), ***, ***, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively, an standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 4.48: Probit Estimates of Informal Financing Constraints 
 Base Model 
 (1) 
Model 
(2) 
Model 
(3) 
Model 
(4) 
Gender 0.199 
(0.191) 
0.198 
(0.194) 
0.222 
(0.206) 
0.221 
(0.207) 
Employment 0.004 
(0.009) 
0.006 
(0.010) 
0.009 
(0.013) 
0.009 
(0.013) 
Distance -0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.001*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.001*** 
(0.0004) 
Retail Sector -0.045 
(0.147) 
0.150 
(0.173) 
0.279 
(0.182) 
0.281 
(0.182) 
Business Sector  0.319 
(0.288) 
0.294 
(0.299) 
0.302 
(0.301) 
Credit History  0.126 
(0.246) 
 0.060 
(0.248) 
Wholesale 
Sector 
 0.503* 
(0.277) 
0.616** 
(0.289) 
0.613** 
(0.289) 
Ethnicity  -0.015 
(0.186) 
-0.057 
(0.189) 
-0.057 
(0.189) 
Foreign  0.231 
(0.187) 
0.105 
(0.196) 
0.102 
(0.196) 
Education   0.064*** 
(0.019) 
0.064*** 
(0.019) 
constant 0.219* 
(0.134) 
-0.041 
(0.187) 
-0.814*** 
(0.291) 
-0.816*** 
(0.291) 
Prob > chi2 0.002 0.005 0.0001 0.0001 
Wald chi2 17.23 23.37 33.17 33.15 
No. 
observations 
329 328 317 317 
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy for financing constraint (= 1 if firm considers 
access to informal finance as a major and moderate constraint, 0 if they consider it minor 
or never an obstacle), ***, ***, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively, 
and standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
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Table 4.49: Probit Estimates of Credit Constraints 
Why the firm chooses not to apply for loan 
 
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy for credit constraint (= 1 if firm chooses not to 
apply for credit for one reason or another, 0 if firm needs no loan), ***, ***, * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively, and standard errors are reported in 
parentheses.  
 
 
  
 Base Model 
(1) 
Model 
(2) 
Model 
(3) 
Model 
(4) 
Gender -0.84 
(0.195) 
-0.044 
(0.215) 
-0.109 
(0.034) 
-0.07 
(0.347) 
Employment 0.009 
(0.11) 
0.004 
(0.123) 
0.080** 
(0.034) 
0.072** 
(0.035) 
Distance 0.001** 
(0.0004) 
0.001**
* 
(0.0004) 
0.003*** 
(0.0005) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
Retail Sector 0.053 
(0.152) 
0.231 
(0.183) 
1.039*** 
(0.281) 
1.400*** 
(0.431) 
Business  -0.572* 
(0.308) 
 -0.464 
(0.613) 
Ethnicity  -0.130 
(0.201) 
 -0.624 
(0.397) 
Foreign  0.277 
(0.206) 
 0.002 
(0.455) 
Education  0.050**
* 
(0.019) 
 0.021 
(0.030) 
Wholesale 
Sector 
 0.726** 
(0.331) 
 0.937* 
(0.538) 
Collateral 
requirement 
  -0.012 
(0.123) 
0.024 
(0.126) 
Constant 0.375*** 
(0.140) 
-0.323 
(0.288) 
-1.176*** 
(0.351) 
-1,428** 
(0.583) 
Prob > chi2 0.241 0.009 0.000 0.0002 
Wald chi2 5.48 21.93 34.38 33.37 
No. 
observations 
329 317 114 111 
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Table 4.50: Probit Estimates of Loan Application 
Whether the firm chooses not to apply for loan or not 
 Base Model 
(1) 
Model 
(2) 
Model 
(3) 
Model 
(4) 
Model 
(5) 
Gender 0.076 
(0.225) 
0.400 
(0.404) 
0.492 
(0.312) 
0.075 
(0.437) 
0.758 
(0.543) 
Employment 0.016* 
(0.010) 
0.100** 
(0.040) 
0.016 
(0.012) 
0.127*** 
(0.043) 
0.082 
(0.052) 
Distance 0.00002 
(0.0004) 
-0.003** 
(0.002) 
-0.0005 
(0.0006) 
0.00004 
(0.001) 
-0.005*** 
(0.002) 
Retail Sector -0.185 
(0.190) 
0.500 
(0.374) 
-0.599* 
(0.308) 
0.187 
(0.448) 
2.194*** 
(0.644) 
Ethnicity -0.042 
(0.216) 
 0.439 
(0.313) 
0.918 
(0.587) 
0.706 
(0.486) 
Collateral 
requirement 
 0.154 
(0.197) 
 0.177 
(0.173) 
0.428* 
(0.252) 
Interest rate 
constraint 
 0.623** 
(0.261) 
  0.667** 
(0.283) 
Years in 
Business  
  0.055 
(0.066) 
 0.247 
(0.218) 
Education   0.066* 
(0.036) 
0.067 
(0.047) 
0.138 
(0.108) 
Foreign   0.024 
(0.380) 
1.480** 
(0.641) 
3.177*** 
(1.105) 
Launch Time     -0.305 
(0.641) 
Poor 
infrastructure 
  0.248 
(0.172) 
 0.485 
(0.378) 
Market 
access 
    -.790* 
(0.435) 
Constant -1.138*** 
(0.154) 
-3.381*** 
(0.759) 
-2.550*** 
(0.706) 
-4.126*** 
(0.938) 
-7.611*** 
(1.793) 
Probe > chi2 0.300 0.015 0.027 0.004 0.000 
Wald chi2 6.07 15.75 18.83 22.35 42.95 
No. 
observations 
328 79 160 111 59 
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy for credit application (= 1 if firm applies, 0 
otherwise), ***, ***, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively, and 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 4.51: Robustness Test for Loan Applications and Approvals 
Probit Model with sample Selection  
Outcome Equation: 
Loan Approval 
Base Equation 
(1) 
Model (2)  Model  
(3) 
Gender 0.121 
(0.106) 
0.099 
(0.340) 
-0.120 
(0.345) 
Employment -0.001 
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.010) 
Distance 0.0005 
(0.0004) 
0.00005 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Retail Sector 0.073 
(0.111) 
0.074 
(0.253) 
0.334 
(0.367) 
Wholesale 
  
 -0.027 
(0.500) 
Foreign 
  
0.118 
(0.242) 
0.970 
(0.594) 
Ethnicity 
  
0.313 
(0.208) 
0.317 
(0.579) 
Access to Market 
  
 0.201 
(0.307) 
Constant -1.423*** 
(0.029) 
-1.471*** 
(0.224) 
0.936 
(0.925) 
Probability Chi2 0.000 0.124 0.436 
Wald Chi2 1.56e+07 10.01 7.98 
No Observations 314 314 314 
Education -0.008 
(0.014) 
-0.010 
(0.014) 
0.034 
(0.026) 
Distance -0.0002 
(0.0004) 
-0.0001 
(0.0004) 
-0.0002 
(0.0004) 
Owning Mobile 
phone 
0.156*** 
(0.055) 
0.198** 
(0.087) 
 
Foreign -0.216** 
(0.098) 
-0.154 
(0.177) 
-0.154 
(0.211) 
Constant -1.095*** 
(0.137) 
-1.130*** 
(0.234) 
-1.470*** 
(0.332) 
/athrho 14.035*** 
(1.694) 
12.686 
(26.261) 
-1.469 
(1.675) 
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.629 0.381 
Chi2(1) 68.61 0.23 0.77 
Note: loan approval and loan applications are outcome equation and loan application are 
selection equation, respectively.  Also, ***, ***, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 4.52: Definitions of Variables in Tables 4.46 - 4.50 
Variable Explanation 
approved 
Employment 
A dummy for whether a loan is received 
Current number of employees in a firm; a proxy for firm 
size 
Distance Distance from Juba in miles 
Foreign A dummy for a foreign owned firm; SME nationality 
Retail Sector A dummy for retail firm; proxy for sectoral bias test 
Wholesale Sector A dummy for whether a firm is a wholesale 
Gender A dummy for gender. Female = 1 ; male = 0 
Ethnicity 
Education 
Technology Constraint 
 
Competition 
Access to market 
 
Credit History 
Collateral Requirement 
 
Bureaucratic Constraint 
Poor Judicial System 
Business Service 
 
Interest Rate Constraint 
Years in Business 
Launch Time 
Poor Infrastructure 
Market Access 
 
ICT Use 
Whether a firm is owned by an ethnic group Dinka 
Years of school of the head of the firm owner 
Whether firm considers implementation of new technology 
as a constraint on firm growth 
Whether firm considers its existence as reasons for downfall 
Whether a firm considers access to market as binding on 
growth 
Constructed from whether firm has received loan or not 
Whether a firm considers collateral requirement as an 
obstacle to growth or not 
Whether firm cites bureaucracy as an obstacle to growth 
Whether SME cites poor Judicial system as harming them 
Whether a firm is a business service such as haircuts, repair 
shops, salon, printing shops, or not 
Does the firm consider interest as a constraint on growth? 
Years firm has been in operation 
Times to start a company 
If the firm considers poor infrastructure as obstacle 
A dummy indicating whether a firm considers lack of access 
to market as a constraint to growth or performance 
If the firm uses mobile phone for communications 
 
Source: Author’s Compilation 
 
 
 
Table 4.53: Credit Demand and Constraints across African Enterprises 
 Small Medium Large 
Received Loan (%) 
No Credit Demand (%) 
Credit Constrained (%) 
24.8 
34.0 
41.2 
32.0 
39.8 
28.2 
55.6 
32.5 
11.9 
Source: Beck, and Honohan (2007), World Bank Investment Climate Assessment 
Survey. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ENHANCING FINANCIAL INCLUSION FOR SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED 
ENTERPRISES IN SOUTH SUDAN 
5.1 Introduction 
In the review of the literature on SME development in Chapter 2, we learned that  
financial inclusion is a requisite for economic development and poverty reduction (UN, 
2005; King & Levine, 1993; Government of Kenya, 2007; Classens, 2006; Beck & 
Demirguc-Kunt, 2008 ), and that SMEs face a significant number of financial access 
constraints, including cost of funding, poor recordkeeping, lack of credit histories and 
access to market, and managerial problems, among others (Mwangi & Sichei, 2011; 
Larossi, 2009; Mendoza & Thelen, 2008; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt  & Maksimovic, 2005, 
2006; Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 2006; Love, 2003).The severity of these 
constraints varies from country to country. For example, more manufacturing firms in 
Kenya than in South Africa or China report lack of access to finance as severe or major 
impediment to firm operation (Larossi, 2009). They can also vary from region to region 
within a given country, as seen in Kenya’s bank branch distribution (Table 5.1).  
Despite these variations, the improvements that have been made in Kenya with respect to 
access to finance can provide important lessons for financial sector development in South 
Sudan. The recent FinAcess National Survey shows that usage and regional coverage of 
financial services has been increasing in Kenya (FSD, 2013). Use of mobile financial 
services more than doubled to 62% in 2013 from 28% in 2006. Bank use has increased in 
all regions and so did the use of MFIs. The number of Kenyans using ATM or debit cards 
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increased from 6% in 2006 to 20% in 2013. The majority of rural population—76%— 
relies on mobile financial service agents as their closest service providers.30  
The concerted efforts by the Government of Kenya, CBK and other financial sector 
players are bearing fruits in Kenya. Larossi (2009) finds improvements in firm external 
financing from 2003 through 2007, partly due to improved fiscal management, better 
banking sector performance, and increased competition bringing down annual cost of 
borrowing in Kenya.  
The analysis presented in Chapters 3 and 4 confirms some of the difficulties that face 
typical SMEs in developing countries such as South Sudan and Kenya. We find that size 
does matter, that is, larger firms have higher probabilities of acquiring loans and are least 
likely to rate lack of access to formal finance as a major obstacle. As discussed elsewhere 
in the literature (see Larossi, 2009) and confirmed by these findings, if a firm thinks that 
it will not receive credit, it is more likely to self-select out of the credit market. Some 
firms that need credit will not apply if they perceive interest rate or collateral requirement 
to be too high or if they doubt loan approval (see Chapters 3 and 4). In South Sudan our 
econometric analysis of the radius of finance also found an inverse relationship between 
the distance from Juba and the probability of a SME receiving credit.  
                                                          
30 This latter development meant that use of post offices; buses and matatus for domestic 
remittances have declined. This meant some people who used to work in bus remittances 
companies lost jobs or relocated or became agents of a Safaricom or bank. 
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This chapter endeavors to identify ways to enhance SME financing in South Sudan in the 
post- conflict, post-referendum environment. Emphasis is placed on replicating best 
practices, investing in new technologies, and taking a policy stance on financial 
inclusion, as other countries have done (AfDB, 2013; AFI, 2010). The chapter proceeds 
as follows: Section 5.2 examines lessons to be learned from Kenya on the financial sector 
and inclusive development. Section 5.3 identifies and discusses gaps in regulatory and 
institutional framework in South Sudan. Section 5.4 discusses strategies to enhance SME 
financing, including investing in ICT, leveraging oil resources for broad-based 
development, and embracing the financial inclusion agenda. Section 5.5 concludes the 
chapter. 
5.2 Lessons from Kenya on the Financial Sector and Inclusive Development 
South Sudan has already drawn many lessons from Kenya in other policy areas, including 
the mechanics and applications of constituency development funds (CDF) to address 
regional inequalities (see Kenya’s CDF Act, 2003), Kenya’s contributions to the AU 
initiative in training civil servants in South Sudan, the adoption of Kenyan primary and 
secondary school curriculums in some South Sudanese schools, the continued role of the 
Kenya School of Government/Kenya Institute of Public Administration in providing 
training to cadres of civil servants from South Sudan31, and Kenyan manufacturers 
                                                          
31 According to FSR (2012) report, Kenya has a regional footprint. Whereas South 
Africa’s banks opened 16 subsidiaries in Sub-Sahara Africa and Nigerian banks had 44 
subsidiaries in 21 SSA countries, Kenya had 11 subsidiaries at the EAC regional level, 
totaling to 282 branches and 31 branches happened to be in South Sudan.  
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supplying South Sudan with crucial good such as cement (African Business Initiative, 
2011).  
In addition, a good number of foreign banks in South Sudan as well as significant 
segment of business community come from Kenya. From the current regulatory 
perspective, there is non-discrimination against Kenyan commercial interests, and if 
anything, South Sudanese leaders seem to appreciate Kenyan’s contributions in the 
country. Just as there is mutual accommodation and regulatory cooperation between the 
US and European Union (Posner, 2009), South Sudan’s government looks upon Kenyan 
banking subsidiaries in a positive light. Building upon these foundations, we argue that 
South Sudan should continue to learn from Kenya’s experience in promoting financial 
inclusion with regard to best practices that are currently lacking in the nation. 
5.2.1 Transferability of “Best Practices”  
While problems of access to finance also exist in Kenya (Atieno, 2009; Nino-Zarazua & 
Johnson, 2011; AFI, 2010; Aduda & Kalunda, 2012), the financial sector in Kenya has 
shown that access can be expanded through solving what I call the “distance dilemma” by 
leveraging new technologies. We know that expanding access over long distances is a big 
problem because of sparse populations and remoteness of the rural areas from financial 
centers. Continued refinement and clarity on regulations (CBK, 2007), lessening 
restrictions on bank branching and licensing to allow more dispersed ATM installation, 
can help by cutting down on the need for bank visits. Where the cost of installing an 
ATM is high, relative to person-to-person or government-to-person payments (Pickens, 
Porteous, & Rotman, 2009), banks should be allowed to collaborate with telephone 
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providers to develop applications such as M-Pesa and M-Kesho, as Kenya did. These 
services have made it easy to access financial services in even distant locations. Sitting in 
his remote village, say in Narok, a Masai person can with a click send money to relatives 
in Masai Mara for a bus fare back to the town. H/she can do the same thing to pay 
electricity bills, school fees, and for many other services which used to demand travel and 
the attendant transport costs (AFI, 2010; Jack, Suri, & Townsend, 2010). Services like 
these will fill important needs if they are introduced in South Sudan. 
When the internet or phone services are not available, as in many places today in South 
Sudan, mobile van banking is another smart way to expand access to local remote areas. 
Mobile vans do not have to make visits seven days a week, but they can make frequent 
scheduled visits in designated areas. Some banks have done this in Kenya with great 
success. 
Investing in appropriate best practice technologies, both by the businesses and by 
concerned government agencies is smart policy, too. Technology has a public-good 
dimension that comes with positive externalities in forms of network effects or 
complementarities. As in complementary investments in education and health, 
technology investments are plagued with free-rider problems, agency or coordination 
failures. Private agents undersupply such goods. Quasi-government involvement is 
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therefore warranted. This being said, we must not forget that sometimes government 
failure can exacerbate market failure (Mendoza & Thelen, 2008).32 
Another best practice is establishment of agency banking, where agents facilitate 
transactions on behalf of commercial banks, or telephone service providers such as 
Safaricom to undertake services including deposit, withdrawal, balance inquires and 
mini-statements, among others (CBK, 2010; FSD, 2013). 
5.2.2 Reducing Information Asymmetries 
Leveraging soft networks (ICT networks such as WIZZIT, G-Cash, and M-Pesa and 
community networks as in Grameen Bank) using commitment mechanisms as Equity 
Bank does with its jijenge accounts (Mendoza & Thelen, 2008), and increasing the 
sharing of information are ways to enhance and deepen access to credit (Mwangi & 
Sichei, 2011). In order to expand the access frontier, countries have resorted to a variety 
of tools to address information needs. Kenya is using the following strategies:  
                                                          
32 The question of coordination failure is best illustrated by the where-to-meet- dilemma. 
That is, let us suppose two friends decide to meet in New York on January 3, 2011 at 
2pm. However, they have not decided on the venue to meet. Suppose they all come to 
New York, start looking around in the hope they will meet in one venue by chance. In the 
age of technology, they can call each other on cell phones or send emails. However those 
means of communications are subject to failure and that may result in cancellation of the 
meeting. Unless by fluke, they cannot possibly choose Time Square as their chosen place 
to meet. In other words, even if activities with complementary benefits are well planned, 
they are subject to coordination failures. 
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(i) Adopting credit scoring to enable banks to calculate risks and compare and 
agree on benchmarks. This provides a degree of objectivity. The establishment 
of credit bureaus has gone a long way to helping Kenya in this area. 
(ii) Banks providing support services in addition to credit. Loans sometimes 
perform poorly due to lack of knowledge about business realities.  
(iii) Financial literacy has also been advocated and advanced by banks and 
financial service providers (Cohen & Nelson, 2011). This can help SME 
owners to learn basics for running an enterprise and how to enter into a 
relationship with a bank through credit-taking. A number of banks, including 
Family Bank, Faulu Kenya and Equity Bank, are now imparting financial 
literacy education to their current and prospective customers in Kenya.  
 
 India is also seeking for strategies to assist SMEs. The Government of India has created 
a Small Industry Development Institute (SIDI) in addition to its Industrial Development 
Bank (IDB). SIDI introduces a range of ITC services, including internet café and mobile 
telecommunications, and having developed this infrastructure it lets the market innovate. 
The IFC and other donors have committed $9 million to develop infrastructure to enable 
SME sector in South Sudan. 
5.2.3 Development Banks 
Development banks, which can be either private or publicly owned, provide medium to 
long-term finance and expertise to specialized sectors, for example, agriculture. Kenya 
has one such bank, the Development Bank of Kenya Ltd (DBK) with established 
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credibility in the region and providing long-term finance for “sustainable investment.”  
None exists currently in South Sudan. 
 Usually, development banks have received their funding from their own governments or 
from bilateral and multilateral aid agencies such as USAID. They also provide technical 
support and expertise to their customers. Criticisms have been directed at them, however. 
Sometimes development banks refuse to lend to SMEs, on the grounds that administering 
small loans to small-scale borrowers is costly to them. Partly for this reason, as 
Ndikumana (2009) indicates in his survey of literature on African development finance 
institutions, they have fallen short in delivering the needed services. The old approach 
often did not integrate development finance into the national development agenda, and 
like other government enterprises, development banks can fall prey to rent-seeking. 
Nevertheless, development banks are important in satisfying demand in certain niches. 
Hence, it is vital that governments create conducive environments and mandate not only 
financial viability but also the social mandate of expanding access and contributing to 
national development agenda in terms of job creation and poverty reduction. 
5.2.4 Sequencing Innovation and Regulation 
Over the years, the financial system in Kenya has benefitted from the responsible role 
that CBK has come to play in monetary policy issues, such as regulations and guidelines 
for the Microfinance Act (2006) and Money Remittance Regulations (2013).33 
                                                          
33 CBK is one of the five main financial sector regulators—Capital Market Authority, 
Insurance Regulatory Authority, Retirement Benefits Authority and Saccos Societies 
Regulatory Authority. These are active players with the expressed aim  because “ 
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Consistence, clarity and cooperation between regulators and market players have come to 
be associated with the CBK policy stance. Based on the interviews I conducted in Kenya, 
the policy stance and direction are regarded as being consistent with the bank’s aim of 
maintaining a “stable and efficient banking and financial system” (CBK, 2010). 
Many have argued that M-Pesa succeeded in Kenya because the regulators first gave it 
breathing space. In treating it like an infant, and refraining from choking it with 
regulations, including know-your-customer requirements (KYC), and taxation at the early 
stages, CBK seemed to have heeded the classic infant argument. The lesson for South 
Sudan is that entrepreneurial innovations and creativity ought to precede stiff regulation 
as long as there are no system-wide negative externalities. 
5.2.5 Post Office Savings Bank as a Vector of Financial Inclusion 
Kenya’s Post Office Savings Bank (Postbank) was established in 1910. Its colonial 
mandate to mobilize savings remains in line with the current government’s 2030 Vision. 
In recent years, Postbank has come to face stiffer competition from deposit-taking 
microfinance institutions. It has also lost some customers in the age of M-Pesa (FSD, 
2013). But in an interview, one of the bank officers indicated that its advantages include 
reasonable and stable interest rates.  
Today Kenya’ Postbank boasts about 97 branches throughout the country, and it 
endeavors to expand the access frontiers. It does this by relying on instruments of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
achieving and sustaining macro-financial stability forms the base for sustainable, broad 
based economic growth and employment creation, vital for realizing the country’s 
development agenda as outlined in the Vision 2030” (FSR, 2012, p. 10). 
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financial inclusion such as branch networking, ATM penetration, mobile phone 
deployments, agency banking, internet banking and educating the public about products it 
offers. 
South Sudan does not currently have a functioning postal service or anything like 
Kenya’s Postbank. South Sudan may take a leaf from Kenya’s experience in the post 
office business. Other countries that have done well in this respect are the BRIC nations  
via the Postal Savings Bank of China, Brazilian model of agency banking, India’s 
multiple partners model and Russian payment model (see Anson & Toledano, 2010). 
Replicating best practices is not a new idea. In the early Meiji period, for example, Japan 
imported a lot from abroad. Its commercial system came from France, its criminal law 
from Germany, its central banking system from Belgium, and its education from America 
(Chang, 2003). Of course, these institutions were adapted to suit local conditions, and 
important new institutions were created. But best practice institutions were an important 
ingredient in the country’s development. 
Another important lesson to be drawn from East Asia is that any public policy must be 
characterized by flexibility, realism, and autonomy (Chang, 2003). Flexibility recognizes 
that mistakes do happen, and when they do, it is best to recognize and seek ways to 
correct them. Realism calls for avoidance of utopian prescriptions. Autonomy can be 
understood as independence of industry from governmental control and vice versa. These 
three values represent departures from what Chang (2003) calls the “market supremacy 
assumption” or in the words of Oliver Williamson (1975) “in the beginning, there were 
markets.”  Markets are man-made like other institutions and are therefore malleable. 
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Inclusive financial sector development in South Sudan will not arise spontaneously—it 
will require an enabling policy environment where private sector innovates and regulators 
prudently guide it. 
5.3 Financial Regulatory and Institutional Framework in South Sudan 
That South Sudan is one of the least developed nations on the face of the earth is no 
accident. The legacy of war (Hutchinson, 2001; Arnold, 2007; Salman, 2011) has meant 
that South Sudan attained statehood with dismal development indicators across the board 
from the financial sector to law-making to the regulatory framework to the enforcement 
of property rights. The economy of South Sudan is best described as “undeveloped, thin 
and fragile”, characterized by incoherent government policy, insufficient labor demand 
and unskilled labor supply, making “it difficult to create conditions for diversified, 
inclusive and sustainable economic growth” (AfDB et al., 2012, p. 2). Consistent with 
this overall picture, the financial sector is beset by a weak regulatory framework.  Unless 
the regulatory framework is strengthened and coverage of the financial system is scaled 
up to reach rural areas, broad access to financial services will remain limited, with little 
more than Juba basking in the radius of finance. 
This section aims to identify the main regulatory gaps and impediments to expansion of 
financial frontiers and broad-based economic development by extension. We highlight 
seven regulatory and credit market imperfections that stand in the way of financial 
inclusion. 
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5.3.1 Lack of Clear Policy Stance on Financial Inclusion Agenda 
The banking and other laws of South Sudan have no mention of the need to be forceful in 
pressing financial inclusion. The South Sudan Development Plan (2011) does hint at the 
2040 Vision (a government blueprint for transforming South Sudan and make it a middle 
income by 2040) and includes a call to return to agriculture as well as to make South 
Sudan business friendly (African Business Initiative, 2011). But there is no explicit 
financial inclusion policy. Neither the CBSS nor other branches of government have 
publicly taken a position to advise banks to spread geographically in an efficient and 
equitable manner.   
Once the policy stance of the government is clearly delineated, it can take appropriate 
measures to pass appropriate regulations and issue relevant guidelines, such as the 
conversion of MFIs into deposit-taking institutions as was the case in Kenya. Unless 
financial inclusion is stipulated as a goal to be achieved and not just regarded as a 
byproduct of development, one will not find much incentive on the part of the 
government, central bank or telecommunications industry to innovate, for example by 
instituting something like a post office savings bank advocating financial education. 
The Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (2009 [CGAP]) finds that financial inclusion 
using branchless services means that traditional methods of payments, say from 
governments to person (G2P) becomes cheaper, through providing low-cost delivery 
channels. A number of developing countries, including Kenya, have made use of the 
geographical spread of the post office service to expand the access frontier, furthering 
along the financial inclusion agenda (d’Alcantara & Gautier, 2013). In order to advance 
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such policies, a quasi-government agency, perhaps called “National Commission for 
Financial Inclusion in South Sudan,” could be set up to do the job. 
5.3.2 Macroeconomic Vulnerabilities 
The macroeconomic environment remains unstable in South Sudan due to a number of 
factors. First, inflation remains high. The currency, the South Sudan pound, continues to 
fluctuate erratically against the dollar. Unless the CBSS works hard to stabilize prices, 
uncertainty will continue to impact investor confidence in the economy and lead to 
currency flight. Absent clear management of the economy, self-inflicted crises such as 
the bungled currency devaluation of 2013 will continue to lead to more price instability. 
Such an environment is unsuitable for loan-making because credit supply tends to be 
adversely impacted by inflation, especially when it is unanticipated (Omran & Naceur, 
2011). To lend to general public, banks have to be assured of their real rate of return to 
money. They cannot do that if they are in the fear of inflation erasing gains from loan 
portfolios or operating in a parallel markets where policymakers take black market 
exchange rate as charting the path (NBS, 2013). The last point is a reality in South Sudan. 
South Sudan officials keep track of black market data or trends because those are the 
ones that really matter or reflect the market conditions. For example, in October 2013, 
one dollar fetched 4.5SSP in the black market and 2.9SSP in the official markets. 
Second, relations between Juba and Khartoum continue to create uncertainty over oil, 
making South Sudan’s economic growth volatile (see figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3). As Figure 
5.1 shows, South Sudan economic growth fell by 55% in 2012 when oil was shut down 
and bounced back to about 70% when the tap was turned back on in 2013. The same 
 237 
 
volatility is also shown by the external trade balance, falling to -82% in 2012 and up to 
346% in 2013 (Figure 5.2). The converse is equally true for current account balance and 
government net borrowing/lending in 2012 and 2013 (Figure 5.3). The passage of South 
Sudan’s oil to the international market through Khartoum’s territory has been and can 
continue to be sabotaged any time there is a disagreement between the two countries. The 
connection between the financial system and the oil sector is strong, since oil revenues 
fuel credit as well as growth. 
The above two factors are compounded by unnecessary regulatory burdens arising from 
tax multiplicity and delays in import clearance at ports of entry. The resulting costs pass 
through to the consumer and currency markets. By South Sudanese authorities charging 
prohibitively or delaying goods entering from East Africa, they impair the cogs of trade. 
This fuels inflation and macroeconomic instability that can get transmitted to foreign 
exchange markets, again limiting credit supply. Better regulation of the imports market 
may go along away to stabilizing prices and creating more conducive environment for 
lending. 
5.3.3 Poor Institutions and Lack of Land Titling  
Whereas close to 90% of South Sudan is suitable for farming, only 4.5% of arable land is 
currently under farming (African Business Initiative, 2011). While there is a vast tract of 
lands in the countryside, land rights issues frequently arise in urban areas. Since there are 
no established proper institutions or policy frameworks that manage the land use, 
acquisition and transfer of ownership, there are conflictual claims to a given piece of land 
by many people, for instance in Juba. These conflicting claims due to institutional 
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vacuum usually pitted the earlier comers (war returnees) against the latecomers after the 
CPA. Take for example, Mr. John who returned to Juba after war in 2005 and acquired 
some piece of land from corrupt land dealer. However, in 2009, another man named Peter 
returned to Juba, and after some time he claimed that the piece of land acquired by John 
belonged to him. The reason is that he was the original occupant of the land before being 
displaced by the war. In other words, some people who returned first acquired pieces of 
land illegally and those who would come later would lay claim to the same pieces of 
land. 
Therefore, both in towns and countryside, there is low utility of land for commercial 
purpose because a person may have his or her land, but if they cannot provide legal titles 
or documents to verify ownership, others may doubt what they claim. When land titles 
are missing, certain markets such as insurance and credit (Mendoza & Thelen, 2008) are 
not inclusive enough to reach all actors. Just as snake can bite a person who has no stick 
at hand in the moment of attack, a firm-owner or entrepreneur without evidence of 
owning collateral may not qualify for a loan. Even though the domain of collateral 
requirements and other kinds of acceptable security guarantees has expanded, land titles 
are still central to many loan appraisals. And collateral requirements remain significant 
determinant of external financing (Larossi, 2009).  
After decades of displacement and destruction by wars, the majority of South Sudanese 
have resettled back to their ancestral lands. Some of these parcels of land are not 
officially recorded, although customary laws and traditions back these ownership claims. 
The laws of South Sudan state clearly that lands belong to the people. Chapter II, article 
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170 (1) of the Constitution states that “All land in South Sudan is owned by the people of 
South Sudan and its usage shall be regulated by the government in accordance with the 
provisions of this Constitution and the law” (GoSS, 2011, p. 45). Many people own 
parcels of lands verbally but have no title deeds, as a result of which their land cannot be 
viably used as collateral.  
While I was doing fieldwork in connection with this research, a number of commercial 
bank officials complained to me that land policies are fragmentary and selectively 
enforced. The lack of land titles and poor land rights administration has meant that 
disputes arise frequently. There have been cases where land is sold to an investor, and 
within a short time another person comes forward to claim that the land belongs to him or 
her. Sometime, these cases go to courts where delays and inefficiencies are rampant. It is 
logical to conclude that such cases affect credit supply. 
5.3.4 Lack of Clear Enforcement Mechanisms to Protect Lenders and Borrowers 
from Bad Deals 
In the market, there must be rules to protect different parties, such as sellers and buyers, 
principals and agents, consumers and producers, suppliers and demanders (Dittus & 
Klein, 2011). Markets work best when the rules of games are laid out and there is trust 
among different parties (McCreevy, 2006). Rules ensure predictability and stability. 
 In South Sudan, however, rules are often arbitrary if they exist at all. For example, there 
are no clear policies on bankruptcy laws to protect lenders in the event of default, nor 
rules to protect borrowers in the event of harassment by a predatory lending party. At the 
time I was collecting data, only three banks had made loans. This vacuum in bankruptcy 
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law and enforcement mechanisms could be one of the weakest links in expanding 
financial access frontiers in South Sudan. 
5.3.5 Policy on Bank Branching 
At the moment, there is no clear policy on the manner and extent to which banks are 
advised to branch out geographically throughout South Sudan. While the choice to build 
a branch in one location as opposed to another is determined by business motive, it is 
helpful and wise for governments to have a clear position. The USA, for example, 
expanded bank branch networks in 1980s and 1990s by relaxing restrictions, including 
security guarantees, capital requirements, distance to the nearest competitor, and 
minimum population densities. This is one way to increase geographical coverage and 
bring about some equity in regional coverage. This is not likely to happen unless there is 
a clear policy position pushing for it. 
5.3.6 Lack of Industry Surveys 
The quality and frequency of the information that firms or public entities produce has a 
bearing on bank lending. Examples include audited accounts and surveys (Larossi, 2009).  
Larossi (2009) finds that 88% of firms in Kenya reported audited accounts, compared to 
58% and 44% in Uganda and Tanzania, respectively. Commercial banks and the central 
bank in Kenya produce surveys on remittance inflows, financial sector stability, and 
monetary policy (see Think Business Limited, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012; CBK, 2012, 2013; FRS, 2012) on frequent basis and provide focused press releases 
to media, the financial sector, and others on a range of issues, including monetary and 
financial matters, banking sector performance and accomplishments. Fina Bank, for 
 241 
 
instance, reports that it is re-strategizing its SME approach (Think Business Limited, 
2010, p. 80). CBK Governor Njuguna Ndung’u declares that “Banking Industry is 
thriving” in an interview that provided an overview of the banking system, including data 
on the number of banks in the country, branches, total employees, deposits, and number 
of ATMs (Think Business Limited, p. 8-16).   
There are no widely distributed industry publications in South Sudan that deal with the 
banking system, hence no public information on what, if anything, the banking system is 
doing to expand the access frontier. On market prices, NBS is succeeding under hard 
circumstances to produce frequent CPI indices, as well as GDP data and other limited 
data. But owing to lack of openness and transparency, the results of onsite inspections of 
commercial banks are only available to the CBSS and not to the general public.  
Moreover, given the constraints that CBSS faces, inspection is generally limited. This 
feeds into the larger theme of “no clarity in the monetary policy management” in South 
Sudan. 
5.3.7 Central Bank Independence and Political Interference  
The Bank Act (2011, p. 7) grants independence to CBSS, stating that: 
When exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties 
conferred upon them by this Act, neither the Bank nor any member of the 
Board, or other Bank officials shall seek or take instructions from any 
ministry, public institutions, office, agency, or other entity or their 
members or officials. Government of South Sudan ministries, public 
institutions, agencies, offices, and other entities operating in South Sudan, 
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their members and officials must not improperly seek to influence the 
Bank or any member of the Board or other Bank officials in the 
performance of their tasks, or interfere with the proper execution of such 
tasks. 
While the central bank can be as independent, like its counterparts in the West, it should 
not be absolved from accountability, including but not limited to testifying before the 
Legislative Assembly or other oversight body (GoSS, 2011). CBSS independence, 
including its ability to set the target level of inflation, is restrained by commonsense, 
because when and how the bank achieves its goals can have political consequences.  
Central bank independence in South Sudan is undercut by the existence of number 
foreign exchange bureaus that are “zombies”, displaying classical rent seeking behavior 
because they remain functioning due to political support. The relations between the 
central bank and the foreign exchange bureaus are very explicit in South Sudan. Like 
commercial banks, these foreign exchange bureaus receive allocation of dollars from 
CBSS on weekly basis at designated official target (about 2.95SSP/$1). Instead of selling 
these hard currencies to the public at value slightly above official rates to make normal 
return, they dump them in the black market where the difference or arbitrage is usually 
manifolds. The conventional opinion is that these foreign exchange bureaus cannot exist 
without this life support from CBSS. The public believes that some officials own foreign 
exchange bureaus and this diminishes the credibility of the central bank and raises 
questions as to the extent of its independence. They can easily generate public backlash 
with the slightest provocation.  
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While cooperation between agencies is permitted, and the Bank is expected to report to 
the Finance Minister as applicable law dictates (GoSS, Chapter 9, Section 64, 2011) there 
has been some cloudiness in the relationships between the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning (MoFEP) and CBSS. This precedes independence of South Sudan in 
2011. For instance, the MoFEP was responsible for designing, contracting out and 
executing the plan to have South Sudan Pound (SSP) printed. Critics thought the Bank of 
Southern Sudan (BoSS) should have been in the forefront, but the assignment was 
dictated by the government. Similarly, in November 2013 when CBSS devalued the 
currency, the National Assembly summoned both the CBSS Governor and the MoFEP 
Minister to testify before the assembly (the minister did not appear because he was 
overseas on an official trip). The message to an average person is clear: that CBSS and 
MoFEP are co-managers of the economy. This is a dangerous precedent because it does 
not acknowledge the autonomy of CBSS as the regulatory authority in monetary policy 
issues, including maintenance of “monetary and domestic price stability” (GoSS, 2011, p. 
5). 
5.4 How to Increase Financing for SMEs in South Sudan 
The fact that most SMEs in South Sudan are not accessing credit is owing to both the 
underdeveloped nature of the financial system and the lack of concerted efforts on the 
part of the government and financial system to expand the access frontier. While many 
firms across Sub-Saharan Africa are financially constrained (Larossi, 2009; Asiedu, 
Kalonda-Kenyama, Ndikumana & Nti-Addae, 2013), some countries have tried to 
improved access by taking a number of aggressive policies. If South Sudan follows suits, 
its financial system can be expanded and improved.  
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5.4.1 Embracing the Financial Inclusion Agenda 
Intentions are powerful agents of change. If the government adopts a policy stance and 
encourages the financial sector to work toward that goal, it can expand the access frontier 
and SMEs could benefit broadly (see FSD, 2013). A number of African countries have 
joined the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI)34. In addition to their membership in the 
AFI, African central bankers met on 14-15 February 2013 in Tanzania to form Africa 
Mobile Phone Financial Services Policy Initiative (AMPI) to “extend financial inclusion 
to the continent’s large unbanked populace,” according to Governor Njuguna Ndung’u of 
Kenya Central Bank. These policymakers see AMPI as a subset or sub-network of AFI. 
Thus, relying on principles such as Maya Declaration and regional cooperation and 
networking in information sharing, AFI AMPI members will be able to share experiences 
and address common policy issues.35  
Other global initiatives for financial inclusion include the Financial Access Initiative in 
New York, the Centre for Financial Regulation and Inclusion in Cape Town, and the G-
20 Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion Principles (Dittus & Klein, 2010). Some 
countries have empowered their central banks to lead the charge, facilitating rolling out 
                                                          
34 African AFI Members include Tunisia, Mozambique, Angola, Morocco, Ghana, 
Namibia, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Guinea, Madagascar, Congo (DR), 
Burundi, Senegal, Togo, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Benin, Niger, Mali, Guinean 
Bissau, Egypt, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Nigeria, Sudan, Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial 
Guinea, Chad, South Africa, Ethiopia, Malawi, Zimbabwe, and Central Africa Republic. 
35 The AFI global policy Forum met at Riviera Maya in Mexico in 2011 to discus and 
agree on a common set of principles that will help develop financial inclusion policy by 
developing country regulatory institutions; these common principles came to be known as 
the Maya Declaration. 
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of mobile deployments (mobile phone financial services), partnerships between the banks 
and development institutions, and setting up community banks, for examples.  
This policy stance enables government to regulate prudently and encourages other 
players in the private sector to innovate and invest in strategic growth areas such as 
finance, communications and energy. We see in Kenya, for example, what it means to 
invest in the ICT industry. Doing so increases the access frontier, empowers the society 
and improves the economy in the process. For businesses, ICT reduces information 
asymmetries, improves credit scoring, and helps to improve the management of debt.  
5.4.2 Leveraging Oil Wealth for Financial Sector Development 
Baruch Spinoza famously said, “If you want the present to be different from the past, 
study the past” (Krieger, 2002, p. 40). This advice is relevant for South Sudanese who 
have not yet realized the impact of the country’s oil resources. Metaphorically speaking, 
Spinoza is calling upon them to study what has been done with oil revenue in the years 
past, and what can be done to channel it to fuel broad-based economic development. It 
behooves the country and development economists to rethink how oil wealth has been 
distributed to draw lessons for the future.  
South Sudan’s government, the Central Bank and financial institutions so far have not 
enabled the channeling of oil revenues into credit, to the private sector and to the SMEs 
in particular, thereby failing to harness oil wealth to fuel broad-based and inclusive 
economic growth. Up until now, there has been no broad-based growth strategy. Instead, 
it can be argued that the economy of South Sudan which is primal and cash-based, suffers 
serious horizontal inequality—that is, economic inequality across regions and ethnic 
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groups—, which is a source of political instability to guard against (Stewart, 2005). As 
illustrated by neighboring Kenya in 2007, political and economic exclusion or the 
calculated dominance of one ethnic group can be a source of grievances and a trigger for 
political violence (Githinji & Holmquist, 2009)36. 
Despite the country’s oil wealth, commercial banks (which have enough reserves at the 
time of field search for this dissertation) in South Sudan have not played a major role in 
financial inclusion. This is typical of many commercial banks in African countries which 
tend to hold excess reserves and safe assets such as government bonds and do not play as 
large of a role as financial intermediaries as they could. Given the structure of bond 
markets (and limited number of buyers), returns on government bonds tend to be high 
and are therefore attractive. 
While the oil lasts, the big question remains how the oil revenue will be managed to 
contribute to the broad-based financial sector deepening and inclusive economic 
development. Studies show that financial sector development is among the important 
variables that determine whether the natural resources become a blessing or a curse 
(Humphreys et al., 2007; Brown, 2009). If well managed, oil revenue can become a 
blessing; if not, it can breed Dutch disease, rent-seeking behavior and corruption. 
                                                          
36 During this field research, I observed the paradox of Western Kenya (Nyanza and 
Western Provinces), with a politically active and highly educated population but poor and 
lacking financial services, underscoring the role of politics, culture and presence/lack of 
inclusion in development outcomes.  
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As it has been done in other countries such as Gulf States, though not with similar 
political settings and analogous initial conditions, I believe it is possible to channel oil 
resources to the productive sectors, especially through targeted lending to SMEs. 
At the moment, oil revenue makes up close to 98% of the government budget, and has 
been the single most important source of consumption expenditure for the national 
government. As depicted in the Figure 5.4, oil revenue goes to pay salaries at the state 
and national levels, and finances public goods such as roads, airways, and defense. But as 
discussed in Chapter 2, South Sudan’s institutions are weak, leaving much of the oil 
revenue to leak out, resulting in missed opportunities. Leakages include money diverted 
to personal private accounts in the country or going to safe havens outside the country as 
capital flight.  
Evidence about oil having not made much difference in South Sudanese lives due to 
large-scale leakages can be inferred from the infamous letter that President Salva Kiir 
wrote to potential 75 government officials, past and present, imploring them to return 
stolen funds supposedly amounting to $4 billion, according the Sudan Tribune on 2 June 
2012. That corruption is commonplace is indisputable and the whole world knows it, 
having placed South Sudan, the youngest nation, on the list of the most corrupt states, 
ranking number 173 out of 177 countries (Transparency International, 2013). South 
Sudan ranks 47 out of 53 African countries in the 2010 Mo Ibrahim Index of African 
Governance.  
What can be done differently if oil heretofore has not brought about improvements in the 
daily lives of average South Sudanese (see SSCCSE, 2010)?  We propose “thinking out 
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of the box.” In particular, increasing the share of the oil revenue going to the financial 
sector is a powerful strategy, for maximizing the rents from oil wealth in focus of 
economic development. Three specific measures are proposed.  
First, we propose that state put some reserves into the stabilization account, which was 
created before the referendum (2005-2011) but seemed to have been depleted long ago, 
and convince the country’s financial systems and the development community to chip in 
if they can. This fund can then be tapped to finance lending to specific sectors including 
SMEs at moderate rates to fuel broad-based development.  
Second, while some capital flight is inevitable, the oil sector can be enticed to retain more 
earnings in the home financial system. That is, the oil sector can channel resources to the 
financial system through depositing company oil profits, as well as paying royalties to 
governments in turn to pay salaries and other expenses, some of which could go into the 
financial system through deposits in banks.  
Third, the financial system in return provides loans to the oil sector to finance further 
commercially viable exploration and production. 
Fourth, from these bank deposits and the stabilization account, the financial system can 
then lend to the general public and provide specific lending facilities to SMEs. Both the 
general lending and focused lending to SMEs may help to bring about desirable 
development outcomes, namely job creation, poverty reduction and equity-enhancement, 
including horizontal equity across regions, ethnic groups and social classes (see Figure 
5.4). 
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At the macro level, the causality runs both ways, from the oil sector to the financial 
system and the real sector, and then feeding back from the real sector to the financial 
system and the oil sector. The result is a shared prosperity that will be good for all. 
For a good number of countries in the region, oil resources could hold key to prosperity. 
A number of Sub-Saharan African countries, including Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Ghana 
and Mozambique have recently discovered oil (World Bank, 2013). Thus South Sudan is 
not alone in confronting the challenges of how to manage these resources so as to avoid 
the “resource curse.” What may crucially matter for South Sudan and other entrants is 
being transparent in oil management along the value chain (Alba, 2009; Barma et al., 
2012), including extraction, taxation and investment of rents (World Bank, 2013). The 
value chain approach calls for transparency in contract negotiations, efficiency in tax 
collection, and targeted public investment using those rents to achieve certain 
development objectives. Being transparent will necessitate joining the league of “publish 
what you earn, publish what you pay” and the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI). The EITI is a global standard that promotes revenue transparency and 
accountability in the extractive sector. As of this writing, only nineteen African countries 
are members of the EITI, with only eight in compliance. South Sudan is not yet a 
member. 
 
5.4.3 Strengthening the Regulatory Framework 
Good governance, especially good corporate governance, is vital for stability and the 
functioning of the financial sector (Ramo, 2013). Because South Sudan is starting out 
with a weak regulatory framework, the central bank and other actors must see to it that all 
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appropriate regulations are enacted and enforced uniformly. The country’s circumstances 
call for moderation in the financial regulatory environment, wherein regulations are not 
too burdensome on financial providers and yet not too relaxed to risk a freefall as 
recently seen in the West. 
The CBK is moving toward a risk-based supervisory framework, which in its own words 
(CBK, 2013, p. 4) “benefits institutions as regulatory effort is focused on high-risk areas 
and provides for more efficient supervision.” A priority first is to ensure that financial 
services are not too big to fail, and are kept at reasonable size as a guard against systemic 
fraud backed by anti-money laundering schemes (CBK, 2010). 
With regard to mobile financial services, both past and present experience shows 
common themes: (i) they tend to exhibit shock and awe that comes with new financial 
product, similar to the case of the derivative markets in the USA which amazed but later 
was blamed for mortgage-backed securization process; (b) they are characterized by 
complexity and multiplicity in application (c) they can yield rapid and high returns and 
(d) they tend to lack robust supervision of risky financial services (Stephen, 2011). It is, 
therefore, advisable to put consumer protection laws in place, albeit not too strict as to 
stifle innovations. In Kenya, the CBK and Communications Commission of Kenya 
(CCK) were instrumental in seeing to it that M-Pesa met certain basic requirements 
before its launch (AFI, 2010). Among other things, the two bodies addressed the issues as 
to whether M-Pesa was a banking entity or not. Because M-Pesa e-float (monetary value 
or credits collected and deposited in M-Pesa customer account) does not earn interest and 
not permitted to engage in commercial activities, it is not a bank. The CBK treaded 
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carefully in regulating the mobile phone financial service sector, deploying prudential 
regulation and supervision, consumer protection laws, and regulations to enhance 
competition and networking among market players. The outcome satisfied both the 
consumer advocates and investors in Kenya.  
While the overall legal framework remains weak in South Sudan, development financial 
institutions (IMF and the World Bank) are working to lay some foundations for the 
country’s investment climate. These include publications such as Doing Business in Juba 
(2011) and the passage of enabling frameworks, including the Investment Promotion Act, 
and the South Sudan Investment Authority. The IFC Investment Climate Reform 
Program is working with relevant institutions to advance broad-based development in 
non-oil sector, and hopes to increase access to finance for SMEs (African Business 
Initiative, 2011). 
5.5 Conclusion 
South Sudan achieved independence with dismal economic indicators and weak 
institutional regulatory frameworks. The regulatory and institutional gaps in the financial 
sector development in South Sudan include lack of policy clarity, lack of a government 
policy stance in favor of financial inclusion, poor property rights enforcement, 
macroeconomic vulnerabilities, and information and data problems. Building on “best 
practices” that can be learned from Kenya, the country can make progress by reducing 
information asymmetries, investing in ICT, establishing development banks, leveraging 
postal service as a vector of financial inclusion, sequencing regulations, and declaring a 
clear policy stance on financial inclusion. By channeling oil to productive sectors, as 
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shown in the loop diagram in Figure 5.4, South Sudan has an opportunity to make inroads 
in the financial inclusion agenda.  
Priming the pump in the financial inclusion ecosystem can bring large dividends as 
shown in the cases of India’s Self Help Group-linkage initiative, Bangladesh’s Grameen 
Bank and M-Pesa in Kenya. Nonetheless, heterogeneity in approaches, models and 
strategies means that there is no single silver bullet method when it comes to expanding 
access to financial service. Even as South Sudan learns from these best practices, it must 
adapt them to its own circumstances & capacities, and in line of its specific development 
needs. 
Table 5.1: Kenya’s Bank Branch Distribution per Region, 2008 
Province  No. of 
branches  
% 
branches  
Adult 
Population 
(Million)  
% below 
poverty line 
% 
banked  
Nairobi  353  40.00  1.88  34  38  
Central  100  11.30  2.23  30  24  
Coast  111  12.51  1.61  70  15  
Eastern  75  8.50  2.75  51  15  
North Eastern  10  0.01  0.59  74  0.1  
Nyanza  61  6.90  2.45  48  12  
Rift Valley  137  15.50  4.09  49  20  
Western 40  4.60  1.81  52  11  
Total 887 100 17.41   
Source: Central Bank of Kenya and FinAcess Survey 2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 253 
 
Figure 5.1: Real GDP Growth in South Sudan (Annual %) 
 
 
Source: IMF 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: External Trade 
 
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, 2012 
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Figure 5.3: Capital Account Balance and General Government Net 
Lending/Borrowing (Unit is % of GDP) 
 
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook 2012 
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Figure 5.4: Analytical Framework of Potential Contribution of the Oil Sector to Financing SMEs 
 
 
Source: Author’s construction
Oil Sector 
Central Government/oil revenue 
(98%) 
State 
governments 
Salaries Public Goods Leakages 
Missed 
Opportiunities  
Personal 
Account 
Capital 
flight 
 
Civil Service 
Salaries 
Public Goods 
(roads, defense, etc) 
Leakages 
Financial System 
Stabilization 
Account 
 
Real sector financing 
 
General Lending Targeted Lending 
SME Lending 
Development Outcomes 
Equity 
Enhancing 
Job 
Creation 
Poverty 
Reduction 
 256 
 
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
6.1 Introduction 
This dissertation set out to explore solutions to potential obstacles to SME growth, 
probing to what extent SMEs have access to finance in South Sudan and Kenya as well as 
how technology and financial sector development are expanding the access frontier in 
Kenya. The overarching question throughout this study has been, “What can South Sudan 
learn from Kenya’s experience in financial sector development?” 
The aims of this study were three-fold. The first was to examine the literature to develop 
an understanding of why SMEs in general, and especially in the least developed and post-
conflict settings, face problems in gaining access to finance. For this reason, expanding 
the financial access frontier and placing more emphasis on financial inclusion seem to be 
paying off, as seen in Kenya. The second aim was to explore the replicability of Kenyan 
“best practices” in South Sudan. All evidence points to the fact that Kenya is relatively 
developed compared to other countries in Great Lakes Region. Hence, we advanced the 
argument that it can be a model from which South Sudan can learn best practices in 
financial sector development. The third aim was to lay the groundwork for a financial 
inclusion agenda for South Sudan, which has not been done before. The dissertation 
aimed to contribute to knowledge in these regards. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the study is significant in light of the recognition in 
contemporary development theory and practice that institutions do not arise from thin air, 
in the absence of active policy. Hence the appropriateness of the financial inclusion 
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agenda championed by central banks across the African continent. The second reason for 
this study’s significance is the recognition that SMEs are dynamic and central to the 
poverty agenda.  
With regard to methodology, in an attempt to answer the research questions, we reviewed 
the relevant literature and undertook 15-month field research in South Sudan and Kenya. 
The data collected in Kenya come from three regions (Nairobi, Tala and Machakos), 
while the data for South Sudan come from three states (Central Equatoria, Western Bahr 
el Ghazal and Northern Bhar el Ghazal). We used Probit models to analyze the data from 
the two countries in the first two essays of the dissertation. The third essay is a qualitative 
analysis, identifying gaps in the financial sector regulatory and institutional framework, 
drawing lessons from Kenya, and recommending a number of options to enhance SME 
financing in South Sudan. 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 6.2 recaps key results from 
each essay, as well as caveats underscoring certain limitations. Section 6.3 discusses 
lessons and policy implications. Finally, Section 6.4 considers possibilities for future 
work. 
6.2 Key Results 
The first essay (Chapter 3), Financial Sector Development and Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises in Kenya, examined financial sector development and SMEs in Kenya. The 
overall conclusion drawn from this essay is that the financial sector, in collaboration with 
the telecommunications industry and the CBK, is doing a great deal to expand the 
financial access frontier. The introduction of agency model (a corresponding banking 
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arrangement whereby bank services are sold through third party or by non-bank financial 
corporations on behalf of the bank), the M-Pesa (a mobile money services revolutionized 
by Safaricom in Kenya) and the race to serve the bottom of the pyramid, as exemplified 
by Equity Bank, have expanded access to financial services as shown by FinaAccess 
Surveys in 2006, 2009 and 2013.  From econometric analysis of the Kenyan data, four 
key findings emerge.  
• First, small size is a disadvantage. We find that larger firms are more likely to 
receive credit than smaller ones, which make up close to 95% of all sampled firms 
in Kenya. Unlike the smaller firms, larger firms rate lack of access to formal 
financial services as a minor or never an obstacle.  
• Second, we find that SMEs are more likely to self-select out of the credit market 
if they perceive collateral requirements to be too strict, interest rates too high or 
application procedures too cumbersome.  
• Third, there is an ICT impact on access to finance in Kenya. Firms that own a 
website are more likely to apply for loans than those that do not. The same is true 
for firms that enjoy business networks: firms that network with others are more 
likely to indicate that they are less financially constrained with regard to formal 
and informal finance. We argue that networks facilitate and enable information 
flow between firms, facilitating trade, insurance, investment and credit.  
• Fourth, we find no gender bias in access to formal credit: our results show no 
evidence that gender is a significant determinant in loan approval and in the 
perception of credit constraints by SME owners.  
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The second essay (Chapter 4), Lack of Access to Finance by Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprise as a Constraint to Development in South Sudan, explored the role of financial 
sector in financing SMEs in South Sudan. The essay noted that South Sudan came onto 
the scene as an independent nation with dismal development indicators, after years of 
neglect and warfare under Khartoum regimes. Analysis of the data and econometric 
investigation yield in a number of key findings:  
• First, as in the Kenyan case, there is size bias in access to credit. That is, larger 
firms are more likely to receive credit, and more likely to rate lack of access to 
formal credit as a minor or no obstacle at all.  
• Second, there is also some gender bias in access to formal credit. Whereas gender 
seems not to be a significant determinant in the actual loan approval, there is 
gender bias in financing obstacles. Unlike men, women SME owners are more 
likely to say that access to formal finance is a major constraint.  
• Third, there is an issue of the radius of finance, in the sense that access to finance 
is inversely related to distance from Juba: firms away from Juba are more likely to 
receive little or no credit, while those that are in close proximity to Juba are more 
likely to receive loans. Although firms located out of Juba are less likely to 
receive loans, when we ask whether they consider access to formal credit to be a 
major obstacle, firms away from Juba are not more likely to consider it a major 
constraint.  
The third essay (Chapter 5), Enhancing Financial Inclusion for Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises for South Sudan, focused on the issues of regulatory and institutional gaps 
and strategies to develop the financial sector in South Sudan. The essay drew a number of 
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lessons to be learned from Kenya: to transfer “best practice” technologies, reduce 
asymmetric information, establish and invest in a development bank, sequence 
innovations and regulation, and use post office savings banks as a vector of financial 
inclusion. In addition to identifying these lessons from Kenya, Chapter 5 discussed the 
prevailing regulatory and institutional gaps in South Sudan, including the lack of clear 
policy on a financial inclusion agenda, macroeconomic vulnerabilities, lack of land titles, 
poorly defined and enforced property rights, lack of industry-wide data, and political 
interference with the central bank’s independence. In order to  address these challenges 
and to enhance SME financing in South Sudan, the chapter advocated strategies to 
expand the access frontier, including taking an explicit policy stance on the financial 
inclusion agenda, leveraging oil wealth for the financial sector development, 
strengthening the regulatory framework through good governance and credible 
enforcement, ensuring that financial institutions are not too big to fail, and promoting 
institutional cooperation among government agencies; the central bank, commercial 
banks and telecommunications industry. 
As discussed extensively in Chapter 1, analyzing access to finance in sub-Saharan Africa 
is difficult due to the rudimentary nature of the data. In relying on my own data, three 
biases could not be completely wished away. First, we could not rule out survivor bias. 
Firms that went out of business before data collection could not have been included in the 
sample. Second, I covered a few areas both in Kenya and South Sudan; hence the 
representativeness of the sample is an open question. Third, I relied on the assistance of 
nine research assistants in both countries, and their own biases as to where or which firm 
to approach for selection into sample might have influenced the final representativeness 
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of the sample. Fourth, I ended up with a smaller sample of banks in Kenya than in South 
Sudan where the entire population of banks is fully covered. It is, therefore advisable to 
interpret the findings in this dissertation with these caveats and limitations in mind. 
6.3 Lessons and Policy Implications 
Based on the results presented in this dissertation, a number of lessons can be drawn with 
policy implications for South Sudan. Here we highlight six pertinent lessons and their 
policy implications.  
6.3.1 Firm Size as a Constraint to Access to Finance 
As the extensive review of the literature indicates, and our econometric results confirm in 
the essays on South Sudan and Kenya, firms continue to face differential degree of access 
to finance. In both Kenya and South Sudan, small firms continue to face significant 
hardships accessing finance. They also express greater awareness of financing obstacles. 
These are important realities that authorities should acknowledge, while they work to 
alleviate financing gaps and promote financial inclusion. 
6.3.2 Institutional Cooperation 
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, cooperation among agencies has been shown to work 
elsewhere. We gave, as an example, the cooperation of the USA and EU in transatlantic 
regulation. We specifically noted that M-Pesa succeeded in Kenya because of the 
conducive policy environment in which it is operating, emphasizing that this policy 
environment is a byproduct of cooperation between the CBK and other stakeholders in 
Kenya. It is, therefore, prudent that South Sudan policy-makers orient institutions to be 
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more cooperative -- independent and competitive, but not to the point of assured mutual 
destruction. 
6.3.3 Proper Sequencing of Innovation and Regulation 
In addition to regulatory and institutional cooperation, the success of M-Pesa is a result of 
conscious effort by the regulatory agencies to give innovation breathing space. The CBK 
decided early on not to choke M-Pesa with prohibitive taxation but instead opted for 
exemptions. Early subsidization of innovators and cautious taxation can be vital for the 
successful development of any meaningful financial product. In developing financial 
products at their initial stage, it is healthy to rethink about merits of the proverbial infant 
industry argument. 
6.3.4 Persistence of Differential Access to Finance 
While the central bank, the banking sector, the telecommunication industry and other 
players are working diligently in Kenya to expand the access frontier, as evident by the 
results of the successive FinAccess Surveys from 2006 through 2013, SMEs continue to 
face constraints in accessing financial services. This reflects the fact that there are no 
silver bullets in resolving the question of access to finance for all. The relevant 
institutions must continue to make efforts, both across the regions and within groups. It 
is, therefore, imperative that South Sudanese authorities should not expect quick fixes, 
even if financial inclusion were to be declared as the number one priority item for the 
government tomorrow. Financial inclusion is a process and it cannot be mystically 
achieved, as the saying goes, Rome was not built in a single day. 
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6.3.5 The Radius of Finance 
As demonstrated in Chapter 4, firms away from the capital city continue to face 
difficulties in access to credit in South Sudan. This is a fact that cannot also be wished 
away. It must be tackled through active policy interventions in the credit market, 
including investments in infrastructure and energy. Through the central bank, the 
government can advise commercial banks to make financial inclusion a priority and 
encourage the establishment of community banks throughout the country, similar to the 
agency model or Self-Help Group Initiatives in India.  
6.3.6 Self-Exclusion from the Credit Market 
The analysis in the first and the second essays confirms that firms will not bother to apply 
for credit if they think that they will be rejected due to lack of collateral and credit 
history. Firms which otherwise qualify could self-select out of credit markets, especially 
if they perceive strict collateral requirements, cumbersome loan application processes, or 
high interest rates. The implication is that simplification of collateral requirements, 
know-your customer (KYC)37, charging stable interest rates (price stability), streamlining 
ID requirements, and eliminating minimum balances could reduce self-exclusion in the 
credit market. 
6.4 Future Work 
The data for this analysis come from a fairly small sample in both countries. Future 
works should increase the sample size and extend the sample to at least five, or better yet 
all, states in South Sudan. For Kenya, too, it will be interesting to increase the sample 
                                                          
37 These requirements exert undue burdens on poor customers. 
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size and to extend it to more counties and a larger number of commercial banks. Given 
the importance of the issue of financial inclusion for broad-based economic development, 
it is hoped that this dissertation will help to inspire such research. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 INFORMED CONSENT LETTER38: SEEKING SME CONSENT TO 
ADMINISTER QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
 
I39 deeply and sincerely appreciate your willingness to participate in this study. 
 
The purpose of my research is to gather opinions and experiences about small businesses 
so as to gauge the easiness or difficulty in accessing finance from formal commercial 
banks, informal banks, non-bank financial and microfinance institutions operating in 
South Sudan and Kenya today.  
 
This study intends to document any obstacles to business growth. The study expects to 
disseminate findings as a way to inspire policy and seek means to alleviate these 
impediments to business growth through public policy or public- private partnerships. 
 
This examination involves dealing with people and businesses and I must disclose that 
there are no known risks associated with sharing vital information with this researcher, 
who with all honesty, promises not to use your name or anything that will identify you as 
an entity when writing up this research. Every bit of your information will be kept 
confidential because I will be the only one having access to the data. 
 
 Therefore by voluntarily participating in this study, you will be contributing towards 
improvements in existing literature on the access to finance for all. Should you have 
questions or concerns, please do not hesitate to contact me. My phone number is (+ 1) 
211/254-XXX-XXX. 
  
                                                          
38 I would like to speak to the general manager or owner of your enterprise. Proceed to 
questions if interview is granted; if an appointment then: write down the name, date, and 
time of appointment; if you get refusal: note the reason for refusal. 
39 My name is James Alic Garang, a South Sudanese PhD student in the Department of 
Economics, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, USA. I am conducting a research on 
“Access to Finance by Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises” in South Sudan and Kenya. 
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APPENDIX B  
SME SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
Instructions 
This survey is designed to allow you to register your opinions regarding your firm or 
business and its external financing possibilities. Please review each of the following 
statements and circle or register the response that best represents your opinion about your 
organization and the overall financial sector in South Sudan or Kenya.  
1. What is your position in the enterprise? (please circle one only) 
(a) Sole owner 
(b) Joint owner 
(c) Member of management team 
(d) Family member of owner(s) 
 
2. What is the present legal status of the enterprise? please circle one only) 
(a) Sole proprietor 
(b) Private limited company 
(c) Public limited company 
(d) Partnership 
(e) Co-operative 
(f) Other 
 
3. What is the gender of the head of this enterprise? 
                     (A) Male 
                     (b) Female 
 
4. What is name of the ethnic group of the head of the enterprise? 
 
5. How long did it take you to formally start the enterprise? (Just indicate only time 
involved in obtaining licensing or  necessary steps to launch the  business) 
(a) __________ Months  (b) __________ Years 
 
6. How long have this enterprise been in business or operational? 
 
7. How many employees does this enterprise have as of to date?  
 
8. List down the number of years of schooling of the head of this enterprise  
 
9. What sector of the economy best describes your enterprise?  
(a) Retail 
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(b) Business Service (such as haircuts, printing, fuel station, etc) 
(c) Manufacturing ( electronics, chemical industry, etc) 
(d) Wholesale 
(e) Agribusiness (for example, tea growers, coffee processing) 
(f) Construction 
(g) Hotels 
(h) Restaurants/catering 
(i) Repair 
(j) Other sector (Name it) 
 
10. Does your enterprise have any branches or joint ventures located abroad? 
(a) Yes   (b) No 
 
11. If your enterprise has branches abroad, please complete this table. 
Name of the Country List names of Location (s) in the country 
  
 
 
Key Obstacles to Doing Business in South Sudan and Kenya 
12.  To what extent has the lack of formal finance (credit from licensed and regulated 
commercial banks) affected growth of your business?  
Check one only 
  
Major 
Obstacle 
Moderate 
Obstacle 
Minor 
Obstacle 
Not 
Obstacle 
    
 
13. To what extent has the lack of informal finance affected growth of your business?  
Check one only 
  
Major 
Obstacle 
Moderate 
Obstacle 
Minor 
Obstacle 
Not 
Obstacle 
    
 
 
14. To what extent has the lack of microfinance finance affected growth of your 
business?  
Mark one only 
  
Major 
Obstacle 
Moderate 
Obstacle 
Minor 
Obstacle 
Not 
Obstacle 
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15. Which of the following has been the major constraint on your business 
performance since the time it was formed?  Check any that applies by ranking 
them from major to least obstacle. 
 (Mark it) Major 
Obstacle 
Moderate 
Obstacle 
Minor 
Obstacle 
Not 
Obstacle 
Lack of business credit     
High interest rate     
Taxation     
Corruption/rent-seeking     
Too much competition     
Unfair competition from 
foreign owned 
enterprises 
    
Inflation     
Poor infrastructure     
Poor judicial system     
Lack of skilled labor     
Implementing new 
technology 
    
High collateral 
requirements 
    
Bureaucratic constraints 
(licensing requirements, 
reporting, controls, 
health and labeling 
requirements 
    
 
 
16. To what extent has the lack of access to market been a problem to your business? 
Mark one 
only 
  
Major 
Obstacle 
Moderate 
Obstacle 
Minor 
Obstacle 
Not 
Obstacle 
    
 
 
Credit Allocation and Type of borrowers 
To distinguish between use and access (or successful borrowers, non-borrowers, denied 
borrowers and discouraged borrowers) each SME respondent is asked to answer the 
following: 
 
17. Have you ever applied for loans before? 
(a) Yes   (b) No  
 
18. If the answer is yes in “17” above, have you received approval? 
(a) Yes   (b) No 
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19. If you applied and received approval, who was your lender?  
Name of the Lender  (Mark it ) 
Commercial Bank  
Microfinance Institution  
Cooperative Bank or Societies  
Moneylenders/Family 
Members 
 
 
20. What was the reason or use for the loans? Check any that applies to you. 
 
Reason for the loan  (Mark it ) 
Working capital  
Expenditure on stationery/office materials  
Purchases of new equipment  
Own consumption  
Workers’ training/skill upgrading  
 
21. Was the interest on the loan fixed or variable? 
Interest rate  (Mark it ) 
Fixed interest rate  
Variable interest rate  
 
22. If it is a fixed interest rate, what is it? 
Interest rate % 
Fixed interest rate  
 
23. If it is a variable interest rate, what was it then and now? 
 
Interest Rate % 
Variable Interest Rate in the past  
Variable Interest Rate in now  
 
24. For a variable interest rate, what was it based on? 
 
 
25. If the answer to “17” is “No”, then why did the firm not apply for loan? Check 
one only.                                               
 
Reason for not applying  (Mark it ) 
The firm does not need loan  
It does not think it will be approved  
Application procedures are too burdensome  
Collateral requirements are strict  
Interest rates are too high  
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26. If you applied and was rejected, what was the main reason the loan application 
was rejected? Check one only. 
Reason for loan denial  (Mark it ) 
Perceived lack of profitability  
Lack of acceptable collateral  
Inadequate credit history of the firm  
Incomplete application   
 
27. How many commercial banks do you have credit line with?  
(a) None 
(b) only 1 bank 
(c) 2 or 3 banks 
(d) 4 or more  banks 
(e) I do not know 
 
28. How many informal banks do you have credit line with?  
(a) None 
(b) only 1 bank 
(c) 2 or 3 banks 
(d) 4 or more  banks 
(e) I do not know 
 
29. How many microfinance institutions do you have credit line with?  
(a) None 
(b) only 1 bank 
(c) 2 or 3 banks 
(d) 4 or more  banks 
(e) I do not know 
 
30. What is the term for the largest loan you have ever received from any commercial 
bank during the last six years? 
(a) Less than 1 month 
(b) 1 to 6 months 
(c) 6 months to 1 year 
(d) 2 to 4 years 
(e) More than 4 years 
 
31. What is the term for the largest loan you have ever received from any informal 
bank during the last five years? 
(a) Less than 1 month 
(b) 1 to 6 months 
(c) 6 months to 1 year 
(d) 2 to 4 years 
(e) More than 4 years 
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32. What is the term for the largest loan you have ever received from any money 
lenders during the last five years? 
(a) Less than 1 month 
(b) 1 to 6 months 
(c) 6 months to 1 year 
(d) 2 to 4 years 
(e) More than 4 years 
 
33. What is the term for the largest loan you have ever received from any 
microfinance institutions during the last five years? 
(a) Less than 1 month 
(b) 1 to 6 months 
(c) 6 months to 1 year 
(d) 2 to 4 years 
(e) More than 4 years 
 
34. Which of the following forms of information communication technology does 
your enterprise use? More answers are allowed. 
ICT Items  (Mark it ) 
Mobile phones  
Standalone Personal Computers (PCs)  
Email  
Intranet  
Own website  
Fax machines  
Landlines  
 
35. Have any of these people been a source of knowledge/skills for your enterprise? 
Sources of Skills and Knowledge 
for Enterprise 
 (Mark it ) 
Family members  
Independent auditors  
Consultants  
Clients/suppliers  
Trade associations  
Training centers/public 
universities/government authorities 
 
None of the above  
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36. Has your enterprise been involved in any of the following activities? Check any 
that applies. 
Economic Activities  (Mark it ) 
Trade fairs  
Study visits  
Business conferences/Networking  
others  
 
37. When starting this enterprise, where did the initial fund come from? Rank them 
from major to the least obstacle. 
 
Source of initial 
capital 
Major Moderate Minor Not Source 
Commercial banks     
Microfinance     
Moneylenders     
Family members     
Friends     
Personal 
contributions 
    
 
38. For your cash needs, which one do you use the most? 
(a) Withdrawals from ATMs 
(b) Make visits to the banks to withdraw money 
(c) Personal vault, home safekeeping or shop-drawer for all cash 
needs 
 
39. How frequent do you use mobile money transfer service to do these transactions? 
(Skip if these does not apply to your enterprise). Check any that applies. 
Mobile Money 
Transactions 
Major Moderate Minor Never  
Pay employees     
Pay vendors/suppliers     
Pay overhead costs     
Pay taxes     
Pay staff allowances     
 
40. Which of the following statements is true about your business enterprise 
appraisal? 
(a) Managerial competency and adoption of technology are behind the success of 
this enterprise. 
(b) Managerial incompetency and neglect of technology are behind the failure of 
this enterprise. 
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(c) My business is not improving because of unfavorable business climate in 
South Sudan (or Kenya). 
 
41. Which of the following insurance policies do you have? Check any policy that 
you have purchased.  
Type of Insurance Policy  Mark with a tick  
I. Life Insurance  
II. Property Insurance (shop, car, 
land) 
 
III. Theft Insurance  
IV. Fire Casualty   
 
 
42. What other financial services do you want the commercial banks or Central Bank 
of South Sudan or Kenya to provide for your business needs? 
 
 
43. What is your annual employment history over the years? (South Sudan data time 
series runs from 2005 to 2011; Kenya 1991 to 2012. 
Year Number of Paid Employees Per Year Comment 
   
 
44. List down your yearly gross revenue in dollars (time series like in # 43) 
Year Annual Gross Sales in Dollars Comment (optional) 
   
 
45. List the total amount of size loan borrowed in each column (like in # 43): 
 
Year Loan Size Per Year in Dollars Comment (optional) 
   
 
46. Of the total yearly amount of loans received/borrowed, how much is due to each 
institution? (fill in like in # 43) 
Year Loan 
from 
formal 
banks 
Loans from 
Microfinance 
institutions 
Loan from 
Moneylenders 
Loan from 
family 
members 
and friends 
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47. Can you breakdown the total liabilities due to banks and other sources as follows? 
 Terms of the loan structure 
 Short term  
(90 days to 3 years) 
Medium Term 
(3-5 years) 
Long-term 
(6-15) years 
Value $ $ $ 
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APPENDIX C 
  
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COMMERCIAL BANKS 
(Some of these questions were also modified for the interviews for Microfinance 
institutions both for South Sudan and Kenya. I have also removed tables in some 
questions for the sake of space). 
 
1. What is the total estimate of your bank customer base (all accounts) in each of 
these three periods? 
 
Year July 2011 August 2011 March 2012 
Customer /Client Base  
(All Account holders) 
   
 
2. What is your total estimate of SME accounts in each of these three periods? 
Year July 2011 August 2011 March 2012 
SME Accounts Only      
 
3. What is the size of your loan to each SME40 borrower? 
 
 Estimate of minimum loan (ever approved: USD________________ 
 Estimate of Maximum Loan (ever approved): USD_____________ 
 
4. Describe your top five SME borrowers. In addition to serving or not serving 
SMEs, which category of the economy do you serve the most? 
 
5. Which of these 5 C’s do you consider most important when appraising SME 
projects? Rank them accordingly. 
 
 (Mark it) Major 
Factor 
Moderate 
Factor 
Minor 
Factor 
Not 
Factor 
Character of the owners     
Capacity of the firm     
Collateral requirement     
Firm initial capital     
Macroeconomic conditions in 
country 
    
 
6. List some of your customized SME products 
 
                                                          
40 SME stands for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises. In term of size, small business 
has about 5 to 50 employees; medium 51 to 200 employees. 
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7. In what ways are you planning to expand the access frontier especially to SMEs 
and poor borrowers? 
 
8. What role has mobile technology played in terms of helping you to expand access 
frontiers and in reducing horizontal inequality? Are information systems 
developed enough to facilitate lending to SMEs? 
 
9. List the development agencies or institutions you have collaborated or continue to 
partner with in pooling resource and lending to SMEs. 
 
 
10. What is your bank doing to improve the customer service in general, reduce long 
waiting hours at bank premise and to encourage the culture of public savings? 
 
11. What has been the major barrier to extending credit to SMEs? Check only one. 
Obstacles  Mark it 
Lack of collateral  
Lack of profitability  
Limited information  
Illiteracy  
Distance  
 
12. How many branch networks does your bank have in each province in Kenya over 
the years? (Table by province by years from 1991 through 2012) 
                    
 
13. Please fill in the table about the total annual lending to all SMEs and their 
numbers (Period: 1991-2012 in Kenya and 2005-2011 for South Sudan). 
Year Total Annual Loan 
($) to SMEs 
No. of  SMEs served 
Each Year 
 
14. How many ATMs do you have in each province in Kenya over the years? 
           (The Total Number of Live ATMs Per Province Per Year, 1991-2012) 
               
15. How many ATM Cards do you have in each province in Kenya over the years? 
(The Total Number of ATM Cards Per Province Per Year, 1991-2012) 
  
16. How many bank agents do you have in each province in Kenya over the years? 
(The Total Number of Bank Agents Per Province Per Year, 1991-2012)  
 
17. SME Geographical Distribution (those you serve; give a number only) 
Province in Kenya Current Number of 
SMEs 
e.g. Central 5 
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18. How much credit does Government of Kenya owe you? 
 
 Amount: $_________________________________ 
 
19. Nonperforming loan (NPL) and percent due to SMEs and big businesses, 1991-
2011. 
Year Total NPL (%) % of NPL Due 
to SMEs 
% of NPL Due to 
Large Businesses 
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20. Please fill in the following table appropriately; that is fill only the columns that correspond to the name of your bank, for 
example, ABC Bank. 
 
 
Characteristics of Commercial Banks in Kenya, 2011 
 Name of 
Bank 
 Year 
of 
creation 
No of 
Branches 
State share 
(%) 
Public 
share 
(%) 
Total 
assets 
(million 
$) 
Depo
sits 
(milli
on $) 
Loans 
(milli
on $) 
Loan 
/Deposit
s (%) 
Total Current 
Employment 
ABC 
Bank 
(Kenya) 
         
 
 
 
 
 
21.  SME Money Demand through ATM withdrawal and at-the –Bank-Window, 1991-2012. 
Year Central 
Province 
Coast 
Province 
Eastern 
Province 
Nairobi 
Province 
Northern 
Eastern 
Nyanza 
Province 
Rift Valley 
Province 
Western 
Province 
 Teller ATM  Teller Walk Teller ATM Teller ATM Teller ATM Teller ATM Teller ATM Teller ATM 
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22. Do you have excess reserves? If you do, why do banks hold excess reserves 
instead of lending to SMEs? Why is the cost of borrowing high in Kenya for 
SMEs? 
 
23. List the top five things you would like to see happening so as to improve the 
business environment and to enable you to lend to small businesses which are job 
creators (i.e. what would small businesses do in order to help your bank lend to 
them?) 
 
24. What would you like the Central Bank of Kenya to do to improve the business 
climate in Kenya? List at least three of those enabling factors. 
 
25. Which of the following accounts does your bank pay interest on? 
Account Name Check if it applies 
Savings Accounts  
Checking Accounts  
Business Accounts  
Other Accounts (Name them here)  
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APPENDIX D 
 
POLICY QUESTIONS FOR THE CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA 
(The same questions were modified to suit interviews for the South Sudan Central Bank) 
 
1. Is an extension of credit to SMEs by financial institutions (such as commercial 
banks) one of the objectives of the CBK?  
 
2. What is CBK doing to encourage the development of inclusive financial sector 
and to motivate banks to lend to all businesses, more importantly small businesses 
which are the job creators? (I am interested in identifying the barriers to SME 
lending). 
 
3. How and in what practical ways is the role of technology factoring into this 
endeavor of inclusive and financial sector development as well as reduction of 
horizontal inequality? Are information systems developed enough to facilitate 
lending to SMEs? 
 
4. Write the number against each name to indicate their totality in the Kenyan 
Financial Sector. 
S/N Name of the Institution Number Comment 
1 Commercial Banks   
2 Microfinance institutions   
3 Insurance companies   
4 Re-insurance companies   
5 Loan savings and credit associations   
6 Cooperative Banks   
7 Housing/Mortgage Societies   
8 Foreign Exchange Bureaus   
9 Western Union Companies   
10 Dahabshiil Companies   
11 Amal Express Money Transfer 
Companies 
  
10 Moneygram Companies   
11 SACCOs   
 
 
5. Can you also please provide me with the official listing of all exchange bureaus 
operating presently in Kenya as well as their central functions? I also want to ask 
about exchange rate policies and their impact on SMEs. I don't know the current 
situation, but for some time, there were fears that the shilling was overvalued - 
which would add pressures to SMEs competing with imports (but possibly benefit 
other SMEs - e.g. retailers selling imported goods). 
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6. What are your current top 5 challenges in the conduct of monetary policy with 
regard to credit expansion? 
 
7. What financial and monetary lessons can South Sudan learn from Kenya’s long 
innovative experience and inclusive financial sector development initiative? 
 
8. What is the Kenyan experience with agency model banking and is it something 
that you can recommend to South Sudan? 
 
9.  Questions on a few specific issues that could affect credit to SMEs:  
I. What is the current situation with non-performing loans throughout the 
commercial banking sector, since this was a major problem in Kenya in the 
past (and froze a lot of lending)? 
 
II. What about excess reserves held by the commercial banking sector? Do these 
exist? How big are they? Why do banks hold excess reserves instead of 
lending to SMEs? 
 
III. Tell me more about the growth areas of credit expansion. Is credit channeled 
to productive uses, including SMEs? Or is it primarily financing consumer 
spending, real estate investments, etc? 
 
IV. Please comment on the role of SACCOs in financing the smaller-scale end of 
the SME spectrum. 
 
10. Can the Bank also grant me an access to publications giving an overview of the 
banking/financial sector in Kenya or commercial banks /financial sector lending 
to SMEs by sectors and regions? These may give me more information than I 
might gather from interviews with the financial sector in general).
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